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I began my PhD research at the start of what would become the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this period, financial supervisory 
authorities all over the world were criticized for their roles in the crisis. No wonder 
the topic of financial supervisory liability became more visible than ever in media and 
legal literature. One could not have wished for a more opportune time to be writing a 
dissertation on this topic.  
 
This is not the first study to deal with financial supervisory liability. However, it 
addresses several important gaps in our knowledge about this topic. Therefore, I hope 
that this study will contribute to a better understanding of financial supervisory 
liability and in this way contribute to the current debate. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Who does not remember the huge queue of people standing in front of the doors of 
the British mortgage bank Northern Rock in 2007—an image not seen since the crisis 
of 1929—afraid of losing all their money? Or what about the bankruptcy of the bank 
Landsbanki, better known as Icesave, in 2008, resulting in one of the worst economic 
and political crises in Iceland? Both events were part of the financial crisis that hit our 
world in 2007 and 2008, considered by many the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Although the responsibility for the crisis can not be easily 
determined, it is now widely recognized that authorities charged with the supervision 
of banks and other financial institutions played their parts in this crisis (Nolan, 2013).  
 
The De Larosière report (Larosière et al., 2009) mentions, for instance, on page 39: 
“Although the way in which the financial sector has been supervised in the EU has not been one of 
the primary causes behind the crisis, there have been real and important supervisory failures, from both 
a macro and micro-prudential standpoint.” The conclusion of the Treasury Committee of 
the House of Commons (2008) in relation to the role of the British Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) regarding the collapse of Northern Rock is also quite clear. Page 34 
of this report reveals: “In the case of Northern Rock, the FSA appears to have systematically 
failed in its duty as a regulator to ensure Northern Rock would not pose such a systemic risk, and 
this failure contributed significantly to the difficulties, and risks to the public purse, that have 
followed.” More recently, the Commission Evaluation Nationalisation SNS Reaal 
concluded that the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) failed in the supervision of SNS Reaal 
in the period prior to the latter’s nationalization in 2013 (Hoekstra & Frijns, 2014). 
 
Financial supervisory failure will ultimately raise questions about liability. Is it possible 
to hold financial supervisory authorities liable for shortcomings in their performance 
of financial supervision?1 In most European countries, this is indeed the case 
(Dijkstra, 2012). Financial supervisory authorities can be held liable not only by third 
parties, such as depositors, but also by financial institutions subject to their 
supervision (Tison, 2003). By intervening too quickly or too strictly, a financial 
supervisory authority can, for instance, create damage, as such intervention might 
affect the reputation of the financial institution. The financial institution can then try 
to hold the financial supervisory authority liable for the damage caused by this 
unjustified intervention. If, however, the authority acts in too lenient a manner, the 
financial institution can get into serious trouble that can result eventually in its 
                                                 
1 For example: Immediately after the publication (23 January 2014) of the report from the Commission Evaluation 
Nationalisation SNS Reaal, the director of the Association of Shareholders (in Dutch: VEB) mentioned in the media 




bankruptcy. This is likely to cause damage to third parties (investors, depositors, and 
other creditors), for which they will try to be compensated by suing the financial 
supervisory authority. It may be alleged, for example, that the authority, faced with 
indications of problems at the financial institution, should have acted more decisively 
to protect depositors (e.g. Tison, 2003; Athanassiou, 2011; Nolan, 2013). Financial 
supervisory liability is not merely a theoretical possibility. A number of financial 
supervisory authorities in the EU have been sued in recent years by both third parties 
and financial institutions under supervision.2  
 
1.2 Arguments against or in favour of limited financial supervisory liability 
The fact that financial supervisory authorities can be held liable by both third parties 
and the institutions they supervise illustrates the difficult context in which they 
operate. Financial supervisory authorities need to balance conflicting interests, 
especially in the case of financial institutions in distress. On the one hand, they are 
responsible for maintaining the soundness of financial institutions and the financial 
system as a whole; on the other hand, they are charged with protecting depositors and 
other creditors of financial institutions (Tison, 2003). This is often referred to as the 
financial supervisor’s dilemma. It is, therefore, not surprising that the topic of 
financial supervisory liability has been discussed frequently in recent years (e.g. Giesen, 
2006; Van Dam, 2006a; Dempegiotis, 2008; De Kezel et al., 2009; Dragomir, 2010; 
Busch, 2011; Athanassiou, 2011; Nolan, 2013). At the centre of the discussion is the 
question whether financial supervisory liability should be limited or not (Athanassiou, 
2011).  
 
In this discussion, politicians, legislators, and legal scholars use various arguments 
against or in favour of (limited) financial supervisory liability. The starting point of this 
discussion can be retrieved from Diceys conception of the rule of law (Dicey, 1915). 
Under normal circumstances, one would expect that public authorities, and thus also 
financial supervisory authorities, should be treated in the same way as other 
defendants. The fact that a public body is vested with wide responsibilities and limited 
                                                 
2 Well-known cases include “Kechichian” in which the State of France (on behalf of the financial supervision 
authority) was held liable based on the proclaimed deficient financial supervision of the United Banking Corporation 
(Conseil d’État 30 November 2001, AJDA 2002.136) and the “Three Rivers” case, in which the Bank of England was 
held liable by depositors based on the proclaimed failure of the Bank to carry out its responsibilities under the Banking 
Act 1987 in light of the bankruptcy of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (2001, 2 All ER 513). The 
Italian Supreme Court decided in a judgment that the Consob, the public authority responsible for regularing the 
Italian securities market, could be held liable towards investors for its negligence in vetting a prospectus (Corte di 
Cassazione, 3 March 2001, case no. 3132). In the Netherlands, the Insurance Supervisory Authority (now part of the 
Dutch Central Bank) was sued by third parties based on the proclaimed supervisory failure of the authority in light of 
the bankruptcy of the life insurance company Vie d’Or (HR 13 October 2006, LJN: AW2077, C04/279HR). The 
Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission (CNMV) was held liable by investors based on proclaimed supervisory 
failure in light of the bankruptcy of the financial intermediary Gescartera (Tribunal Supremo, No. 5921/2004). 
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resources does not mean that a special immunity should be granted in certain 
circumstances.  
 
This line of reasoning is often supported by the idea that there is a need to hold 
supervisors accountable for their acts or omissions and to give them incentives to act 
in the public interest (Athanassiou, 2011). In this perspective, financial supervisory 
liability stimulates financial supervisors to take adequate care in the performance of 
their supervisory duties (Giesen, 2006; Van Dam, 2006a; De Kezel et al., 2009; Busch, 
2011). This argument is based on the general law and economics notion that tort law 
prevents negligent conduct from happening (e.g. Cooter & Ulen, 2008). 
 
Another argument in favour of applying normal liability rules is compensation. 
Compensation would, of course, be best served without introducing any limitations on 
financial supervisory liability. The argument of compensation does not, however, play 
an important role in the debate. It merely serves as a supportive argument (Giesen, 
2006). A plausible reason for this, amongst others, is the existence of a deposit 
guarantee system as an alternative compensation mechanism. This system provides, to 
a certain limit, compensation for the losses of depositors when a financial institution 
goes bankrupt.  
 
A less frequently used argument is fairness. From a fairness perspective, it is difficult 
to accept that parties can be denied their right to recover compensation for their 
losses from those who have caused them through their wrongful acts, or negligent 
omissions (Athanassiou, 2011). Fairness can, however, also be used as an argument in 
favour of limited financial supervisory liability. One could question whether it is fair to 
expose a party to liability grossly disproportionate to his fault; it is the wrongful 
behaviour of the financial institution that caused the damage in the first place. As both 
views on fairness can be considered compelling, it is not so strange that this argument 
is less decisive in the discussion. 
 
When limiting the liability of their financial supervisory authorities, politicians and 
legislators often refer to the legal situations in neighboring countries. Belgian 
legislators, for instance, referred explicitly to Germany when limiting the liability of 
their financial supervisory authorities to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith in 
2002 (De Kezel et al., 2009). The introduction of a standard of bad faith for the 
supervisory authorities in Ireland was inspired by the situation in the United Kingdom 
(Doherty & Lenihan, 2005), and Dutch politicians referred to the limited-liability 
regimes of neighboring countries when introducing a standard of gross negligence 
and/or bad faith in 2012.3 Politicians are thus using the limited financial supervisory 
                                                 
3 See Dutch Parliament 2011/2012, explanatory memorandum regarding the law on limited liability for DNB and 
AFM, publication 33 058, no. 3, pp. 1-6. 
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liability regimes in other countries as a reason for limiting the liability of their own 
financial supervisory authorities.  
 
Another reason in favour of limited financial supervisory liability is the fear of a huge 
number of damage claims (the “floodgates argument”). This reason assumes that 
applying normal liability rules to financial supervisory authorities would result in a 
dramatic increase in litigation (Giesen, 2006; Athanassiou, 2011). This is most likely to 
happen in the case of bankruptcy of a financial institution. To be fully compensated, 
victims will, in this situation, turn to the ‘deep pockets’ of financial supervisory 
authorities, as bankrupted financial institutions probably do not offer sufficient means 
for compensation. This would then impose a huge financial burden on the State and 
indirectly operate as an undesirable transfer of wealth (Athanassiou, 2011).  
 
Closely related to the floodgates argument is the, frequently used, argument of 
defensive conduct, or in our case, defensive financial supervision (Giesen, 2006). It is 
argued that the huge number of damage claims would have a chilling effect on 
performing effective financial supervision (Delston & Campbell, 2007).4 The fear of 
being held liable is, in this situation, so severe that one starts to act with too much 
caution when dealing with the supervisee. This line of reasoning is not new. Defensive 
conduct is one of the traditional arguments against public authority liability used 
especially in commonwealth countries (e.g. Booth & Squires, 2005; Dari-Mattiacci, 
2010). It is, therefore not surprising that this argument is also being used in the 
context of financial supervisory authorities. 
 
Based on the reasons mentioned above, legislators, politicians and scholars prefer 
either to limit financial supervisory liability or apply normal liability rules (in most 
cases negligence) to financial supervisory authorities. 
 
1.3 This study 
This study revolves around three specific arguments mentioned in the section above, 
namely referring to limited financial supervisory liability regimes, defensive conduct 
and careful financial supervision. These arguments often play a major role in the 
discussion whether or not to limit the liability of financial supervisory authorities. In 
this perspective, the case of the Netherlands is illustrative. The Dutch government 
explicitly referred to limited liability regimes in neighboring countries and the fear for 
defensive conduct when they limited the liability of their own financial supervisory 
authorities to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith in 2002.5  
 
                                                 
4 See also fn 3. 
5 See fn 3. 
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However, when examining these three arguments, it is important to consider the 
theoretical and/or empirical evidence, or lack thereof, that often underpins them. So, 
to what extent do these arguments actually hold true? This question is at the centre of 
my study. Answering this question will provide politicians, legislators and scholars a 
better theoretical and empirical foundation regarding the arguments that do hold true. 
This may support them in their decision making processes regarding whether financial 
supervisory liability should be limited or not.  
 
In order to answer the research question, I will examine five gaps in our knowledge 
that relate to these three arguments. The first gap relates to our knowledge about 
financial supervisory liability regimes in other countries. More specifically, it relates to 
the fact that politicians often refer to the limited liability regimes in neighboring 
countries as an argument for limiting the liability of their own financial supervisory 
authorities. Are these references valid and to what extent is referring to limited 
financial supervisory liability regimes a convincing argument?  
 
The more dominant limited financial supervisory liability is, the stronger this argument 
becomes. In recent years, a number of legal scholars have performed comparative 
research. Andenas and Fairgrieve (2000) compared, for instance, state liability for 
negligent banking supervision in England, France, and Germany. Tison (2005) 
described the financial supervisory liability regimes in Germany, France, Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Luxembourg. In his report “Liability of Regulators”, 
Van Dam (2006a) included country analyses of Germany, Belgium, England and 
Wales, Italy, and France that also described the liability regime for financial 
supervisory authorities. Finally, De Kezel et al. (2009) compared financial supervisory 
liability regimes in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. All these comparative studies include a 
number of EU member states but certainly not all of them. Because of the ongoing 
process of ‘Europeanization’ of financial law and supervision, broader knowledge of 
financial supervisory liability can support both individual member states as well as the 
EU in developing future legislation.  
 
So, what does the liability regime for financial supervisory authorities in the member 
states look like? And is there a dominant financial supervisory liability regime in the 
EU? These questions reflect the first gap in our knowledge about financial supervisory 
liability.  
 
The second gap relates to our (theoretical) knowledge about the deterrent impact of 
financial supervisory liability. In the existing literature, the deterrent effect of financial 
supervisory liability is often described in general terms. Participants in the discussion 
frequently state that financial supervisory liability results in defensive conduct or 
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prevents unlawful conduct from happening.6 In doing so, they seem to refer to 
general, widely used insights from law and economics theories about the deterrent 
impact of tort law. However, the deterrent impact of liability rules can not be 
examined without taking into account the specific context in which the actors, in this 
case financial supervisory authorities, operate. Thus, what are the characteristics of 
this context, and how do they influence the deterrent impact of financial supervisory 
liability? These questions can be considered as the second gap in our knowledge about 
financial supervisory liability. Knowledge of and insight into these characteristics will 
contribute to a better understanding of the most likely behavioural impact of financial 
supervisory liability.  
 
Financial supervisory liability is not the only instrument that, at least theoretically, can 
provide financial supervisory authorities with incentives to behave carefully. It is 
merely one of the many accountability arrangements that govern financial supervisory 
authorities. These arrangements need to ensure that authorities perform their 
supervisory roles with adequate care (e.g. Kane, 1989; Ward, 2002; Schüler, 2003; 
Tabellini, 2008). The impact of financial supervisory liability is, however, often 
discussed without taking into account the role of these other mechanisms. In order to 
evaluate the role of tort law with regard to its deterrent effect, it is also important to 
explore the roles of other accountability arrangements. Depending on the incentive-
generating capacity of these other accountability arrangements, the deterrent impact of 
financial supervisory liability can be considered a more important or less important 
argument. However, we need to be aware that insofar as there are various incentive 
generating mechanisms that might serve as alternatives to liability, financial 
supervisory liability law might have the capacity to interact with those other incentives 
in a beneficial way. For instance, financial supervisory liability can generate publicity 
that stimulates financial supervisory authorities to behave carefully (Schwartz, 1094). 
So, what kinds of accountability arrangements exist? And to what extent are they able 
to provide financial supervisory authorities with incentives to behave carefully in 
comparison with tort law? Examining this knowledge gap will provide us with a 
clearer picture about the relative importance of the deterrence argument. 
 
Financial supervisory liability is often triggered by the bankruptcy of a financial 
institution. People who have suffered damage from a bankruptcy are searching for 
means of compensation and will try to be compensated by holding financial 
                                                 
6 Sometimes, views on the deterrent impact of financial supervisory change. This is nicely illustrated by the changing 
view of Dutch politicians on the impact of financial supervisory liability. While Wouter Bos, the Dutch Minister of 
Finance in the period 2007–2010, favoured applying normal liability rules (negligence) for financial supervisory 
authorities by referring to the preventive effect, his successor, Jan Kees de Jager (2010–2012) prepared the bill for 
limiting the liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities based on the possible chilling effect normal liability 
rules (negligence) have on performing effective financial supervision. This confirms the need for insights in the 




supervisory authorities liable. In this situation, tort law is not the only mechanism 
people can rely on to receive compensation for their losses. Victims of bankrupted 
financial institutions will often receive compensation from a deposit guarantee system. 
This raises some interesting questions. First of all, one could ask to what extent this 
alternative compensation system affects the incentives of depositors, financial 
institutions, and financial supervisory authorities in comparison with tort law. In 
addition, one might ask how this alternative compensation mechanism influences tort 
law itself with regards to its incentive-generating capacity. These questions are seldom 
mentioned when discussing financial supervisory liability and can thus be considered 
to reflect the fourth gap in our knowledge about financial supervisory liability.  
 
In the discussion about whether financial supervisory liability should be limited or not, 
both prevention and defensive conduct are used as arguments. Whether financial 
supervisory liability promotes more-effective financial supervision, encourages 
defensive conduct, or has no significant effect is, however, at heart an empirical 
question. Only empirical research is able to validate the actual impact of financial 
supervisory liability on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities. To my 
knowledge, there is hardly any empirical research regarding the behavioural impact of 
financial supervisory liability. Only Van Dam (2006) and Trebus & Van Dijck (2014) 
have undertaken limited empirical research in this area. Based on a short questionnaire 
and interviews with Dutch financial authorities, Van Dam mentioned, according to 
the statements of the supervisors, there was no indication for defensive conduct. 
Trebus & Van Dijck carried out interviews with employees of the Dutch Financial 
Markets Authority in order to examine the impact  of liability on their behaviour. 
Based on their research they conclude that liability has almost no impact on the 
behaviour of financial supervisors. This limited empirical research can, however, not 
be seen as overwhelming empirical evidence regarding the impact of financial 
supervisory liability. This lack of empirical research is the fifth gap in our knowledge 
that this study will aim to address. 
 
1.4 Structure of this study 
To answer the central research question, I conducted five studies presented in 
Chapters 2-6. Each of these chapters has been published as a separate article. Chapter 
5 has been co-authored by Michael Faure. All these chapters deal with one of the five 
knowledge gaps identified in the previous section. In addition, Chapter 7 presents the 
conclusion of this study. 
 
Chapter 2 Liability of financial supervisory authorities in the European Union 
Chapter 2 appeared in the Journal of European Tort Law (Dijkstra, 2012). It contains an 
overview of third party financial supervisory liability regimes in the EU member 
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states.7 It elaborates on earlier comparative research by adding more countries and 
introducing weighting criteria to reflect the importance of each EU member state. 
Chapter 2 describes the liability regimes of 48 financial supervisory authorities in 28 
member states. In order to do so, I examined legal literature regarding financial 
supervisory liability, national legislation governing financial supervisory authorities, 
and legislation that dealt with the liability of public authorities in general. To 
categorize the liability regimes, I defined five liability categories. In most of the cases, 
national legislation or legal literature clarified in which liability category a financial 
supervisory authority belonged. National experts (legal scholars and members of the 
financial supervisory authorities) were asked to review the outcome of my research. By 
using weighting criteria that reflect the importance of each member state in the EU, I 
was able to compare the use of different liability regimes in the EU. This chapter will, 
therefore, augment our knowledge about financial supervisory liability regimes in the 
EU. 
 
Chapter 3 Liability of financial supervisory authorities: Defensive conduct or careful supervision? 
Chapter 3 appeared in the Journal of Banking Regulation (Dijkstra, 2009). In this chapter, 
I evaluate the role of liability rules in preventing negligent financial supervision, and, 
in particular, I examine the incentive effects of liability rules on the behaviour of 
financial supervisory authorities. In other words, will the application of tort law lead to 
defensive conduct, or is it an adequate mechanism to promote careful financial 
supervision? I start by describing a basic economic model of third party financial 
supervisory liability. This model is derived from law and economics literature and 
shows how tort law, in theory, can encourage financial supervisory authorities to 
exercise careful supervision. Financial supervisory authorities, however, operate in a 
context of specific characteristics that are likely to influence the deterrence impact of 
tort law. Using literature regarding the Dutch financial supervisory authorities, I 
identify these specific characteristics that deviate from the conditions mentioned in 
the basic economic model. Next, I show for all these characteristics whether the 
proclaimed effect of tort law is positively or negatively influenced. Because it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure the exact magnitude of these effects, I make a 
qualitative judgment as to the likely impact of tort law on, in this case, the behaviour 
of Dutch financial supervisory authorities. This chapter thus provides a clearer 
theoretical understanding of the deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability. 
 
Chapter 4 Accountability of financial supervisory authorities: An incentive approach 
Chapter 4 was published in the Journal of Banking Regulation (Dijkstra, 2010). A lack of 
adequate accountability arrangements is often mentioned as a cause for financial 
supervisory failure (e.g. Kane, 1989; Ward, 2002; Schüler, 2003; Tabellini, 2008). This 
                                                 
7 At the time of my research, Croatia (the 28th member state) was not yet a member of the EU. Article 10 of the Act on 
Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, however, limits the liability of the Croatian financial supervisory 
authority to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith (Dijkstra, 2014). 
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chapter, therefore, examines to what extent existing accountability arrangements, 
including financial supervisory liability, can provide incentives for taking adequate care 
in the performance of financial supervision. By using insights from public-choice 
theory and principal-agent theory, I first identify possible conflicts between society 
and financial supervisory authorities that can lead to supervisory failure. Next, I 
examine which consequences may result from being held accountable for this failure 
and whether these consequences provide effective incentives that stimulate financial 
supervisory authorities to pursue the public interest. This chapter thus places financial 
supervisory liability in the broader perspective of accountability for supervisory failure 
and helps to determine the relative importance of the deterrence argument. 
 
Chapter 5 Compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions: A law and economic analysis 
Chapter 5 was co-authored by Michael Faure and published in the Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance (Dijkstra & Faure, 2010). In addition, the paper was presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics (Paris, 23 
September 2010). Financial supervisory liability is not the only mechanism that can 
provide compensation for damages. Therefore, this chapter explores how different 
compensation mechanisms affect incentives for the welfare-improving behaviour of 
all stakeholders involved, namely, depositors, financial institutions, and financial 
supervisory authorities. We identify, by examining legislation and legal literature, the 
different compensation mechanisms depositors can rely on when they face losses as a 
result of the bankruptcy of a financial institution. Next, we perform an economic 
analysis of these mechanisms. With the use of insights from law and economics, we 
make predictions with regard to the incentive effects of compensation mechanisms on 
all parties involved. Furthermore, we show how these mechanisms influence each 
other with regard to their incentive-generating capacity. This chapter helps us to better 
understand the role of compensation mechanisms in relation to incentives for welfare-
improving behaviour. 
 
Chapter  6 Is limiting financial supervisory liability a way to prevent defensive conduct? The outcome 
of a European Survey 
Chapter 6 presents the outcome of an empirical study on the impact of financial 
supervisory liability. This chapter was published in the European Journal of Law and 
Economics (Dijkstra, 2015). The central research question focuses on the likelihood that 
normal liability rules (no-fault and negligence) result in defensive conduct, and, if that 
is the case, to what extent limiting financial supervisory liability (gross negligence and 
bad faith) will prevent defensive conduct from happening. Because objective data on 
the impact of financial supervisory liability is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, I 
adopt the strategy of exploring this impact through the perceptions of financial 
supervisors. In order to do so, I developed an online survey that was sent to senior 
financial supervisors working in 48 financial supervisory authorities in 27 member 
states of the EU. The main part of the survey presents a series of statements, asking 
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respondents to state their opinions about the impact of financial supervisory liability 
by means of a 5-point Likert-type scale. This chapter reports the findings from the 
survey and, therefore, helps to fill the empirical gap in our knowledge about the 
impact of financial supervisory liability. 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusion  
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of this study. This chapter also presents the answer 
to the central research question. In addition, it sets forth some final thoughts 
concerning the answer to the question of whether or not financial supervisory liability 
should be limited that can be drawn from the findings of this study. 
 
1.5 Limitations and terminology used in this study 
Before turning to the different chapters, it is useful to briefly consider main 
limitations, terminology, and more specifically, the meaning of certain terms used in 
this study. In this study, the term “financial supervisory liability” is used to express the 
liability of the institution itself. Individual liability of staff members of the financial 
supervisory authority, therefore, falls outside the scope of this study. The main reason 
for this choice is the fact it is almost always the employer, in our case the financial 
supervisory authority itself, who is being held liable for the actions or omissions of its 
employees (vicarious liability). In addition, the term “normal liability rules” refers to 
liability rules that are formally not limited such as (simple) negligence and rules of no-
fault (e.g. strict liability).  
 
Furthermore, the study focuses only on the third party liability of financial supervisory 
authorities, as this liability category receives the most attention in society. 
Administrative review procedures or liability claims brought by financial institutions 
subject to supervision are, therefore, not covered. It is however worthwhile to notice 
that tighter financial regulation in combination with more strict financial supervision, 
as a result of the financial crisis, is likely to result in more future liability claims from 
financial institutions subject to supervision.  
 
As mentioned earlier, this study examines five gaps in our knowledge that relate to 
three dominant arguments in the debate about financial supervisory liability. By 
examining these gaps, it becomes clear to what extent these three arguments hold true. 
In doing so, this study contributes to a higher quality decision making process 
regarding whether financial supervisory liability should be limited or not. This study 
does however not cover all issues relevant for the underlying policy question of 
limiting financial supervisory liability. The normative issue whether (limited) financial 
supervisory liability is fair or reasonable is, for instance, not investigated in this study 
as such. Some authors point out that exposing a financial supervisory authority to 
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liability grossly disproportionate to his negligence is inherently unfair (Giesen, 2005; 
Squires, 2006). On the other hand, refusing or limiting the victims’ rights to recover 
damages can also be seen as unfair (Athanassiou, 2011). Fairness debates may also 
relate to what can be expected from depositors when they make decisions whom to 
entrust their money with. It is probably not fair to expect from depositors to closely 
monitor their financial institutions. However, a certain responsibility may be expected 
from this group. Whether fairness is used as an argument against or in favour of 
limited financial supervisory liability is often dependent on society’s sense of what is 
fair. At times fairness, justice and reasonableness require greater protection for public 
authorities and at others there should be greater availability of damages for individuals 
who suffer harm (Squires, 2006).  
 
Each chapter adds substantially to our knowledge about financial supervisory liability 
and, more specifically, about the three main arguments used in the debate. However, 
the method followed in this study has some limitations. When categorizing the 
member states, I use relative broad categories of liability and do not go into the 
intricacies of each of the 27 systems (Chapter 2). For a number of member states, 
legal scholars have already discussed the nuances of these regimes (Andenas & 
Fairgrieve, 2000; Tison, 2005; Van Dam, 2006a; De Kezel et al, 2009). This detailed 
knowledge can significantly contribute to understanding what type of intermediate 
regimes can be constructed, or, are preferred when countries obtain more experience 
in case law. However, to examine which member states in the EU have formally 
limited the liability of their financial supervisory authorities, we can use a less detailed 
approach. This approach is also a practical one: one would need substantial resources 
to carry out detailed research for 28 member states. 
 
This study applies the standard law and economics model of profit maximizing 
behaviour in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 (Cooter & Ulen, 2007). The application of this model 
to public authorities is highly debated as these authorities do not pursue a goal of 
profit maximizing. Both Levinson (2000) and Schäfer (2012) argue, for instance, that 
public bodies are more responsive to political incentives than to liability claims and 
reject the application of traditional models of profit maximization to explain the 
behaviour of public authorities. On the other hand, Rosenthal (2006) argues that 
public authority liability reduces the resources available to politicians to pursue their 
favoured political agenda. Hence, there is an incentive to minimize exposure to tort 
claims. Niskanen (1971) suggests finally that the goal of budget maximization will 
replace profit maximization in a bureaucracy, since many of the objectives of a 
bureaucrat (power, prestige and salary) are directly tied to the size of the bureau that 
the bureaucrat oversees (Dijkstra, 2009). As public authority liability imposes some 
(political) costs (direct or indirect via negative publicity) upon public authorities which 
are likely to create some incentives to prevent misconduct, I have chosen to apply the 
profit maximizing model. This is, to my opinion, the most appropriate model to 
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reflect that liability has an impact on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities. 
The extent to which financial supervisory liability does have a deterrent effect, remains 
then to be investigated. 
 
For more specific limitations and/or underlying assumptions of this study, I refer to 
the individual chapters. Every chapter contains information about specific limitations 
and/or assumptions regarding the conducted research. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 were written between 2009 and 2012. During this 
period, the Dutch financial supervisory authorities were subject to a rule of negligence 
(based on article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code). However, as of 1 July 2012, the 
liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities has been limited to cases of 
gross negligence and/or bad faith.8 In order to take this legislative change into 
account, I have included a commentary section at the ends of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
These commentary sections discuss the extent to which this legislative change impacts 
the overall conclusions of these chapters. Chapter 7 takes the changed legal situation 
in the Netherlands fully into account. 
 
This study is of interest to various stakeholders. It should be noted, however, that it is 
written primarily for policy makers, legislators, and (legal) scholars active in the field 
















                                                 
8 See article 1:25d of the Dutch Law on Financial Supervision (Stb. 2012/265). 
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2 Liability of financial supervisory authorities in the 
European Union 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the third party liability of financial supervisory authorities in 
the European Union (EU). Third party liability refers to a third party (e.g. depositors, 
shareholders, or bondholders) suffering damage from a financial institution and 
holding the financial supervisory authority liable on grounds of shortcomings in 
performing its supervisory role. This topic is becoming increasingly important from a 
European perspective due to the ongoing process of ‘Europeanization’ of financial 
law and supervision (Dragomir, 2010; Athanassiou, 2011). Member states are also 
increasingly looking to each other when discussing the topic of financial supervisory 
liability.9 The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the European third 
party liability landscape with regards to financial supervisory authorities and to show 
the relative importance of the different third party liability regimes in the EU when 
taking into account certain weighting factors.  
 
I carried out this research in three steps. First, the different liability categories were 
defined in order to categorise the financial supervisory liability regimes. By examining 
legal literature regarding (European) tort law, five general categories have been 
defined, namely no-fault liability, (simple) negligence, gross negligence, bad faith and 
immunity. These categories are described in detail in the beginning of Section 2.2. 
Next, the national financial supervisory liability regimes are described and categorised. 
The starting point was to identify the existing financial supervisory authorities in the 
different member states followed by a description of their liability.10 In order to do 
this, legal literature regarding financial supervisory liability was examined along with 
national legislation governing financial supervisory authorities and legislation that dealt 
with the liability of public authorities in general.11 In most of the cases, national 
legislation or legal literature clarified in which category a financial supervisory 
authority belonged. Other cases have been categorised to the author’s best knowledge. 
In order to check the description and classification, national experts (legal scholars 
and members of the financial supervisory authorities) were asked to review the 
                                                 
9 For instance, the Dutch Ministry of Finance recently prepared a draft bill in which the liability of the Dutch financial 
supervisory authorities will be limited to cases of bad faith and gross negligence. One of the arguments used by the 
Ministry is the Netherlands’ differing liability regime compared to other countries, specifically Germany, France, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom, which have limited the liability of their financial supervisory authorities. See the 
memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Finance FM 2011/6407M, dated 11 March 2011, regarding limiting the liability 
of financial supervisory authorities. 
10 The description is limited to a general description of the liability regimes; it does not, for instance, include the study 
of relevant case law or a detailed explanation of all requirements needed to hold a supervisory authority liable. 
11 These laws can be found using Lexadin (http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/legis.php). 
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outcome of the research.12 Any inability to identify the applicable liability regime in a 
member state, or lack of response from a national expert, is clearly stated in the text. 
The third and last step of this research consists of a comparative analysis of the third 
party liability regimes by calculating the relative importance of each predefined liability 
category in the EU. This is done by adding up the number of financial supervisory 
authorities that belong to one of the predefined liability categories followed by a 
calculation of the relative share of one category in the total. In doing so three of the 
most common weighting factors that reflect the relative importance of individual 
member states were used, namely one vote per member state, population size and 
gross domestic product (GDP).  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 starts with a definition of the liability 
categories followed by a general description of the third party liability regimes in the 
member states of the EU. In this description, the liability regime is also categorised 
into one or more of the five pre-defined categories. Section 2.3 begins with an analysis 
of the research data of the previous section followed by the calculation of the relative 
importance of each pre-defined liability category in the EU. This section ends with 
some critical reflections on the research. In section 2.4 the conclusions to be drawn 
are outlined. 
 
2.2 Financial supervisory liability in the EU – An overview 
2.2.1 Defining liability categories  
What categories can we define in order to classify the financial supervisory liability 
regimes of the different member states? The first distinction that can be made is 
between liability and immunity, where immunity refers to a situation in which it is not 
possible to hold the financial supervisory authorities liable. But what about a further 
distinction of liability categories? Legal literature makes a general distinction between 
no-fault liability and fault based liability (e.g. Zweigert & Kötz, 1998; European Group 
on Tort Law, 2005; Van Dam, 2006b; Schäfer & Müller-Lander, 2009). 
 
In this chapter no-fault liability refers to liability for unlawful or illegal conduct or 
breach of administrative regulations that does not require negligence or intentional 
wrongdoing. In other words, a plaintiff does not have to prove intent, recklessness or 
negligence on the defendant’s part (Van Dam, 2006b). Because liability requires 
violation of the required (objective) standard of conduct, no-fault liability is not strict 
liability in the classic sense as found, for example, in liability in respect of hazardous 
activities or the control of dangerous things. 
                                                 
12 The various experts are referred to per member state. Their many helpful comments contributed to the quality and 
reliability of this research. Any mistakes are, however, mine. 
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Fault liability is based on both negligent and intentional conduct (Van Dam, 2006b). 
Under a rule of (simple) negligence, the tortfeasor will only be held liable for failing to 
exercise ordinary care. This standard is also called reasonable care or due care, and is 
usually determined by the law and/or by the court (European Group on Tort Law, 
2005). Where there is serious carelessness on the side of the tortfeasor, we speak of 
gross negligence. An actor classified as grossly negligent refers to someone whose 
actions have fallen so far below the ordinary standard of expected care that the label 
‘gross’ is warranted. It relates to conduct or a failure to act that is so reckless that it 
demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for whether damage will result. One stage 
further produces the concept of bad faith. Bad faith or ‘quasi-immunity’ refers to 
intentional wrongdoing by an actor. Someone acts in bad faith when he knowingly 
acts outside the scope of his powers and with the knowledge that this action will likely 
cause damage to third parties. In this chapter I therefore make a distinction between 
no-fault liability, negligence, gross negligence, bad faith and immunity as shown in 
Figure 1.13 The chapter assumes that the conduct giving rise to liability may be that of 




       Figure 1: Liability categories. 
 
                                                 
13 The classification of fault liability into negligence, gross negligence and bad faith regarding financial supervisory 



















2.2.2 Overview  
This section first describes per member state which authorities are engaged in 
financial supervision, secondly how their third party liability is arranged and thirdly to 
which liability category they can be allocated.14 
 
Austria 
Austria has had a single integrated supervisory authority since 2002, when the 
Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde or Financial Market Authority (FMA) was established under 
public law as an independent institution with its own legal personality (European 
Central Bank, 2010).15 Its liability is stated in the Federal Act on the Institution and 
Organization of the Financial Market Authority (FMABG 97/2001). Section 3 para (1) 
of this Act states: 
 
The Federal Government shall be liable pursuant to the provisions of the Amtshaftungsgesetz (Public 
Liability Act, AHG), Federal Law Gazette No. 20/1949, for damage caused by the FMA’s 
bodies and employees in the enforcement of the Federal Acts specified under section 2. Damage as 
defined in the present provision, is such that was directly caused to the legal entity subject to 
supervision pursuant to this federal act. The FMA as well as its employees and bodies shall not be 
liable towards the injured party. 
 
The provision that states that only damage suffered by the legal entities to be 
supervised by the FMA will be considered as ‘damage’ was added by the Austrian 
legislator during the global financial crisis in 2008 (Steininger, 2009). As a result, third 
party liability of the Austrian Federation as well as of the FMA is excluded (immunity). 
 
Belgium 
Since April 2011 financial supervision is carried out by the National Bank of Belgium 
(NBB) and the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA).16 Since reform of 
the supervision structure by the Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and 
on Financial Services 2002, Belgium limits the liability of its financial supervisors to 
gross rather than ordinary negligence (Van Dam, 2006a). Article 68 of this Act, 
together with article 26 (1) section 4 of the Law of 2nd of July 2010, states:  
 
The FSMA and NBB shall carry out their tasks exclusively in the public interest. The FSMA and 
NBB, the members of their bodies and the members of their staff shall not bear civil liability for their 
decisions, acts and conduct in the exercise of the legal tasks of the FSMA and NBB, save in the 
event of fraud or gross negligence. 
 
                                                 
14 The information in this section is correct as of June 2012. 
15 See http://www.fma.gv.at/cms/site/EN/index.html.  




Supervision of the financial sector in this country is performed by two authorities, 
namely the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the Financial Supervision 
Commission (FSC).18 As both of these authorities fall under the description of 
governmental bodies performing administrative functions, their liability for 
shortcomings in their supervisory role is governed by the provisions of the Law on 
the Liability of the State and the Municipalities for Damages.19 Article 1 of this law 
states that ‘the state and the municipalities shall be liable for damages inflicted on 
citizens and legal persons from unlawful acts, deeds or omissions of their bodies or 
officials upon, or on the occasion of, implementation of their administrative 
behaviour’. This means that, in theory, the BNB and FSC, in their capacity as 
governmental bodies, are liable for shortcomings in their supervisory roles if damage 
occurs. The liability provided for under the statute can be categorised as no-fault 
liability: in other words, liability could be established independently of whether the 
state (through its official) has acted intentionally or not. However, unlike the liability 
of the FSC, the liability of the BNB has been limited to actions in bad faith by the 
Law on Credit Institutions 2006. Article 79(8) of this law states that the Bulgarian 
National Bank, its bodies and the persons authorised by them shall not be liable for 




In Cyprus financial supervision is carried out by four institutions, namely the Central 
Bank of Cyprus, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Insurance 
Company Control Service (ICCS) and the Cooperative Societies Supervision and 
Development Authority (CSSD) (European Central Bank, 2010). According to the 
Cyprus Banking Law (No. 66(1) 1997), the Central Bank of Cyprus is liable in cases of 
gross negligence or bad faith. This is based on Part XII, article 32(1) which states:  
 
The Central Bank and any person who is a Director or an officer of the Central Bank, shall be liable 
in any action suit or other legal proceedings for damages for anything done or omitted in the discharge 
of the functions and responsibilities of the Central Bank under this Law or under the Regulations 
issued under this Law, unless it is shown that the act or omission was not in good faith or the result of 
gross negligence. 
 
Insufficient information was available regarding the applicable third party liability rule 
for the SEC, the ICCS and the CSSD. 
 
                                                 
17 I would like to thank Viktor Tokushev for his helpful comments on the topic of financial supervisory liability in 
Bulgaria. 
18 See http://www.bnb.bg/BankSupervision/index.htm and http://www.fsc.bg/?l=english. 




Supervision of the financial market in the Czech Republic is performed by an 
integrated supervisory authority, namely the Czech National Bank (CNB).21 The 
banking legislation does not provide any explicit provision regarding the liability of the 
CNB. Therefore its liability is based on the State Liability Act.22 According to articles 3 
and 13 of this Act, the State (including all public authorities) is primarily liable for any 
damage caused by unlawful decisions or improper administrative actions by a legal 
entity or person in the course of executing public authority on the State’s behalf. 
Supervision by the CNB clearly constitutes an exercise of public authority. The State is 
therefore liable for any damage caused to third parties as a result of any unlawful 
decision or improper administrative action of the CNB carried out in the exercise of 
its public authority. In theory, the liability standard is relatively low since it is based on 
no-fault liability. However, in practice, the substantive laws play an important role as 
there is no clear definition of what constitutes improper conduct (or supervisory 
failure). As a result, and despite several cases against the State for the unlawful 




In Denmark, supervision over the financial sector is performed by a single supervisor, 
namely the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA). The DFSA is part of the 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. There are no specific provisions regarding 
the liability of the DFSA in Danish law. Its liability is therefore based on general 
liability rules as stated by the Danish courts as the Danish statute book contains no 
general provision on the liability in damages of public authorities. The Danish rules on 
public liability in damages for tortious acts and omissions originate from the general 
principles of civil law on liability in damages.24 Liability is thus based on ‘culpability’ 
(negligence). It is impossible to give a comprehensive definition of 'culpability'. The 
acts or omissions of public authorities must be judged in the context of each particular 
case. In some cases, a slight error is sufficient to establish liability, while in others 
serious error must be proved. Public authorities can be made liable both for the failure 
of the administrative machinery and for the acts of their servants or agents acting 
within the scope of their duties. To date, no cases of financial supervisory liability 
have been brought before the Danish courts. Consequently, Danish courts have not 
                                                 
20 I would like to thank the Czech Central Bank, Jiří Hrádek and Zdeněk Kudrna for their help in describing the 
situation in the Czech Republic. 
21 According to article 44 of the Act No. 6/1993 Coll. on the Czech National Bank. 
22 See Act No. 82/1998 Coll. on liability for damage incurred in the course of the exercise of public powers through a 
decision or incorrect procedure. 
23 I would like to thank Vibe Ulfbeck, Niels Vase and Troels Bay Simonson for their helpful comments regarding the 
Danish situation. 
24 In a 1943 judgment, the Danish Supreme Court stated that central government is liable for damage caused in the 
exercise of statutory powers. Regarding the liability of public authorities in Denmark, see also the report of Paul 
Hoyrup, Judge of the Supreme Court, at http://www.juradmin.eu/en/colloquiums/colloq_en_07.html. 
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In Estonia supervision of the financial markets and financial institutions is performed 
by the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA). The liability of the EFSA is 
addressed in § 58 of the Financial Supervision Act 2001 (RT I 2001, 48, 267) which 
states that ‘[t]he liability of the Supervision Authority for rights violated or damage 
caused in the conduct of financial supervision, and the bases of and procedure for the 
restoration of violated rights and the payment of compensation for damage caused 
shall be provided by law.’ This article refers to the State Liability Act 2002 (RT I 2001, 
47, 260). Paragraph 13(3) of the State Liability Act states that ‘a public authority shall 
be relieved of liability for damage caused in the course of performance of public 
duties if the damage could not have been prevented even if diligence necessary for the 
performance of public duties had been fully observed’. Based on this paragraph and 
the comments from the experts, it follows that the EFSA will only be liable towards 
third parties in cases of actions or omissions made in bad faith. However, to date, the 
EFSA has not yet been subject to claims by third parties. Thus, there is no court 
practice to validate this assumption.  
 
Finland 
Since 1 January 2009, the Finanssivalvonta or Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FIN-FSA), is responsible for the supervision of Finland’s financial sector. 
Administratively the FIN-FSA operates in cooperation with the Bank of Finland.26 
Section 69 of the Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority states that the Bank of 
Finland shall be liable for any damages arising from an error or omission of the 
Financial Supervisory Authority as provided in the Tort Liability Act. Chapter 3 
section 2 paras 1 and 2 of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974) states that a public 
corporation shall be vicariously liable in damages for injury or damage caused through 
an error or negligence in the exercise of public authority. The same liability shall also 
apply to other corporations that perform a public task on the basis of an Act, a 
Decree or an authorisation given in terms of an Act. This liability only arises, however, 
if the performance of the activity or task, in view of its nature and purpose, has not 






                                                 
25 I would like to thank Anu Kõve (legal department of the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority) and Kadri Siibak 
(University of Tartu) for their help regarding the applicable liability regime of the EFSA. 




Since reform at the beginning of 2010, financial supervision in France has been carried 
out by two institutions, namely the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel (ACP) and the Autorité 
des Marchés Financiers (AMF).27 Both institutions have no legal personality and are part 
of the French government. As a result, third parties must hold the State liable for 
damage caused by the two supervisory authorities. No specific legal rule exists to 
address their liability. Therefore, normal rules regarding governmental liability apply. 
The supreme administrative court of France has determined that a governmental 
supervisory body can only be held liable in cases of gross negligence (e.g. Andenas and 
Fairgrieve, 2000; Dempegiotis, 2008; De Kezel et al., 2009). 
 
Germany 
The German financial supervisory authority, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(BaFin), is an independent public law body. Its liability is based on § 839 Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code, BGB). Under this article the government can only be 
held liable by third parties when the task of the government consists in protecting the 
individual interests of those third parties. To reduce the possibility of individual claims 
against the supervisory authority, the German government stated, in § 4(4) 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz (Financial Services Supervision Act), that BaFin 
performs its financial supervision only in the general public interest. As a result, in the 
absence of a specific and targeted duty of care, BaFin is immune from claims by third 
parties (e.g. Andenas and Fairgrieve, 2000; Dempegiotis, 2008; De Kezel et al., 2009). 
 
Greece28 
Since 2011 financial supervision has been carried out by two public authorities, namely 
the Bank of Greece (BoG) and the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission (HCMC). 
There are no specific provisions in Greek law regulating the (third party) liability of 
these financial supervisors. Third parties may thus hold the institutions liable for 
shortcomings in their supervisory role based on article 914 of the Greek Civil code 
read in conjunction with articles 105 and 106 of Greek Law 2783/1941. Article 105 
states:  
 
The State shall be liable and shall pay compensation for illegal acts or omissions of State bodies in the 
course of exercise of state authority appointed to them, unless the act or omission was in breach of a 
provision intended to benefit common interest. Without prejudice to special provisions regarding the 
                                                 
27 The ACP was formed through the merger of existing licensing and supervisory authorities that supervised the bank 
and insurance industries (the Commission Bancaire (Banking Commission), the Autorité de Contrôle des Assurances et des 
Mutuelles (Insurance and Mutual Insurance Societies Supervisory Authority), the Comité des Établissements de Crédit et des 
Entreprises d'Investissement (Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Committee) and the Comité des Entreprises d'Assurance 
(Insurance Companies Committee). See European Central Bank (2010). 
28 I would like to thank Tsolakidis Zafeiris, Eugenia Dacoronia, Sotiris Dempegiotis and Vera Lazaridi for their help in 
describing the Greek situation. 
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liability of ministers, the liable natural persons serving in the State bodies shall be liable jointly and 
severally with the State.  
 
In addition, article 106 states that ‘the liability in the previous article shall apply with 
regard to the liability of municipalities, communities and other legal entities of public 
law in respect of acts or omissions of bodies operating under their management’. The 
HCMC (Law 1969/1991) is a legal entity of public law and therefore falls directly 
within the scope of articles 105 and 106. The BoG is a legal entity of private law. 
However, due to the fact that the BoG acts as both a commercial bank and a 
supervisor (exercising State authority) it is considered as a ‘legal person of mixed 
character’ by Greek jurisprudence. It is therefore subject to articles 105 and 106 of 
Greek Law 2783/1941 as well. Based on article 105, it would appear that the 
applicable criterion to establish third party liability is an illegal act or omission in the 
course of exercise of state authority, in our case, financial supervision. The criterion 
‘illegal act or omission’ falls under the category of no-fault liability.29 
 
Hungary30 
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) is responsible for the 
supervision of the financial sector in Hungary (European Central Bank, 2010). Due to 
the fact that there is no specific law dealing with the liability of the HFSA, its third 
party liability is based on the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959. Section 349 (1) of this 
code states that ‘liability for damages caused within the jurisdiction of government 
administration shall be established only if the damage can not be abated by common 
legal remedies or the aggrieved person resorts to the ordinary legal remedies for the 
abatement of damages’. Section 339 (1) provides the general rule regarding the 
applicable liability criterion, namely, that ‘a person who causes damage to another 
person in violation of the law shall be liable for such damage. He shall be relieved of 
liability if he is able to prove that he has acted in a manner that can generally be 
expected in the given situation’. The latter sentence implies the applicable standard of 
care. Based on these sections it seems that the liability of the HFSA is based on a 
negligence rule. However, while there have been several cases in the past where 
consumers sued the HFSA for negligence committed during supervision, the liability 
of the HFSA was not established in any of them. 
 
Ireland31 
With effect from 1 October 2010, the Central Bank Reform Act created a new single 
unitary body – the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) – responsible for both central 
                                                 
29 See also article 914 of the Greek Civil Code according to which a person who through his fault has caused in a 
manner contrary to the law prejudice to another shall be liable for compensation. 
30 I would like to thank Laszlo Seregdi for his helpful comments regarding the Hungarian financial supervisory liability 
regime. 
31 I would like to thank Eoin Quill and the Central Bank for their help with describing the Irish situation. 
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banking and financial regulation.32 The new structure replaced the previous related 
entities, the Central Bank and the Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) 
and the Financial Regulator. With regard to the third party liability of the CBI for 
actions or omissions in its supervisory role, the following can be mentioned: 
section 33AJ of the Central Banking Act is the relevant statutory provision which 
deals with the liability of the CBI (previously the CBFSAI). This section provides that 
the CBI ‘is not liable for damages for anything done or omitted in the performance or 
purported performance or exercise of any of its functions or powers, unless it is 
proved that the act or omission was in bad faith’. Therefore, the CBI is only liable in 
cases of bad faith (Doherty & Lenihan, 2005).  
 
Italy33 
Italy has four financial supervisory authorities, namely the Bank of Italy, the 
Supervisory Authority for Private Insurance and Undertakings and Insurance 
Undertakings of Public Interest (Isvap), the Supervisory Authority for Pension Funds 
(Covip) and the National Commission for Listed Companies and the Stock Exchange 
(Consob). The liability of these authorities is outlined in article 24(6) of the Law 28 of 
December 200534 and states that ‘in supervising financial activities the Authorities 
listed by subsection 1 (Banca d’Italia, Consob, Isvap and Covip) as well as the 
Antitrust Authority, their employers and staff are held responsible for damages caused 
by gross negligence or intention’. It is worth mentioning that before this amendment, 
the (third party) liability of financial supervisory authorities was based on the general 
rule of tort law stated in article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code, which provides for a 
negligence liability rule (e.g. Rossi, 2003; Scarso, 2006). 
 
Latvia 
Since 2001, the Financial and Capital Market Commission (Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus 
komisija, FKTK), an autonomous public institution, has been responsible for 
supervision over the Latvian financial sector. Its liability has been established in the 
Law on Credit Institutions. Article 111(6) of this Law states:  
 
The Financial and Capital Market Commission is responsible for damage caused to a third party by 
the Financial and Capital Market Commission’s actions in fulfilling its statutory functions only in 
the case where the Financial and Capital Market Commission has deliberately acted unlawfully or 
with gross negligence.  
 
Based on this article, the FKTK can be placed in the ‘gross negligence’ category. 
 
                                                 
32 See Central Bank Reform Act (NO. 23/2010).  
33 I would like to thank Elena Bargelli for her help in describing the Italian situation. 




Since 2012, the Bank of Lithuania (BoL) has been responsible for supervision over the 
financial sector in Lithuania.36 Article 46¹ (1) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania 
1994 (No. I-678 as last amended by No. XI-557) states:  
 
The damage caused by the illegal actions of the Bank of Lithuania or Bank of Lithuania staff in 
relation to the performance of the supervisory function of credit institutions and payment institutions 
shall be reimbursed only in the case where the person who has suffered the damage proves the Bank of 
Lithuania or Bank of Lithuania staff guilty of such damage.  
 
The objective criterion ‘illegal actions’ indicates a no-fault liability rule. One should 
notice, however, that there has been no case law in Lithuania in which the (past and 
present) Lithuanian financial supervisory authorities have been held liable. 
  
Luxembourg 
All financial intermediaries and markets in Luxembourg are under the supervision of 
the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), which commenced its activities 
on 1 January 1999, except for the insurance sector, which is under the jurisdiction of 
the Commissariat aux Assurances (CAA). The third party liability of the CSSF is outlined 
in article 20(2) of the Law Creating a Commission for the Supervision of the Financial 
Sector (1998). This article states that third parties can only hold the CSSF liable when 
the damage is caused by gross negligence (une négligence grave) on the part of the CSSF. 
Third party liability of the CAA is based on article 24 of the Law on the Insurance 
Sector (1991). Under this article the State is responsible for the actions taken by the 
CAA and third parties can only hold the State or the CAA liable in cases of gross 
negligence (une négligence grave). 
 
Malta 
The Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) is the sole supervisor for financial 
services in Malta. Paragraph 29 of the Malta Financial Services Act (Act XXXIV 1988) 
limits the liability of the MFSA to acts in bad faith: The Authority, the Board of 
Governors, the Coordination Committee, the Supervisory Council, the Board of 
Management and Resources, the Legal Office and the officers and employees of the 
Authority shall not be liable in damages for anything done or omitted to be done in 
the discharge or purported discharge of any function under this Act, unless the act or 
omission is shown to have been done or omitted to be done, as the case may be, in 
bad faith. 
 
                                                 







The Financial Market Authority (AFM) and the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) are 
responsible for financial supervision in the Netherlands. Because there is no specific 
law dealing with the liability of these supervisory authorities, liability is based on 
normal tort rules, specifically article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Section 1 of this 
article states that ‘a person who commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another 
person that can be attributed to him, must repair the damage that this other person 
has suffered as a result thereof’. An unlawful act is defined (section 2) as ‘the violation 
of a right and an act or omission breaching a duty imposed by law or a rule of 
unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct’. Jurisprudence and publications on 
the topic of financial supervisory liability clearly indicate that the standard for financial 
supervisors is ‘reasonable care’. But what is meant by reasonable care? The Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands pointed out in the Vie d’Or case that, in order to determine 
whether financial supervision complies with the standards of reasonable care, all 
circumstances of the individual case have to be taken into account.37 These 
circumstances include the ‘nature’ of financial supervision, the fact that financial 
supervisors have discretionary powers in order to fulfil their supervisory duties, and 
the fact that financial supervisors face the difficult task of taking into account both the 
interests of the supervised institutions and individual consumers (the supervisor’s 
dilemma). The applicable liability criterion for the DNB and AFM is therefore 
negligence (Giesen, 2005; Dijkstra, 2009; Busch, 2010).38 
 
Poland39 
Poland has two authorities that perform financial supervision, namely the Polish 
Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) and the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The 
liability of these two authorities is dealt with in the Act of Financial Market 
Supervision of 26 July 2006. Article 33(6) of this Act formulates the following 
amendment to the Act on the National Bank of Poland (August 1997):  
 
Article 133.4 shall read as follows: The Financial Supervision Authority, the National Bank of 
Poland and the persons responsible for carrying out banking supervision activities shall have no 
liability whatsoever for damages resulting from any action or omission connected with the exercise of 
supervision by the Financial Supervision Authority over the activities of banks, branches and 
representative offices of foreign banks, branches of credit institutions and the exercise of supervision, 
pursuant to the provisions of the Electronic Payment Instruments Act of September 12th 2002, over 
                                                 
37 See sections 3.8–3.12 of the conclusion of A-G Timmerman with regards to the outcome of the Vie d’Or case 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 October 2006, No. C04/279HR). 
38 As this chapter was originally published in 2012 it does not take into account the change of legislation that took 
place in the Netherlands as of 1 July 2012. As of that date, the liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities 
was limited to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith. See also Section 2.5 of this chapter. 
39 I would like to thank Ewa Bagińska and Katarzyna Ludwichowska for their help in describing the financial 
supervisory liability regime in Poland. 
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electronic money institutions and branches of foreign electronic money institutions, where such action or 
omission is compliant with statutory regulations.  
 
Liability of the PFSA and NBA is thus based on their non-compliance with statutory 
regulations; in other words, their ‘unlawfulness’. Based on this wording alone it is 
difficult to categorize the liability, and one thus needs to look further. Due to the fact 
that performing financial supervision can be considered exercising public authority, 
the liability of the PFSA and NBP can be based on the general rule on liability for 
damage caused by the exercise of public authority as stated in article 417 of the Polish 
Civil Code. Article 417 § 1 states that ‘liability for damage caused by illegal action or 
omission in the course of exercise of public authority rests with the State Treasury, a 
local authority or other legal person who exercises authority conferred upon it by law’. 
In order for liability to arise, it is sufficient that the public authority’s conduct is illegal 
(contrary to law). This means that liability for damage caused by the exercise of public 
authority is independent of fault.40  
 
Portugal41 
Currently, three authorities supervise the financial sector in Portugal: the Banco de 
Portugal (Central Bank of Portugal, BdP), the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários 
(Securities Market Commission, CMVM) and the Instituto de Seguros de Portugal 
(Portuguese Insurance Institute, ISP). There are no specific rules regarding the (third 
party) liability of these authorities. Article 22 of the Constitution of Portugal 1976 
states:  
 
The State and other public bodies are jointly and severally liable under civil law for the members of 
their organs, their officials, and their staff members, for actions or omissions in the exercise of their 
functions or caused by such exercise which results in violations of rights, freedoms, or safeguards or in 
damage to another party.  
 
Law No. 67/2007 of 31 December 2007 deals more specifically with the liability of 
the State and other public entities. Since the above mentioned supervisory authorities 
can be considered public entities, as they are exercising public authority (performing 
financial supervision), their liability is based on this law, or, more particularly, on 
article 7 which states that ‘[t]he State and other legal public persons are solely 
responsible for any damage that results from unlawful acts or omissions, by the 
holders of its organs, officials or agents, in the exercise of administrative function.’ In 
addition, article 7(3) states that:  
                                                 
40 Besides this no-fault regime, the liability of the Polish financial supervisory authorities can also be based on a fault-
based liability criterion as stated in art 415 of the Polish Civil Code. In such an action non-compliance with statutes 
would typically amount to negligence (objective standard of fault as applied to professionals).  




The State and other legal public persons are still responsible when the damage has not been the result 
of the specific conduct of a public organ, official or agent, or when it is not possible to prove the 
personal act or omission, but when the damage must be attributed to an abnormal functioning of the 
authority.  
 
Based on the latter article, we can conclude that the applicable liability criterion for the 
Portuguese financial supervisory authorities is negligence. 
 
Romania 
Supervision over the Romanian financial sector is performed by three authorities, 
namely the National Bank of Romania (NBR), the National Securities Commission 
(Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare, CNVM) and the Insurance Supervisory 
Commission (Comisia de Supraveghere a Asigurarilor, CSA). Each of these authorities is 
categorised as an autonomous administrative authority with a legal personality. 
Despite several attempts to gather information about the liability of these authorities, 




In Slovenia there are three main national financial supervisory authorities: the Bank of 
Slovenia (responsible for bank institutions), the Slovenian Securities Market Agency 
(responsible for investment firms) and the Insurance Supervision Agency (controlling 
insurance companies, intermediaries and agents). As there are no specific provisions 
dealing with the liability of these financial supervisory authorities, their liability is 
based on the Slovenian Code of Obligations (No. 001-22-117/01). Article 131(1) of 
the Code states that ‘any person that inflicts damage on another shall be obliged to 
reimburse it, unless it is proved that the damage was incurred without the culpability 
of the former’. Article 135 defines culpability as a case where damage was caused 
intentionally or by negligence without further explanation of either of these elements 
of fault.  
 
Slovakia43 
Since 2006 the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) has been the single integrated 
financial supervisory authority responsible for the supervision over the Slovakian 
financial sector. Regarding the third party liability of the NBS, article 43(1) of the Act 
on Supervision of the Financial Market No. 747/2004 Coll (as amended) states that 
‘liability for damage caused by the National Bank of Slovakia during the exercise of 
public authority within the scope of supervision of the financial market shall be 
stipulated by a separate law’. This law refers in turn to Act No. 514/2003 Coll on 
                                                 
42 I would like to thank Vida Hočevar and the Securities Market Agency (ATVP) for their helpful comments regarding 
the Slovenian situation. 
43 I would like to thank Anton Dudlak of the NBS for his help with describing the situation in Slovakia. 
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Liability for Damage Caused during the Exercise of Public Authority, article 4(1)(g) of 
which states that ‘the Slovak State is liable for all possible claims arising due to damage 
caused by activities performed by the NBS in the exercise of its supervisory tasks 
(“maladministration”)’. Article 9(1) defines the concept of maladministration as the 
breach of obligations of a public authority to take action in exercising its public 
authority. Based on the above mentioned articles, a rule of no-fault can be considered 
the applicable liability criterion. 
 
Spain44 
The Spanish supervisory system includes, in total, three institutions (European Central 
Bank, 2010): the Banco de España (Bank of Spain), the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores (National Securities Market Commission) and the Dirección General de Seguros y 
Fondos de Pensiones (General Insurance and Pension Funds Directorate). There are no 
specific legal provisions regarding the liability of the above mentioned supervisory 
authorities. As they are all public bodies subject to the Act on the Legal Regime of 
Public Administrations and General Administrative Procedure of 1992 (LRJAP),45 
their liability is based on the rules of State liability. Article 139 of the LRJAP states 
that ‘individuals are entitled to compensation from the State regarding damages that 
are the result of the normal or abnormal functioning of public services’. The liability 
of the financial supervisory authorities in Spain can therefore be classified as ‘no-fault’. 
However, it is important to notice that their liability goes beyond the objective liability 
for unlawful or illegal conduct that is found in other countries in this category.46 Thus, 
the State is liable unless the victim is expected to endure the damage or no causal link 
can be found between the public body’s conduct and the victim’s harm. There are 
currently some important pending claims regarding recent financial scandals involving 
State authorities and public bodies. In the case Afinsa/Forum Filatelico, several decisions 
of the Audiencia Nacional exonerated CNMV, Bank of Spain and the Ministry of 
Economy from liability.47 However, appeals against these decisions will come before 
the Supreme Court over the next few years. 
 
Sweden48 
Since 1991, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (SFSA), or Finansinspektionen, 
has been the single integrated supervisory authority responsible for supervision over 
the Swedish financial sector (European Central Bank, 2010). The SFSA is a 
government central administrative authority that falls under the Swedish Ministry of 
Finance. Since no specific rules exist regarding the liability of the SFSA, its liability is 
based on the Swedish Tort Liability Act of 1972 (1972:207). Chapter 3, section 2 of 
                                                 
44 I would like to thank Jordi Ribot Igualada for his help regarding the Spanish situation. 
45 Law 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de régimen juridico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común. 
46 The liability of the Spanish financial supervisory authorities can be considered ‘strict’ in the classic sense.  
47 See for instance http://www.tradersnarrative.com/a-sad-end-for-the-afinsa-fraud-saga-3625.html. 
48 I would like to thank Mårten Schultz for his remarks on the Swedish situation. 
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this law stipulates that the Government or a municipality is liable for damages caused 
by public bodies through the negligent exercise of public authority. Thus, when it 
comes to the liability of public bodies (in our case the SFSA), the general liability 
criterion of negligence (culpa) applies.  
 
United Kingdom 
Since 2000, the supervision of the financial sector in the United Kingdom has been 
performed by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA is an independent 
public law body and its liability is dealt with in the Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA) of 2000 (2000 c 8). Schedule 1 para 19 of the FMSA limits the liability of the 
FSA to ‘acts in bad faith’ as well as acts that breach Convention rights incorporated 
into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (1998 c 42). As a result, the FSA can 
be regarded as falling in the ’bad faith’ category (e.g. Proctor, 2002; Proctor, 2004; 
Booth and Squires, 2005; Singh, 2007). It is worth mentioning that the liability of 
predecessors of the FSA was limited to cases of bad faith by specific legal provisions 
contained in the Financial Services Act 1986 (1986 c 60) and the Banking Act 1987 
(1987 c 22) (Tison, 2003).49 
 
2.3 Comparing the third party liability regimes 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, a comparison is made between the third party liability regimes of the 
financial supervisory authorities in the member states of the EU. The comparison of 
liability regimes can take place on various levels. In practice, since comparing more 
countries comes at the expense of less information per country, the level of 
comparison is less detailed than it might otherwise have been. As the scope of this 
research covers all the member states of the EU, only a quantitative comparison 
(numerical measurement) has been performed by calculating the relative importance 
of each pre-defined liability category in the EU. 
 
2.3.2 Data analysis 
In this chapter the legal rules concerning third party liability from 48 different 
financial supervisory authorities in the 27 member states of the EU have been 
examined. It was not, however, possible to find sufficient information on one member 
state, namely Romania (which has three financial supervisory authorities). 
                                                 
49 As per 1 April 2013, the Financial Services Act 2013 (FSA 2013) came into force, abolishing the FSA with effect 
from this date. Its responsibilities were then split between two new authorities (the Prudential Regulation Authority 
and the Financial Conduct Authority) and the Bank of England. Schedule 4 para 14 of the FSA 2013 limits the liability 
of these institutions to ‘acts in bad faith’ as well as acts that breach Convention rights incorporated in English law by 
the Human Rights Act 1998.  
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Furthermore, data was only available for one of the four financial supervisory 
authorities in Cyprus. The data in this research therefore reflect 42 supervisory 
authorities (or 88% of all member state supervisory authorities) while it fully reflects 
the third party liability situation in 25 member states (or 93%).  
 
When we take a closer look at the data from the 42 financial supervisory authorities, 
we find that 21 supervisory authorities (50%) are governed by specific liability rules. 
‘Specific liability rules’ refers to the idea that national legislation contains specific 
provisions which address the liability of supervisory authorities. In most cases, these 
provisions introduce limitations to third party liability by introducing a standard of 
gross negligence (applied to ten supervisory authorities), bad faith (applied to four 
supervisory authorities) or immunity (applied to one supervisory authority). Regarding 
the six other supervisory authorities, the provisions contain a reference to general 
liability rules. Regarding these latter cases and the cases where no specific legal 
provision exists (total of 27 financial supervisory authorities),50 it was more difficult to 
determine which liability standard applied.  
 
As described above, legal literature was used to determine the applicable liability 
standard. In this way it was possible to determine the liability standard of five51 of the 
27 financial supervisory authorities. To determine the liability standard of the 
remaining 22 financial supervisory authorities, national laws that deal with 
governmental liability or the liability of public authorities were examined. In order to 
review the outcomes of the research, empirical research was conducted in terms of 
which at least one national expert per member state (legal scholars or members of the 
financial supervisory authorities) was consulted. The outcomes of the research are 
summarised in detail in Appendix 1 of this study. 
 
2.3.3 Comparing third party liability regimes 
In order to compare the third party liability regimes, a quantitative analysis of the data 
from section 2.2 was made. The first step was to add up the number of supervisory 
authorities per liability category followed by a calculation of the weight (in percentage 
terms) of each category. This numerical measurement is based on the assumption that 
every member state has equal weight (one vote per member state). One could 
question, however, whether this is a fair reflection of the relative importance of each 
member state within the EU. It seems more appropriate to use some kind of 
weighting factor. Weighting the importance of member states can be effected by using 
various criteria. The most commonly used criteria to measure the relative importance 
of member states are population size and gross domestic product (GDP), which are 
                                                 
50 Excluding the six financial supervisory authorities for which it was not possible to find sufficient information. No 
specific liability provision exists for these cases either. 
51 These five are: AMF and ACP (France), Bafin (Germany), AFM and DNB (Netherlands). 
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thus used in this analysis. For a detailed outcome of this analysis, readers should refer 
to Appendices 2, 3, and 4 of this study. Table 1 gives a comprehensive overview of 
the outcome based on the mentioned criteria. 
 




 ('one vote per member state') 
Based on population 
size 
Based on GDP 
No-fault 24% 24% 16% 
Negligence 26% 12% 14% 
Gross negligence 19% 28% 32% 
Bad faith 17% 14% 15% 
Immunity 7% 18% 23% 
Unknown 6% 4% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
What can we conclude from Table 1? First of all, it shows that there is no common or 
single dominant third party liability regime for financial supervisory authorities in the 
EU. Negligence (26%) is the most common used liability rule when taking into 
account ‘one vote per member state’, while gross negligence (28% and 32%) is the 
most frequently used liability rule when taking into account population size and GDP. 
But there is no single liability rule with an overwhelming impact in the EU.  
 
In the discussion regarding financial supervisory liability, the central question is 
whether financial supervisory authorities should be held liable at all and, if so, under 
what conditions and subject to what limitations (Athanassiou, 2011). From a 
European perspective, the answer to the first question seems to be positive as the 
majority of the financial supervisory authorities can be held liable (see Table 2). 













Table 2: Liability versus immunity. 
Category 
Equally weighted  
('one member state, one 
vote') 
Based on population 
size 
Based on GDP 
Liability 86% 78% 76% 
Immunity 7% 18% 23% 
Unknown 6% 4% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
The second part of the question, namely, under what conditions and subject to what 
limitations should financial supervisory authorities be held liable, is a bit more difficult 
to answer. If we consider the categories of gross negligence, bad faith and immunity as 
more or less formal limitations of liability compared to no-fault and negligence, the 
following table appears: 
 
Table 3: Limited third party liability versus non-limited third party liability. 
Category 
Equally weighted 





Based on GDP 
No-fault 24% 24% 16% 
Negligence 26% 12% 14% 
Non-limited third party liability 50% 35% 29% 
Gross negligence 19% 28% 32% 
Bad faith 17% 14% 15% 
Immunity 7% 18% 23% 
Limited third party liability 44% 60% 70% 
Unknown 6% 4% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
From Table 3, it becomes clear that there is a big difference between applying the 
equally-weighted criterion and using the other two weighting criteria. Using the 
criterion of ‘one member state, one vote’ results in a figure of 44% for limited third 
party liability and 50% for non-limited third party liability. From this perspective, 
limited third party liability is not dominant in the EU. However, if we apply the 
weighting criteria population size or gross domestic product, the outcome is different. 
In the case of population size, limiting third party liability has a weight of 60% 
compared to a weight of 35% for liability non-limited. When using gross domestic 
product as a weighting criterion, the difference becomes even bigger: 70% for ‘limited’ 
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and only 29% for ‘non-limited’. So when we apply these weighting criteria, limited 
third party liability can be considered dominant in the EU. This is mainly due to the 
impact of the third party liability regimes in France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
2.3.4 A critical note 
One should be careful in interpreting this research. Limited third party liability in this 
research means that (1) a more severe liability standard is introduced (gross negligence 
or bad faith) or that (2) it has been made impossible for third parties to hold the 
financial supervisory authority liable (immunity). Compared to ordinary negligence or 
no-fault liability, these severe additional standards are indeed limitations. However, the 
behavioural standard (negligence, gross negligence or bad faith) for supervisory 
authorities is just one of the requirements for holding them liable. Other requirements 
are, in general, the existence of damage and a causal relationship between the damage 
and the behaviour of the tortfeasor. The exact borders between the different fault 
liability categories, especially between negligence and gross negligence, are also 
difficult to define in practice.  
 
The interpretation of the behavioural standard and other requirements will often 
differ amongst the member states due to their historical and cultural backgrounds and 
their policy views as to what can be considered fair, just and reasonable. In practice, 
this can result in a greater or lesser tendency to impose liability on the financial 
supervisory authorities. Member states can also limit the impact of third party liability 
by imposing a liability cap; in that case, the compensation that financial supervisory 
authorities are obliged to pay when being found liable is set to a fixed maximum 
amount. As the liability regimes have not been examined in detail in this chapter, the 
outcome of this research provides only a general indication of the importance of the 
different liability categories in the EU. In order to provide a more accurate overview, 
more in-depth research would need to be carried out at member state level. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The topic of financial supervisory liability is becoming increasingly important from a 
European perspective due to the on-going process of ‘Europeanisation’ of financial 
law and supervision. It is therefore interesting to see how the current liability 
landscape regarding financial supervisory authorities looks. The outcome of such 
research could be a starting point for further debate regarding financial supervisory 
liability, both at a national as well as a European level.  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the national supervisory third party liability 
arrangements in the EU and showed the relative importance of the liability categories 
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when taking into account ‘one vote per member state’, population size and gross 
domestic product as weighting factors. From this analysis, it becomes clear that most 
financial supervisory authorities can, formally, be held liable by third parties. Only two 
member states, Germany and Austria, grant immunity to their financial supervisory 
authorities. There exists, however, no common approach to financial supervisory 
liability; none of the individual liability categories has a dominant representation in the 
total. When taking into account the weighting criteria population size or gross 
domestic product, limited third party liability (consisting of gross negligence, bad faith 
or immunity) seems to be more dominant in the EU compared to non-limited third 
party liability (no-fault or negligence based liability). 
 
It is, however, important to note that this research did not examine all the 
requirements for holding a financial supervisory authority liable nor did it involve a 
detailed study of the relevant jurisprudence. The outcome of the research therefore 
provides only an indication of the relative importance of the different liability 
categories in the EU. In order to obtain a more accurate overview, in-depth research 
will need to be carried out for each member state. 
  
2.5 Commentary 
As this chapter was originally published in 2012 it does not take into account the 
change of legislation that took place in the Netherlands as of 1 July 2012. As of that 
date, the liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities was limited to cases of 
gross negligence and/or bad faith.52  
 
Furthermore, as of 1 July 2013, Croatia became the 28th member state of the 
European Union.53 Financial supervision in Croatia is carried out by the Croatian 
National Bank (CNB) and the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency 
(HANFA). The liability of the CNB is arranged in article 8(2) of the Act on the 
Croatian National Bank. This article states that the Croatian National Bank, the 
members of the Council, and employees of the Croatian National Bank shall not be 
liable for any damage that may arise in the course of exercising supervision and 
oversight unless the damage has been caused intentionally or by gross negligence. A 
similar provision has been included in Article 10 of the Act on the Croatian Financial 
Services Supervisory Agency. As a consequence, the liability of the Croatian financial 
supervisory authorities is limited to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith. 
 
                                                 
52 See article 1:25d of the Dutch Act on financial supervision. 




What does the change in Dutch legislation and the additional member state mean for 
the outcome of this chapter? Table 4 presents a comparison. The columns ‘Before 1 
July 2012’ show the outcome of the original research, while the columns ‘After 1 July 
2012’ show the outcome including the change of legislation in the Netherlands and 
the inclusion of Croatia. 
 
Table 4: Comparing the liability categories before and after 1 July 2012 
Category 
Equally weighted 
Based on population 
size 
Based on GDP 
Before   1 
July 
2012 
After    1 
July 
2012 
Before   1 
July 
2012 
  After  1 
July 
2012 






No-fault 24% 23% 24% 23% 16% 15% 
Negligence 26% 21% 12% 8% 14% 9% 
Non-limited third party 
liability 
50% 45% 35% 32% 29% 24% 
Gross negligence 19% 26% 28% 32% 32% 37% 
Bad faith 17% 16% 14% 14% 15% 15% 
Immunity 7% 7% 18% 18% 23% 23% 
Limited third party 
liability 
44% 49% 60% 64% 70% 75% 
Unknown 6% 6% 4% 4% 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 4 makes clear that the change of legislation in the Netherlands and the inclusion 
of Croatia in the analysis does not significantly influence the overall outcome as 
presented in this chapter. From an equally weighted perspective, the balance has 
shifted from non-limited third party liability towards limited third party liability. As 
this shift is relatively small, limited third party liability still can not be considered 
dominant from this perspective. However, when applying population size and GDP as 






3 Liability of financial supervisory authorities: Defensive 
conduct or careful supervision? 
3.1 Introduction 
Should financial supervisory authorities be liable to third parties if they conduct their 
supervisory tasks in a negligent manner? In light of the recent financial crisis, this 
question seems to be more relevant than ever. The answer differs however, between 
the member states of the European Union. A number of countries, including the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, France and Hungary, submit their financial 
supervisory authorities to normal liability rules (Tison, 2003). On the other hand, 
countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland and Estonia, have statutory immunities in 
place to protect their financial supervisory authorities from being sued.54 In other 
jurisdictions, it has been explicitly recognised that a supervisory authority owes his 
duties to the public as a whole, and not to individual investors. In the absence of a 
specific and targeted duty of care, the supervisory authority can not be liable for the 
loss of deposits in this type of case (Proctor, 2002; Proctor, 2004).55 It is important to 
note that all these protections are in line with the recommendations of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). 
 
But why do these countries have such different views? In order to understand these 
different views, we have to take a closer look at the underlying arguments. The need 
for financial supervisory authority protection seems to be based on the chilling effect 
or defensive conduct that even the threat of litigation can have on the performance of 
a financial supervisory authority’s work. It has been suggested that imposing liability 
would inhibit the effective operations of a financial supervisory authority, thus leading 
to an allocation of resources to unnecessary and wasteful practices aimed at averting 
litigation (e.g. Tison, 2003; Proctor, 2004; Booth & Squires, 2005; Singh, 2007; 
Delston & Campbell, 2008). On the other hand, submitting financial supervisory 
authorities to normal tort rules can be based (at least to a large extent) on the 
preventive function of tort law, in which the threat of being held liable gives financial 
supervisory authorities an incentive to perform the tasks assigned to them with 
(greater) care (e.g. Shavell, 2005; Van Dam, 2006a; Giesen, 2006; Boom, 2006; 
Visscher, 2008).56 As a consequence, these incentives will lead to a situation where the 
                                                 
54 See for example Schedule 1, section 19(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FMSA) 2000 (United 
Kingdom), article 4 (2-3) Financial Supervision Authority Act (FSAA) and article 58 FSAA in combination with article 
13 (3) of the State Liability Act (Estonia), section 25A Central Bank of Ireland Act 1997 (Ireland). The term immunity 
seems to indicate that these financial supervisory authorities can not be sued at all. However, this is not the case. 
Exceptions to this immunity are formed by acts of omissions in bad faith (see for instance Schedule 1, section 19(3) 
FMSA 2000 for the UK situation). 
55 This refers to the concept of ‘relativity’ or ‘proximity’. 
56 Besides tort law there are also other instruments which, in theory, could give financial supervisory authorities  
incentives for taking (greater) care. Examples of these instruments are public law, criminal law and threat of reputation 
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primary injurer (the supervised financial institution) also causes fewer losses, since the 
financial supervisory authority will require more care from the primary injurer so as to 
avoid liability (Giesen, 2006).57 In this manner, tort law could lead to more careful 
financial supervision. 
 
The obvious question that arises is which view on the liability of financial supervisory 
authorities is the most likely to occur? The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the role 
of liability rules in preventing negligent financial supervision, and in particular, to 
examine the incentive effects of liability rules on the behaviour of financial 
supervisory authorities. The central question of this chapter focuses on the most likely 
effect of tort law on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities. In other words, 
will the application of tort law indeed lead to defensive conduct, or is it an adequate 
mechanism to regulate financial supervisory authorities? To answer this research 
question, I focus only on the third party liability of financial supervisory authorities. 
This kind of liability will often come in view following the insolvency or bankruptcy 
of a financial institution (Tison, 2003).58  
 
Debtors, for example, who have not been able to fully recover their claims out of 
bankruptcy, or after reimbursement by the deposit guarantee or investor 
compensation system, may try to get compensation from financial supervisory 
authorities by holding them liable on grounds of shortcomings in their supervisory 
role (Tison, 2003). This act seems like a rather obvious move, considering that 
financial supervisory authorities, as part of the government, have deep pockets and 
therefore form a good alternative (compared with a bankrupted financial institution) 
to provide compensation for losses. As stated before, we need to examine the impact 
of tort law on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities to answer the central 
question of this chapter.  
 
To do this, I use a positive economic analysis. This kind of economic analysis tries to 
predict the incentive effects of liability rules on the behaviour (the chosen level of 
care) of, in this case, financial supervisory authorities, and is therefore a suitable 
analysis tool.59  
                                                                                                                  
loss. 
57 It is important to notice that not all accidents will be avoided due to the presence of tort liability. While it was never 
meant to deter accidents entirely, tort law is aimed to lessen the number and severity of accidents that would otherwise 
occur. 
58  This type of liability occurs most frequently and receives a lot of media attention. Examples include Vie d’Or, Befra, 
Van der Hoop (The Netherlands), BCCI (UK) and Banque Phocéenne (France). 
59 Positive economic analysis has to be distinguished from a normative economic analysis. The latter goes one step 
further and makes policy recommendations based on the consequences of various policies. The key concept for 
normative analysis is efficiency. However, in this chapter, I give no recommendations based on the outcome of my 
positive economic analysis. My only goal is to show the readers, from a theoretical point of view, the most likely 
impact of tort law on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes a basic economic model of 
third party supervisory liability. This model is derived from common law and 
economics literature and shows how tort law, in theory, can encourage supervisors to 
exercise careful supervision. This part presents a good understanding about the basic 
law and economic analysis of tort law. However, this basic model uses relatively 
simple assumptions, which are not in accordance with the real world in which 
financial supervisory authorities operate. Financial supervisory authorities operate in a 
context with specific characteristics that are likely to influence the deterrence impact 
of tort law. 
 
Section 3.3 will examine these specific characteristics more closely. The Dutch 
financial supervisory authorities will be used as an example for identifying these 
characteristics.60 With the use of literature regarding Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities, I shall identify the specific characteristics which deviate from the 
conditions mentioned in the basic economic model. For all of these characteristics, I 
show, with the use of law and economics literature, whether the proclaimed 
deterrence effect of tort law is positively or negatively influenced. From this analysis, it 
becomes clear whether a characteristic leads to under-deterrence, over–deterrence, or 
has a neutral effect. However, the magnitude of these effects is not clear. Because it is 
very difficult (if not impossible) to measure the exact magnitude of these effects, a 
qualitative judgement will be made to obtain the most probable impact of tort law on, 
in this case, the behaviour of Dutch financial supervisory authorities.  
 
Section 3.4 contains the conclusion, in which the central question of this chapter is 
answered from a law and economics perspective. 
 
3.2 A basic economic model of third party financial supervisory liability 
3.2.1 Why do we have financial supervisory authorities? A short economic 
background 
Before entering into a detailed analysis of financial supervisory liability, I will first 
provide a general economic background regarding financial supervisory authorities 
and their liability. The first question that arises is why financial supervisory authorities 
are needed at all. The answer to this question can best be described by the term 
market failure.61 Financial markets, like many other markets, are influenced by market 
imperfections (Heremans, 2000). A good example of such market imperfection is the 
information asymmetry between financial institutions and their customers. Individual 
consumers lack the knowledge, information and time to assess the solvability of 
                                                 
60 Many of these characteristics will also apply to other financial supervisory authorities in Europe. 
61 A lawyer being asked the same question would probably answer ‘consumer protection’. 
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financial institution themselves. Even if individual consumers would be able to do 
this, it would not be efficient for them. Therefore, specialised institutions engaged in 
the task of supervision would be more effective. Another market imperfection is 
caused by so called ‘externalities,’ which are not internalized by financial institutions. 
When I say externalities, I am referring to the following: Financial markets and 
institutions are much more interconnected and characterized by ‘herd behaviour’ 
compared with other sectors of the economy. Bankruptcy of one institution may easily 
spill over to others and endanger the whole financial system, as has been the case of 
recent times (Heremans, 2000). Individual financial institutions do not take these 
externalities into account. As a consequence, they are likely to engage in riskier 
strategies compared to situations in which they would take these externalities into 
account. 
 
To overcome the above mentioned causes of financial market failure, the government 
can use a number of instruments. One important instrument is regulation. Financial 
markets are considered to be the most regulated markets in the world. Regulation can 
be seen as an instrument giving financial institutions incentives to behave in line with 
regulation. The question of who monitors compliance with the regulation must also 
be answered. It is not likely that individual consumers are capable of doing this, given 
the already mentioned lack of knowledge, time and information. Therefore, financial 
supervisory authorities are established to monitor financial institutions. They have 
more knowledge, time and instruments than individual consumers to adequately 
monitor these financial institutions. Furthermore, given the importance of the 
financial markets for the overall economy, so called safety nets are also needed, 
namely Lender Of Last Resort (LOLR) and deposit insurance systems (Heremans, 
2000; Singh, 2007). These governmental instruments can, however, lead to moral 
hazard problems. In providing alternative safety nets, it tempts financial institutions to 
pursue high risk investment strategies at the expense of the government. Also, when 
they are covered by deposit insurance, depositors have fewer incentives to monitor 
and discipline financial institutions themselves. As a consequence, government safety 
nets help solve risk problems, but only by creating other problems. Another factor 
impacting the incentives for financial institutions is the fact that a lot of these 
institutions are ‘too big to fail’. By this I mean the idea that the collapse of these 
financial institutions would have such a huge impact on the (world) economy,  
governments would likely intervene in order to avoid such a breakdown. Knowing the 
government will intervene, these large financial institutions may pursue riskier 
strategies. To overcome these problems, interventions by regulation and supervision 
are necessary (Heremans, 2000). 
 
3.2.2 Financial supervisory liability: An economic perspective 
Having discussed the main reasons for the existence of financial supervisory 
authorities, it is now time to focus on their liability with regard to third parties. From a 
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law and economics perspective, the liability of the primary wrongdoer, in this case the 
supervised financial institution, is most efficient. Why? This actor is in the best 
position to prevent damages (De Mot, 2001). So, why then, should we hold financial 
supervisory authorities liable? The economic answer to this question is that tort law 
does not always give the most efficient incentives to supervisees. There are two main 
reasons for this inefficiency. First, the threat of tort law for potential injurers is not 
always severe. Losses for the individual victim may be so small that the costs of a suit, 
including opportunity costs, would make it too expensive or too much trouble to sue. 
The second reason can be found in the so called ‘judgment proofness’ of the potential 
injurer (Giesen, 2006). An injurer is often not a solvent party and, thus, frequently 
judgement proof. Faced with liability, the actor is not able to put up the total cost of 
liability if forced to pay, and he knows this well in advance. As a consequence, the 
potential injurer does not take into account the full costs of his behaviour, leading to a 
level of precaution that lies beneath the required level. 
  
It becomes clear that tort law does not always give potential injurers sufficient 
incentives to behave carefully. As such, we need other mechanisms for creating such 
incentives. One solution is the use of supervisory authorities. Through financial 
supervision, the supervised financial institution gets an incentive to behave carefully, 
as deviant behaviour will be punished by the financial supervisory authority. However, 
this leads to one important question, namely, who regulates the financial supervisory 
authority? Like all other actors in society, financial supervisory authorities should also 
have incentives to perform the tasks assigned to them with care. In theory, tort law 
can give such an incentive. The threat of being held liable could give the financial 
supervisory authorities incentives to make optimal use of their instruments in order to 
prevent unlawful conduct by the supervised financial institutions. Financial 
supervisory liability is, in this way, justified by the fact that these authorities also need 
some kind of incentive to act carefully. How does this mechanism work in theory? 
What conditions have to be met in order to achieve this kind of incentive from tort 
law? And, more importantly, does it work?  
 
The following sections will outline a basic economic model of financial supervisory 
liability which clarifies how the deterrent impact of tort law works. The first step in 
analysing the impact of tort law on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities is 
the description of a basic economic model which predicts the incentive effects of 
various liability rules under a set of assumptions.62 The next step is to identify and 
examine the specific characteristics of financial supervisory authorities which are likely 
to influence the deterrent impact of tort law. Relaxing some of these assumptions, and 
to replace them with the identified characteristics, may lead to a more realistic model 
                                                 
62 The basis economic model of tort law is mainly derived from Cooter & Ulen (2007). 
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and, as a consequence, to better insights and a more accurate outcome. The latter is 
done in Section 3.3 of this chapter. 
 
3.2.3 Financial supervisory liability 
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter focuses on third party financial 
supervisory liability which arises from the bankruptcy of a financial institution. An 
important characteristic of this kind of liability is the fact there are three actors 
involved (instead of two), namely the supervised financial institution, the consumer 
















Figure 2: Third party financial supervisory liability. 
 
The supervised financial institution plays an important role because financial 
supervisory liability will only arise when consumers incur damage from the unlawful 
behaviour of a financial institution; in this case, the behaviour which led to the 
bankruptcy of the financial institution. As a consequence, the liability of financial 
supervisory authorities is not only dependent on a breach of their own duty of care, 
but also on the fact of whether the supervised financial institution caused damage to 
their customers. The bankruptcy of a financial institution can therefore be seen as the 
trigger for suing the financial supervisory authority.  
 
 
                                                 
63 Notice that this is the situation in which a financial institution goes bankrupt. Other forms of third party liability are 
not dealt with in this chapter. 












3.2.4 Basic model 
In describing a basic economic model of third party financial supervisory liability, we 
have to make some essential assumptions. The first assumption is that the probability 
of unlawful behaviour by a supervised financial institution, which will be denoted as p, 
decreases with increases in the care level (quality) of supervision by the financial 
supervisory authority, which I denote as S.64 In other words, financial supervision 
leads to a smaller chance that financial institutions subject to supervision will behave 
unlawfully and cause damage (Tison, 2003). This assumption is, in my opinion, rather 
obvious, since reducing unlawful behaviour from the side of financial institutions is 
one of the main arguments for having financial supervisory authorities. For the 
purpose of my analysis, it is also assumed that unlawful behaviour by a financial 
institution leads (in the end) to its bankruptcy and, as a consequence, to a certain 
amount of damage for the consumer (debtor).65  
 
Let D denote the monetary value of damage from the bankruptcy. D multiplied by p 
equals the expected monetary damage. Like p(S), the expected harm, p(S)D, is a 
decreasing function of care S. Increasing the level of care decreases the probability of 
a tort occurring at a diminishing rate. Thus, taking care also offers benefits of damage 
prevention. However, the crucial concept of care is that it possesses the characteristic 
of being costly; taking care costs money. In fact, more care leading to a better quality 
of supervision can only be achieved at higher costs. So the next assumption I make in 
my basic model is the fact that careful financial supervision costs € m per unit. To 
keep it simple, it is assumed that m is constant and does not change with the amount 
of supervision S. The line mS, equal to the total amount spent on careful financial 
supervision, is therefore a straight line. Now, the total social costs of accidents can be 
defined as the sum of the cost of careful supervision (mS) and the cost for expected 
damage (p(S)D). This can be denoted as SC = mS + p(S)D. See Figure 3 for a 
graphical illustration of the basic model. 
 
                                                 
64 Note that not only the quality of supervision, but also the amount of supervision, reduces the risk that financial 
institutions cause damage through unlawful behaviour. In this chapter, I assume that the total amount of supervision is 
stable and that the quality of supervision is a variable that can be influenced. 
65 Notice that unlawful behaviour does not always lead to instant damage. Suppose a bank does not comply with the 
applicable prudential regulation. In the short term, it is unlikely that this will cause damage to their clients. However, 





  Figure 3: A basic economic model of financial supervisory liability. 
 
In Figure 3, the expected social costs of accidents are obtained by adding up the line 
mS and the curve p(S)D. The result is the U-shaped curve, which I labelled SC = mS 
+ p(S)D. The minimum of SC, corresponding with the value of S*, represents the 
level of careful supervision that minimizes the social costs. In other words, S* can be 
seen as the socially efficient level of careful financial supervision, where the marginal 
costs of taking care equal the marginal benefits of taking care; or, put differently, 
where marginal costs of care equal marginal benefits of damage prevention. At this 
efficient level of care, the total costs for society – made up of costs of damage plus 
costs of care – are minimised. But how can this desired level be reached using liability 
rules?  
 
3.2.5 Third party financial supervisory liability: incentives for careful 
supervision? 
In general, we can choose between rules of no liability, strict liability and negligence-
based liability to achieve the incentives needed to obtain the efficient level of 
supervision. These liability regimes have, in theory, different impacts on the behaviour 
of financial supervisory authorities. It is obvious that a rule of no liability (or 
immunity) gives no incentives to financial supervisory authorities to take efficient 
care.66 In this situation, other mechanisms should provide the financial supervisory 
authorities with the necessary incentives. On the other hand, this rule gives consumers 
a stronger incentive to take more care in selecting their financial institution because 
there is no alternative manner to get compensation. 
 
Now, one must consider the situation in which supervisory authorities face strict 
liability. Strict liability of financial supervisory authorities implies that whenever third 
parties face damage resulting from the unlawful behaviour of financial institutions, the 
financial supervisory authority must pay for these damages. Under this rule, the 
                                                 
66 See for a more detailed explanation Cooter & Ulen (2008). 
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financial supervisory authority has an incentive to minimize the costs that he or she 
bears. Consequently, the supervisory authority chooses S to minimize mS + p(S)D. 
This minimum occurs at the level of supervision denoted as S*, where the financial 
supervisory authority’s marginal cost of precaution equals the resulting reduction in 
the expected cost of harm. Thus, a rule of strict liability gives supervisory authorities 
an incentive for efficient supervision. But what about the incentives for the other 
parties involved? With a strict liability rule for financial supervisory authorities, the 
financial institution receives no incentives from tort law, most likely resulting in more 
risk taking behaviour.67 Financial supervisory authorities should prevent such a 
situation from happening. Furthermore, under a strict liability rule, third parties do not 
receive incentives from tort law. This could result in more careless behaviour on the 
side of the consumer, especially when choosing a suitable financial institution. Thus, 
despite the fact that a rule of strict liability creates proper incentives for financial 
supervisory authorities, it should still not be utilized when we take the negative side-
effects into consideration. 
  
A negligence rule, on the other hand, can give all parties involved incentives for 
careful behaviour. Under a negligence rule, actors have to comply with a legal standard 
of care in order to avoid liability. The applicable standard of care for financial 
supervisory authorities is denoted as S˚. So, when financial supervisory authorities act 
beneath the level S˚, the reasonable care or due care, they are held liable, while a level 
equal to or above S˚ leads to no liability (see Figure 4). The basic model assumes that 
the requested level of care is set at a level of care that is equal to the socially optimal 
level (S˚ = S*). Furthermore, it is assumed that this level is ex ante precisely known by 







    
   Figure 4: Liability and the duty of care. 
 
In theory, this leads to careful financial supervision. A financial supervisory authority 
will not choose a supervision level above the level of care S*. This is because any care 
in excess of the standard would be more costly without reducing the costs of 
compensation, since due care is enough to be non-liable. In addition, he would not 
choose a level below due care, because then he runs the risk of bearing the total 
amount of expected damages. Thus, from the basic model of financial supervisory 
                                                 
67 Under the assumption that the financial supervisory authority may not or is not able to recover (a part of) the 
damages from the financial institution. 




liability, it becomes clear that under a negligence rule, financial supervisory authorities 
receive proper incentives in order to perform their supervisory tasks with adequate 
care.  
 
3.3 Preventing negligent financial supervision through liability rules? 
3.3.1 General 
From the basic economic model of supervisory liability, it becomes clear that tort law, 
particularly a rule of negligence, can play an important role in generating incentives in 
order to achieve more careful financial supervision. So, it is obvious that a lot of 
lawyers use the deterrent effect of tort law as an argument in favour of (financial) 
supervisory liability.68 But is this basic model accurate enough to predict the effect of 
liability on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities? This part examines to 
what extent specific characteristics of the context in which financial supervisory 
authorities operate influence the deterrent impact of tort law and, as a consequence, 
the behaviour of the financial supervisory authorities. The context of the Dutch 
financial supervisory authorities is thereby used as a starting point. From various 
publications regarding Dutch financial supervisory authorities, I have come up with 
six specific characteristics which I will examine in detail (Tison, 2003; Giesen, 2006; 
Van Dam, 2006). These are: the behavioural model of financial supervisory 
authorities, the duty of care, damage, guarantee systems, safeguard clauses and 
insurance. Most of these characteristics also apply to other European financial 
supervisory authorities. 
 
3.3.2 Behavioural model of financial supervisory authorities 
We have seen that, from a law and economics point of view, tort law gives, in theory, 
a party an incentive to take an efficient level of care. To be able to do so, we obviously 
need a theory on behaviour. Without understanding and being able to predict the 
behaviour of an actor, it is impossible to know how to give them incentives in an 
effort to change their behaviour in a manner we would judge preferable. Thus, the 
prediction of the effect of a liability rule is very sensitive to assumptions about the 
underlying behavioural model (Spitzer, 1977). The basic economic model used the 
standard model of profit maximizing behaviour, which is commonly used in 
traditional law and economics analysis.69 This model applies well to private companies. 
These companies are generally constrained to produce at minimum average cost in 
                                                 
68 Nowadays, almost every lawyer is familiar with a basic knowledge of law and economics and, as a result, with the 
possible deterrent impact of tort law on the behaviour of various actors. As a consequence, lawyers often use these 
insights in their publications without a detailed understanding of the underlying mechanisms. 
69 The underlying model refers to the ‘Homo Economicus’. People will act egoistically rational in that they will 
minimize the costs they are faced with in order to maximize their wealth. 
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order to maximize their profits. Faced with liability, they will take optimal care in 
order to avoid being held liable and experience a decrease in profits. But what about 
public authorities? Applying the profit maximizing model to a public authority seems 
to be more difficult. In general, public authorities do not pursue a goal of profit 
maximizing and, as a consequence, are not motivated by the desire to maximize 
profits (Kramer & Sykes, 1987; Rosenthal, 2006). Furthermore, the budget constraint 
of the State or public authority is not directly comparable to the ones of private 
companies or individuals (Roosebeke, 2006). When public authorities, for example, do 
not react to economic incentives at all, a ‘no liability’ rule or statutory immunities are 
optimal from a law and economics perspective (Cohen, 1990). Thus, we have to be 
careful in applying the standard model of profit maximizing behaviour to public 
authorities without a better understanding of the underlying behavioural model.  
 
When we take a closer look at the behavioural models of public authorities, there are 
both maximizing (“rational-actor”) and non-maximizing varieties (Spitzer, 1977). A 
maximizing model assumes that the governmental entity has a goal and is trying to do 
its best to achieve that goal, while this maximizing behaviour is not assumed in the 
non-maximizing model. The most important maximizing model of governmental 
behaviour was developed by Niskanen. He suggests that the goal of budget 
maximization will replace profit maximization in a bureaucracy, since many of the 
objectives of a bureaucrat (power, prestige, and salary) are directly tied to the size of 
the bureau that the bureaucrat oversees (Niskanen, 1971). But what about financial 
supervisory authorities? Financial supervisory authorities are public authorities and 
part of the governmental infrastructure of a country. It is obvious that they do not 
pursue a goal of profit maximizing, as their main goals consist of reducing financial 
market imperfections to establish confidence in financial markets. However, to fulfil 
these goals, financial supervisory authorities need some kind of budget that however 
can not be unlimited, considering the government has a lot of other goals to fulfil. 
Hence, financial supervisory authorities face, to a certain degree, a budget constraint, 
and shall try to maximize their budgets according to the theory of Niskanen. 
Furthermore, the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities is not only affected by 
budget maximizing behaviour, but also by minimizing political costs. Governmental 
liability, and thus financial supervisory liability, creates a political incentive to invest in 
adequate care to keep taxes low and avoid unnecessary government expenditures 
(Rosenthal, 2006). In response, I assume that the assumptions underlying the profit-
maximizing model can also be applied to financial supervisory authorities. In other 
words, from an economic point of view, financial supervisory authorities shall try to 
maximize their budget and, therefore, try to prevent getting sued by third parties.70 A 
                                                 
70 An important assumption is that the potential impact of liability claims (in % of their total budget) is big enough to 
motivate them in taking adequate care. Cohen (1990) showed in his article that legal liability costs are often not a major 
concern to any particular department in determining its budgetary estimates. Actual legal exposure never exceeds 0.2% 
of a departmental budget. 
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way to accomplish that outcome is to take adequate care while performing their 
supervising tasks. 
 
It is also important to notice that neither financial supervisory authorities nor financial 
institutions commit harmful acts – people do. Supervisory liability involves the 
imposition of liability on the organization itself due to the harmful act of the 
employees. But making the public organization liable, in this case the financial 
supervisory authorities, may fail to provide its employees with sufficient incentives to 
act carefully. This is because the sanction imposed on the organization might not 
reach the responsible individuals. Thus, the question arises, to what extent can the 
incentives (if any) be transferred from the organization to its employees? This chapter 
assumes that the organisation is capable of fully transferring the received incentives to 
the employees. 
 
3.3.3 Duty of care 
The basic model assumed that due care was set at the optimal level of care, and that 
there was no uncertainty regarding this level of care.71 In the real world, however, legal 
standards are often uncertain. To determine the optimal level of due care, courts need 
complete and accurate information on the cost of care and the expected costs of 
accidents for each level of care. However, data necessary to set the optimal level of 
care will often not be available. Also, courts will not always be able to properly 
observe the actual level of care exercised by the injurer due to measurement errors, 
insufficient evidence and misrepresentation about the actual level of care. Thus, only 
during the trial, when parties present the facts of the case, is the due level of care 
established in a more precise way. Consequently, injurers exercising a certain level of 
care might not know ex ante whether they will be found negligent or not, either 
because they are not certain about the required level of due care or because they are 
not certain what level of care they will be found to have exercised (Kahan, 1989). 
Does this also apply to financial supervisory authorities? And what might that mean 
for the deterrent effect of tort law?  
 
From jurisprudence and publications regarding the topic of supervisory liability, it 
becomes clear that the standard for financial supervisory authorities is ‘reasonable 
care’.72 But what is meant by reasonable care? The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
pointed out in the Vie d’Or case that, in order to determine whether financial 
supervision complies with the standard of  reasonable care, all circumstances of the 
individual case have to be taken into account.73 These circumstances are the ‘nature’ 
of financial supervision; the fact that financial supervisory authorities have 
                                                 
71 Uncertainty regarding the level of care can decrease over time due to the development of a lot of jurisprudence. 
72 See for instance sections 3.8 - 3.12 of the conclusion of A-G Timmerman with regards to the outcome of the Vie 
d’Or case (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 October 2006, No. C04/279HR). 
73 See fn 72. 
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discretionary powers in order to fulfil their supervisory duties, and the fact that 
financial supervisory authorities face the difficult task of taking into account both the 
interests of the supervised institutions and the individual consumers (financial 
supervisor’s dilemma). It becomes clear that the standard of reasonable care is 
surrounded by uncertainty for all parties involved. Therefore, it is likely that we can 
present the applicable standard of care for financial supervisory authorities as follows 
(see Figure 5). 
 
      Figure 5: Duty of care for financial supervisory authorities. 
 
In Figure 5, I have pointed out two levels of care, namely S(l) and S(h).74 At the lower 
level of care, S(l), it is clear that below this level the financial supervisory authority was 
negligent and should therefore be held liable. There exists also a level of care, S(h), at 
which financial supervisory authorities know that they will not be held liable because 
they have taken enough care in exercising financial supervision. The optimal level of 




        Figure 6: Probability of financial supervisory liability.  
 
For every level of careful supervision between S(l) and S(h), there exists a certain 
probability that the financial supervisory authority is being held liable (Figure 6). 
However, this probability is ex ante unknown. From the above analysis, it becomes 
clear that the duty of care for financial supervisory authorities is vague and gives 
supervisors ex ante no exact guideline for performing their tasks. What does this mean 
from a law and economics perspective? Uncertainty regarding the level of due care 
                                                 
74 This figure is derived from Schwarz (1998). 
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changes the deterrent impact of legal rules by creating two opposing effects (Craswell 
& Calfee, 1986).  
 
The first effect is an incentive to over comply as a result of over-deterrence. In this 
situation, injurers will take more care than is prescribed by the legal standard of care. 
So, over compliance enables potential injurers to increase the chance that they will not 
be held liable. However, uncertainty also creates a positive chance that an injurer will 
not be held liable, thus reducing the incentives to comply with the legal standard 
(Schäfer & Schönenberger, 2000). The question thus created is which effect will 
prevail? In order to determine whether the net incentives are to under comply or to 
over comply, we need to know the relative strength of these two effects. However, 
this can not be determined ‘in general’ (Schwartz, 1998). An important factor to 
determine the net incentive in case of an uncertain legal standard is ‘damage’, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3.4 Damage: Pure economic loss versus loss in confidence 
Damage is an important condition for liability. Without it, there can be no liability. In 
general, we can identify two kinds of damages: pure economic or financial damage and 
immaterial damage. What kind of damage is most likely to occur when a financial 
institution goes bankrupt? When a financial institution goes bankrupt, clients will 
often lose (a part of) their money. Thus, the damage of an individual debtor exists 
primarily of pure economic loss. These kinds of losses are different from other losses, 
mainly because pure economic losses may, in fact, result in a transfer of wealth from 
one party to another, while ordinary losses result in the destruction of valuable 
resources. If a client of a financial institution loses money through the unlawful 
behaviour of this institution, it is likely that another party benefits from this 
behaviour. Let me use an example to clarify this: Suppose a financial institution 
undertakes a lot of risky investments and, as a result, does not comply with relevant 
prudential regulation, ultimately leading to its bankruptcy. The individual debtors lose 
all their money due to the unlawful behaviour of the financial institution. But, from 
society’s perspective, there might be no loss at all. Other financial institutions, as well 
as the issuers of the risky investments, might benefit from new customers. Overall, a 
transfer of wealth takes place between the parties involved in the default financial 
institution to other parties. For this reason, it is likely that the private loss to the 
victim is higher than the loss to society, which also takes the third party earnings into 
account.  
 
So, what are the consequences from a law and economics perspective? To answer this 
question, we have to make a distinction between a precise level of care and the 
situation in which the due level of care is not precisely known ex ante. If the level of 
care is precise, overcompensation can not lead to over-deterrence because the 
potential injurer knows ex ante which level of care is necessary to avoid liability. He 
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will choose this level of care in order to avoid compensation. One can only assume 
that overcompensation leads to a stronger incentive to take adequate care in this 
situation. It is unlikely however, that the potential injurer has an incentive to take 
more precaution at such a level. Therefore, overcompensation will not lead to over-
deterrence when the level of care is precise. In this situation, there is no economic 
reason to refuse full compensation, including damages caused by pure financial losses 
(Mattiacci & Schäfer, 2007). 
 
The picture changes drastically, however, if an uncertain legal standard is in place. This 
is the case for financial supervisory authorities, as explained in the previous section. A 
financial supervisory authority can not be guaranteed that he will avoid liability by 
taking a certain level of care while exercising supervision, as there is a residual 
probability that such level of care will be considered too low during the lawsuit. When 
we combine an uncertain legal standard with pure economic loss, the result may be 
over or under-deterrence. By taking more care, the injurer reduces the expected 
accident loss and the probability of being found negligent, but increases his costs of 
precaution. If damages are less than the social loss, under-deterrence will likely be the 
result, since the injurer does not face the total costs of his behaviour. On the other 
hand, if damages are in excess of social loss, the over-precaution outcome (over-
deterrence) is more likely because there is an extra pay-off in decreasing the 
probability of being held liable. The problem of over-deterrence can be solved by 
negligence rules, which restrict compensation to cases of obvious negligence or to 
wilful behaviour. This makes the negligence standard more precise, thus avoiding 
over-deterrence.  
 
Till now, I have assumed that the damage arising from bankruptcy of a financial 
institution only consisted of pure economic loss, namely the monetary loss for the 
depositor, and did not correspond with the social loss. However, the current financial 
crisis shows us that a social loss, which likely exceeds the pure economic loss, can 
occur. This loss is mainly caused by a lack of faith in the financial markets. It is 
difficult to quantify the loss in confidence, but the economic consequences can be 
very large. When a bankruptcy of a financial institution occurs, not only the depositors 
of this institution can lose confidence in the financial markets, but other participants 
as well. This can eventually lead to the collapse of other financial institutions, as the 
current financial crisis has demonstrated. When compensation is only based on the 
economic loss of the individual depositors of the collapsed institution, financial 
supervisory authorities do not internalize the total costs of their behaviour. As a 
consequence, under-deterrence is more likely to happen when the social loss is larger. 
 
3.3.5 Guarantee systems 
Another assumption underlying the basic model is that tort law is the only mechanism 
capable of getting compensation for losses suffered through the bankruptcy of a 
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financial institution. From a law and economics perspective, it is important that the 
potential injurer internalizes all costs of his behaviour. Otherwise, he or she will 
receive an incentive from tort law that is less than the optimal situation and, as a 
consequence, will engage in more careless behaviour. The same goes for financial 
supervisory authorities. To be effective as a deterrence mechanism, financial 
supervisory authorities should face all costs of their behaviour. So is tort law the only 
mechanism to receive compensation from?  
 
In the case of a bankruptcy of a financial institution, the answer to this question is 
negative. Most developed countries have depositor’s protection schemes. For 
example, the European Council Directive 94/19 EC of May 1994 requires each 
member state to implement a deposit guarantee system with a minimum 
compensation of € 20,000. The primary object of any deposit guarantee scheme is to 
provide protection allowing depositors to be quickly repaid should a financial 
institution fail. If depositors have an accurate and clear understanding of the 
protection offered, then panic behaviour, like financial institution runs, can be 
avoided. In that way, deposit guarantee systems contribute to the financial stability of 
a country. However, the current financial crisis showed us that, despite the existence 
of such a deposit guarantee system, depositors panicked and withdrew their money 
from financial institutions in trouble. This behaviour, for example, led to the 
nationalization of Northern Rock in 2007 and Fortis in 2008. As a consequence, in 
October 2008, the Council of the European Union agreed, that it is a priority to 
restore confidence and proper functioning of the financial sector. This had led to a 
new proposal, in addition to the existing Directive 94/19 EC of May 1994, in which 
all member states provide deposit guarantee protection for individuals of at least € 
50,000 for at least one year, compared with the former figure of € 20,000.75 However, 
a number of member states have gone further and (temporarily) guaranteed even 
larger amounts.76 For example, in the Netherlands, the guaranteed amount rose from 
€ 40,000 to € 100,000. In the same period, the German government offered an 
unlimited guarantee for all private financial institution deposits. Ireland even offered 
an unlimited guarantee for all deposits.  
 
But what is the influence of such guarantee systems on the deterrent effect of tort 
law? The basic model assumed that tort law was the only mechanism that could 
provide compensation. The threat of being held liable, and thus having to pay full 
compensation, gave financial supervisory authorities the necessary incentives to 
behave according to the optimal level of due care. When alternative means of 
                                                 
75 See 2008/0199 (COD) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay. 
76 On 7 October 2008, the Dutch minister of Finance announced the new guarantee limits. See also the memorandum 




compensation are available, it is obvious that the liability threat for financial 
supervisory authorities decreases. Depending on the amount of losses arising from the 
bankruptcy of a financial institution, people faced with these losses will always get full 
or partial compensation by the deposit guarantee scheme. Only if their losses are 
(much?) greater than the compensation from the deposit guarantee scheme, they have 
an incentive for holding the financial supervisory authority liable. Thus, the larger the 
amount of money a system guarantees, the less chance financial supervisory 
authorities face being held liable. The current average deposit of an EU citizen 
amounts to approximately € 30,000. With the new EU minimum deposit guarantee of 
€ 50,000, 80%, as opposed to 65%, of deposits would be covered (with regards to the 
€ 20,000 guarantee.77 Thus, it is likely that an increase of the deposit guarantee amount 
will lead to a smaller chance that depositors are going to sue financial supervisory 
authorities. 
 
From this analysis, we can conclude that the existence of depositor guarantee schemes 
eliminate some of the legal threat. As a consequence, financial supervisory authorities 
will receive fewer incentives from liability rules, more likely resulting in under-
deterrence (leading to inadequate levels of financial supervision). It is important to 
notice that this suggested impact on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities 
only occurs in cases of bankruptcy of financial institutions, which are under the 
supervision of a financial supervisory authority. Damage resulting from the unlawful 
behaviour of financial institutions that do not lead to their bankruptcy can only be 
compensated through the use of tort law. However, in the latter case, it is more likely 
that victims will sue the financial institution rather than try to get compensation from 
the financial supervisory authority by using tort law, mainly due to the fact that the 
latter procedure is much more difficult and uncertain. 
 
3.3.6 Safeguard clauses and insurances 
In the Netherlands, there are so called safeguard clauses between the financial 
supervisory authorities and the Ministry of Finance.78 Through the existence of these 
safeguard clauses, the financial supervisory authorities face only a financial risk of 10% 
of their budget. The remainder of the damage is being compensated by the Dutch 
State. Like the existence of deposit guarantee schemes, this arrangement has a negative 
effect on the deterrent effect of tort law. With this kind of arrangements, financial 
supervisory authorities do not take into account the full costs of their activities, likely 
leading to under-deterrence with the possible consequence of less careful financial 
supervision.  
 
                                                 
77 See fn 75. 
78 See Dutch Parliament (2005-2006), publication 30 300 IXB, no. 2, p. 23 and Dutch Parliament (1995-1996), 
publication 24 843, no. 1 p. 12. See also the memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Finance of 17 November 2006 
(FM 2006 01624M). 
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Besides safeguard clauses, financial supervisory authorities can also insure (part of) 
their liability risk. In the Netherlands, one of the financial supervisory authorities 
insured the risk of being held liable. To what extent does this influence the deterrent 
effect of tort law? From standard law and economics literature, it becomes clear that 
insurance has, in general, a negative impact on deterrence (Shavell, 1979). In other 
words, the insured party will display less care as a consequence of the insurance 
coverage. With the insurance coverage, an insured party no longer faces the financial 
consequences of taking less care. This behaviour is called moral hazard.79 There are 
two partial solutions to the problem of moral hazard, namely incomplete coverage 
against loss and observation of the care taken to prevent loss. In case of incomplete 
coverage, a party is still exposed to some financial risk and will, therefore, be 
motivated to prevent loss. Observation allows the insurer to link the perceived level of 
care to either the insurance premium or the amount of coverage paid in the event of a 
claim. This gives the insured party an incentive to take care to avoid rising insurance 
premiums or partial coverage of the damage. In case of the Dutch Financial Market 
Authority (AFM), it is unknown whether, and if, the insurance company has defined 
specific conditions or terms for the insurance coverage.80 However, it is likely that 
certain conditions do exist. With regards to the safeguard clauses, the Dutch State will 
not compensate the financial supervisory authority’s damage in case of gross 
negligence or bad faith, or when the financial supervisory authority does not comply 
with certain other terms. 
 
In order to give financial supervisory authorities sufficient incentives to perform the 
supervisory tasks assigned to them with adequate care, it is necessary that both the 
Dutch State and the insurance company can observe the level of care taken by the 
financial supervisory authorities. Due to the fact that the Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities operate independent from the State, it is difficult for the State to observe 
ex post the actual level of care taken by the supervisory authorities. Furthermore, we 
have seen that the requested duty of care, ‘reasonable care’, is vague. As a 
consequence, both the Dutch State and the insurance company will also have 
problems in determining whether the actual level of care corresponds with the 
reasonable care standard. This leads to the conclusion that safeguard clauses and 
insurance will likely lead to under-deterrence and, therefore, to less careful financial 
supervision. 
 
                                                 
79 Moral hazard refers to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual’s motive to prevent loss (Shavell, 
1979). 




The central question of this chapter is whether tort law will lead to careful financial 
supervision or to defensive conduct. Both statements are currently being used in EU 
member states, either in favour of or against the liability of financial supervisory 
authorities. This chapter used the insights from law and economics literature to 
analyze third party liability of financial supervisory authorities in the case of a 
bankruptcy of a financial institution. From the basic economic model of third party 
financial supervisory liability, it becomes clear that tort law can play an important role 
in preventing careless financial supervision. In order to maximize their budget and 
also to minimize political costs, financial supervisory authorities receive incentives 
from tort law to take optimal care in performing their supervisory tasks. However, the 
specific characteristics of the context in which the Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities operate, increase doubt in the certainty of this effect. Section 3.3 analyzed 
the impact of these characteristics on the deterrent effect of tort law. Table 5 shows a 
comprehensive overview of these impacts. 
 
Table 5: Overview of the impact of the characteristics of Dutch financial 
supervisory authorities. 






Vague duty of care & pure economic loss 
  
X 
Vague duty of care & loss in confidence X 
  
Deposit guarantee system X 
  
Safeguard clauses & insurance X 
  
 
From Table 5, it becomes clear that third party liability will most likely lead to under-
deterrence, as the majority of the characteristics show us. This means that the current 
tort law regime does not give the Dutch financial supervisory authorities adequate 
incentives to perform the supervising tasks assigned to them with adequate care. Even 
in the situation where the bankruptcy of a financial institution does not lead to a social 
loss of confidence, under-deterrence is most likely to occur. Why? In order to work 
properly, the threat of being held liable must be severe enough to give financial 
supervisory authorities enough incentives to change their behaviour in way we judge 
preferable. The main threat of being held liable arises from the compensation a 
financial supervisory authority has to pay if he was found negligent. Due to the 
existence of a deposit guarantee system, safeguard clauses and insurance, Dutch 
financial supervisory authorities do not fully face the financial consequences of their 
behaviour and, as a consequence, will probably not take optimal care. On the other 
54 
 




As this chapter was originally published in 2009, it does not take into account the 
change of legislation that took place in the Netherlands as of 1 July 2012. As of that 
date, the liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities was limited to cases of 
gross negligence and/or bad faith.82 What does this change in legislation mean for the 
findings and overall conclusion of this chapter? 
 
In Chapter 3 we have seen that the required level of due care under a negligence rule 
is reasonable care. The standard of reasonable care is, however, surrounded by 
uncertainty for all parties involved. To what extent is a standard of gross negligence a 
more precise standard? Gross negligence refers to actions that have fallen so far below 
the ordinary standard of expected care that the label ‘gross’ is warranted. It relates to 
conduct or a failure to act that demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for whether 
damage will result. It is likely that a standard of gross negligence makes it easier for the 
tortfeasor to avoid liability. Compared to simple negligence, a standard of gross 
negligence can therefore be considered more precise.83 What does this mean for the 
deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability? 
 
Section 3.3.4 showed that the damage resulting from the bankruptcy of a financial 
institution could be defined as pure economic loss. Compensating pure economic loss 
leads to over-compensation if this kind of loss exceeds the overall damage for society 
(Schäfer, 2004). If the level of care is more precise, overcompensation is, however, 
less likely to result in over-deterrence. A standard of gross negligence makes it easier 
for financial supervisory authorities to avoid liability and hence reduces their 
incentives to take precautions beyond the socially optimal level (Dari-Mattiacci & 
Schäfer, 2007). The change from a negligence regime to a gross negligence regime can 
therefore limit the unintended consequence of over-deterrence. 
 
                                                 
81 In a previous published paper, Dijkstra & Visscher (2007) concluded that a negligence rule is likely to result in over-
deterrence. They therefore suggested to introduce a standard of gross negligence which could prevent over-deterrence 
from happening. However, the paper from 2007 did not take into account the existence of a deposit guarantee system. 
A deposit guarantee system, as we have seen in this chapter, eliminates a substantial part of the legal threat. As a 
consequence, financial supervisory authorities will receive fewer incentives from liability rules, more likely resulting in 
under-deterrence (leading to inadequate levels of financial supervision). 
82 See article 1:25d of the Dutch Act on financial supervision. 
83 However, it is important to note that it is not likely that a standard of gross negligence will reduce all uncertainty. 
Gross negligence needs to be established on a contextual basis, depending on the facts of each particular case. Even if 
a standard of gross negligence would result in the same amount of uncertainty as a standard of ordinary negligence, the 
overall conclusion of this chapter would not change, given the impact of the other characteristics. 
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So, the more precise the standard of due care, the less likely it is that over-deterrence 
will occur. The overall impact is shown in Table 6. This table compares the standard 
of gross negligence with simple negligence. 
 
Table 6: Comparing gross negligence with simple negligence 
Characteristic 











(Vague) duty of care 
& pure economic loss 
  X  X  
(Vague) duty of care 
& loss in confidence 
X   X   
Deposit guarantee 
system 
X   X   
Safeguard clauses & 
insurance 
X   X   
Impact financial 
supervisory liability 
X   X   
 
Table 6 makes clear that in the event of pure economic loss, the impact shifts from 
over-deterrence to neutral when introducing a standard of gross negligence. The table 
furthermore shows that the introduction of a standard of gross negligence does not 
change the overall conclusion of Chapter 3. Under both standards, financial 
supervisory liability is likely to result in under-deterrence. This is caused mainly by the 












































4 Accountability of financial supervisory authorities: An 
incentive approach 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Causes of financial supervisory failure 
One of the most important responsibilities of financial supervisory authorities is to 
ensure that financial institutions act in conformity with legal norms. This duty is not 
only done in order to maintain the stability of our financial system but also to 
maintain the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions and to protect 
consumers from the unlawful behaviour of financial institutions (Llewellyn, 1999). 
Since the world banks have sailed into a sea of troubles, the role of financial 
supervisory authorities is being heavily discussed. Many people blame financial 
supervisory authorities for their part in the credit crisis – an accusation which is not so 
surprising given the fact that these authorities were specifically created to ensure the 
stability of our financial system. Even financial supervisory authorities themselves 
acknowledge that in some cases they have failed to provide adequate financial 
supervision.84 What are the reasons for this kind of failure by financial supervisory 
authorities? In general, one can cite the following reasons (Ward, 2002; Tabellini, 
2008).  
 
First of all, financial supervision may fail because financial supervisors lack enough 
information in order to act adequately.85 Furthermore, they may have enough 
information but are not sufficiently skilled or are skilled but simply make mistakes. 
They may also have too little power (or too much) which could lead to supervisory 
failure. These explanations of why financial supervision may fail are quite plausible. 
But is it complete? For example, in light of the recent financial crisis a great deal of 
information was actually available in addition to growing signs of concerns (Tabellini, 
2008). However, the information was not acted upon despite the fact that most 
financial supervisory authorities had power to do so. Why then, did they not take 
adequate measures?  
 
                                                 
84 After the events at Northern Rock it became clear that the UK financial watchdog, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), failed to regulate Northern Rock adequately. The FSA said there had been a ‘lack of adequate oversight and 
review’ by the authority of the troubled bank. See the internal audit report of the FSA in 2008 
(http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/nr_report.pdf). US regulators failed to realize the massive risk American 
International Group’s credit default swaps posed and should have stepped in sooner to stop the insurers from 
originating the products, according to the head of the Office of Thrift Supervision (see 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/29528855). In September 2009 it became clear the Securities and Exchange Commission 
had failed in uncovering Madoff  
(see http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf). 
85 In this chapter, “financial supervisory authority” and “financial supervisor(s)” are used interchangeably as the 
‘behaviour’ of a financial supervisory authority is caused by the behaviour of individual financial supervisors. 
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A potential answer to this question may be a lack of adequate incentives (Kane, 1989; 
Ward, 2002; Schüler, 2003; Tabellini, 2008). Financial supervisory authorities, like any 
other organizations, are managed by people who have personal preferences. Instead of 
serving the public good, the actions of supervisors may be driven primarily by political 
motivations or private career concerns or in an attempt to advance their own 
institutional self-interests (Ward, 2002; Schüler, 2003). Without adequate incentives in 
place, they will not necessarily act in the public interest which could eventually lead to 
supervisory failure.  
 
4.1.2 Accountability as an incentive mechanism 
To prevent financial supervisory failure, arrangements should be in place to ensure 
that financial supervisors pursue the public interest or, at least, discourage them from 
pursuing their self-interests. These arrangements can be best described as incentives. 
In economics and sociology, an incentive is any factor (financial or non-financial) that 
enables or motivates a particular course of action, or counts as a reason for preferring 
one choice to another. It is an expectation that encourages people, and thus, financial 
supervisors, to behave in a certain way (Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). A distinction can 
be made between internal and external incentives.  
 
With internal incentives I mean the incentives embedded in the organisational 
structure of the financial supervisory authorities such as the salary level, the existing 
culture and the existence of a code of conduct (Quintyn & Taylor, 2002; Weder di 
Mauro, 2009).86 However, in this chapter I will only focus on external incentives. This 
latter category relates to incentives that financial supervisors face from outside their 
organisational structure. The literature regarding financial supervisory authorities 
shows us the importance of accountability as an external mechanism that could 
influence the behaviour of financial supervisors (e.g. Ward, 2002; Hüpkes et al., 2005; 
Masciandaro & Quintyn, 2006; Bovens et al., 2008; Amtenbrink & Lastra, 2008).  
 
From a law and economics perspective, accountability can, in theory, provide financial 
supervisors with incentives to perform their supervisory tasks with adequate care. 
How? Financial supervisors have to comply with a (legal) standard of care in order to 
avoid the possible sanctions arising from accountability. If financial supervisors act 
beneath the requested level of care, they will face the negative consequences from 
being held accountable. Assuming that they, to a certain degree, are willing to 
maximize their private wealth or the budget of their supervisory authorities, they have 
an incentive to comply with the requested standard of care (and thus behaving in the 
interest of society) in order to avoid any consequences that will have a negative 
                                                 
86 It is likely that low wages will stimulate regulatory capture and thus lead to a situation in which financial supervisors 
do not pursue the public interest (Quintyn & Taylor, 2002; Weder di Mauro, 2009). However, as already stated, I do 




financial impact. Despite the fact that accountability is recognized as an important 
pillar of the governance structure of financial supervisory authorities, less attention 
has been placed on the effectiveness of accountability as an incentive mechanism 
(Hüpkes et al., 2005; Masciandaro & Quintyn, 2006). 
 
4.1.3 Research method 
In this chapter, I examine to what extent the existing accountability arrangements give 
Dutch financial supervisory authorities sufficient incentives for performing their 
supervisory tasks with adequate care (Van Dam, 2006a; Pratt, 2009).87 The starting 
point is the application of the well known principal-agent theory and public choice 
theory on financial supervisory authorities. With the use of these theories, I will 
identify the possible conflicts between society and the financial supervisory authorities 
that can lead to supervisory failure. From this perspective, society is considered as the 
principal and the financial supervisory authority, the agent. Then, I will examine, with 
the use of literature regarding financial supervisory authorities, which consequences 
may result from being held accountable. The next step is to examine, with the use of 
insights from law and economics theory, whether these consequences are effective 
incentives that stimulate financial supervisory authorities to pursue the public interest 
or discourage them from pursuing their self-interests. This line of thinking is 
illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7: Changing the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities.  
 
                                                 
87 The Dutch financial supervisory authorities are the Financial Market Authority (AFM) and the Dutch Central Bank 
(DNB). Due to the fact that financial supervisory authorities in other European countries have many characteristics in 
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In order to examine this, we also need a theory on behaviour (Dijkstra, 2009). Without 
understanding and being able to predict the behaviour of an actor, it is impossible to 
know whether certain consequences will change their behaviour in a manner we 
would judge preferable. Thus, the prediction of the effectiveness of accountability is 
very sensitive to assumptions about the underlying behavioural model. In this chapter 
I will use the standard model of profit maximizing behaviour, which is commonly 
used in traditional law and economics analysis.88 
 
4.1.4 Outline 
In addition to the introduction, this chapter is divided into four sections. The 
following section (4.2) applies the principal-agent theory and the public choice theory 
on financial supervision to explain the existence of conflicts of interest between 
society/government and the financial supervisory authorities. The next section (4.3) 
describes several consequences that financial supervisory authorities might face when 
they are being held accountable. I then examine, from a law and economics 
perspective, whether these consequences give financial supervisory authorities enough 
incentives to perform their supervisory tasks with adequate care (Section 4.4). The last 


















                                                 
88 The underlying model refers to the ‘Homo Economicus’. People, and thus also authorities, will act egoistically 
rational in that they will minimize the costs they are faced with in order to maximize their wealth. 
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4.2 A principal-agent perspective on financial supervisors 
4.2.1 Introduction: principals and agents 
It is important to understand why incentives are needed in the first place. A good 
manner for examining this is the application of the well known principal-agent theory 
to financial supervisors (Masciandaro & Quintyn, 2006).89  In Figure 8, I have applied 
this theory and outlined the principal-agent relationships within the context of 
financial supervision. 
 
    
    
    Figure 8: Principal-agent relationships in the context of financial supervision.  
 
The starting point of principal-agent theory correspondents to the delegation of a task 
by the principal to an agent (Lavont & Martimort, 2002). In our case, society is the 
main principal. Individual members of society (citizens) formally have the task of 
supervising the financial institutions they do business with themselves. However, as 
we already have seen, they often lack the time, information and knowledge to monitor 
all the financial institutions properly. Given the importance of the financial sector for 
the welfare of society, this supervisory task is delegated to the government, or, for our 
purposes, the agent of society. However, the government often delegates the task of 
supervising financial institutions to a specialized authority. Why?  
 
                                                 
89 However, it should be noted that some scholars do not agree with the assumption that the principal-agent theory is 
an adequate way to analyse the relationship between the supervisory authority and the government (Gilardi, 2008).  
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Financial supervision has characteristics that make delegation to bureaucrats attractive 
for politicians. First of all it is a highly complex activity which calls for the use of a 
specialized organization. Furthermore, due to its complexity, financial supervision has 
a high reputation risk – failure of financial institutions harms depositors and may 
therefore reduce re-election probabilities (Alesina & Tabellini, 2005; Masciandaro et 
al., 2007). So, therefore delegation to a specialized authority is attractive, both for 
society and government. The financial supervisory authority then acts as both the 
agent of the government and society. From Figure 8 it becomes clear that there exist 
at least three layers of agency problems: between society and government, between 
government and the financial supervisory authorities and between society and the 
supervisory authorities.90 The latter two agency problems will be described in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
4.2.2 The agency problem 
Delegating a task to the government, who, in turn, delegates it to a specialized 
authority, results in information asymmetry within the various principal-agent 
relationships. Both society and the government have incomplete information about 
the actions of their financial supervisory authorities. Due to the fact that financial 
supervisory authorities are independent organisations, it is difficult for these actors to 
monitor the actions of these authorities adequately (mainly caused by a lack of time, 
information and knowledge). As a consequence, financial supervisory authorities can 
use their knowledge to deceive their principals about their behaviour. The agent is 
selected for his specialized knowledge, while the principal is never completely able to 
check the agent’s performance. Furthermore, financial supervisory authorities are 
supposed to comply with their duty of confidence.91 This means that they can not 
disclose all information obtained from their supervisory activities to the general 
public. In this way, the duty of confidence contributes to the information asymmetry 
between society and financial supervisory authorities. But to what degree is 
information asymmetry a problem?  
 
Well, due to the existence of information asymmetry it is possible for the agent to 
pursue interests that deviate from the interests of the principal. In this way, a conflict 
of interests may occur. A principal-agent problem generally arises because agents not 
only have goals that conflict with those of the principals, but also have the discretion 
to pursue these goals because principals can not monitor all agent activity. This can 
result in severe problems. Thus the question remains, are there any conflicting 
interests between society, government and financial supervisory authorities? To find 
out, I will use insights from public choice theory.  
                                                 
90 Besides the mentioned layers of agency problems, it is also likely that there exists an agency problem within the 
government and financial supervisory authorities. However, these ‘internal’ agency problems are no subject of research 
in this chapter. 
91 See for instance Section 1:89 and further of the Dutch Act on Financial Supervision. 
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4.2.3 Conflicting interests? A public choice perspective 
To identify conflicting interests we must compare the interests of society, the 
government and financial supervisory authorities. The interests of society can 
generally be described by a stable financial sector; in other words, citizens have an 
interest in the soundness of individual financial institutions and the financial system as 
a whole (Schüler, 2003; Tison, 2005). What about the interests of the government and 
the financial supervisory authorities? Both are part of the so called public sector of a 
country. The traditional view identifies the public sector with the pursuit of the public 
good. However, do politicians and bureaucrats pursue only the public interest? Public 
choice theorists say no. Public choice theory applies the theories and methods of 
economics to the analysis of the public sector. It attempts to look at the government 
from the perspective of the bureaucrats and politicians who compose them, and 
makes the assumption that they act in a self interested way for the purpose of 
maximizing their own economic benefits.92 So, instead of working in the public 
interest they are motivated by factors such as salary, public reputation and power 
(Tullock et al., 2002; Ward, 2002; Masciandaro et al., 2007). Therefore, public choice 
theory attributes deficiencies in the public sector to the existence of the private 
objectives of politicians and bureaucrats. What does this mean for our financial 
supervisory authorities?  
 
If we take a look at the official goals of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities, 
one may notice that these goals correspond or contribute to the interests of society, 
namely a stable financial system.93 The same goes for the Financial Service Authority 
(FSA) in the United Kingdom. The FSA focuses on the objectives of market 
confidence, public awareness, protection of consumers and reduction of financial 
crime (Singh, 2008). All contributing to financial stability. However, to what extent do 
supervisory authorities really pursue the interests of society? According to public 
choice theory, bureaucrats of financial supervisory authorities will not automatically 
pursue the public interest, that is to ensure the stability of the financial system by 
performing adequate financial supervision. Instead they may pursue their self-interest 
(Boot & Thakor, 1993; Schüler, 2003; Masciandaro & Quintyn, 2006).  
 
Financial supervisory authorities, like any other organization, are managed by people 
who have personal preferences. Instead of serving the public good, the actions of 
financial supervisors may be driven primarily by political motivations, their reputation 
or private career concerns. In addition, they may try to advance their own institutional 
self-interests by seeking an increase in the power, reputation, prestige or size of their 
authorities. This self-interesting behaviour can lead to suboptimal financial 
supervision and ultimately supervisory failure. For example, the supervised financial 
                                                 
92 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_choice_theory. 
93 See for the objectives of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities their website: www.afm.nl or  www.dnb.nl. 
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industry may be an important source of future employment opportunities for the 
supervisory authorities' staff. Their obvious career path is to move to the regulated 
private sector where it is possible to claim lucrative appointments.94 To accomplish 
such a self serving goal, financial supervisors might promote financial industry 
interests over those of the public. This is called regulatory capture, a term used to 
refer to situations in which a supervisory authority created to act in the public interest 
instead acts in favour of the commercial or special interests that dominate in the 
industry or sector it is charged with regulating or supervising.  
 
Financial supervisors may also want to protect their careers or reputation by acceding 
to pressures from the people who strongly influence their careers – the politicians 
(Mishkin, 1996; Masciandaro et al., 2007). In this case, they might promote the 
interests of politicians, which may deviate from those of the public. This situation 
might result in regulatory forbearance (bureaucratic self capture), that is, allowing 
financial institutions to keep on operating as usual despite noncompliance with 
regulations because it is hoped that the problem will go away with time (Weder di 
Mauro, 2009). For example, the government may put pressure on the supervisor not 
to close a bank, as bank closure comes at a political cost, with depositors and possibly 
taxpayers being harmed. From the perspective above, financial supervisory failure can 
be seen as the result of a conflict between the public’s interest and the private interests 
of financial supervisors enabled by information asymmetry. 
 
 
  Figure 9: Views on the behaviour of financial supervisors. 
 
It is fair to say that both the traditional view (public interest perspective) and the 
public choice view (private interest perspective) are the most extreme views of the 
public sector. So, the truth with regard to the behaviour of financial supervisors will 
lie somewhere in-between (see Figure 9). Such a statement insinuates, also from a 
more traditional view, that financial supervisors will still try to pursue their self-
interest to a certain extent, thus leading to the existence of conflicts of interests 
between them and society. 
 
                                                 
94 This kind of behaviour is consistent with the “career concern model” as presented by Alesina and Tabellini (2008b). 
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Financial supervisory failure may arise from the existence of conflict of interests 
between society and financial supervisory authorities. To ensure financial supervisors 
only pursuing the interest of society (resulting in adequate financial supervision) and 
thus discouraging them from pursuing their self-interest, it is necessary to have 
adequate incentives in place. How is this done with regards to the Dutch financial 
supervisory authorities?  
 
4.3 Accountability as an incentive mechanism 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The previous section concluded that incentives are necessary. Incentives, that 
stimulate financial supervisors to pursue the public interest and discourage them from 
pursuing their self-interest, need to be in place. But what do I actually mean by 
incentives? In general, an incentive is any factor (financial or non-financial) that 
enables or motivates a particular course of action, or counts as a reason for preferring 
one choice to another. It is an expectation that encourages people, and thus, financial 
supervisors, to behave in a certain way (Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). After examining 
the existent literature regarding financial supervisory authorities, it is clear that 
accountability is considered an important mechanism to discourage financial 
supervisors in pursuing their private interest (e.g. Ward, 2002; Hüpkes et al., 2005; 
Bovens et al., 2008; Amtenbrink & Lastra, 2008). In the following sections, I will 
discuss this topic in more detail.  
 
4.3.2 Accountability: a way to limit the principal-agent problem? 
Accountability is considered an important element of the governance structure of 
financial supervisory authorities (e.g. Litan et al., 2002; Hüpkes et al., 2005; Singh, 
2007; Seelig & Novoa, 2009). As stated in Section 4.1.2, the threat of being held 
accountable gives financial supervisors, in theory, incentives to pursue the public 
interest instead of their self-interest. But does accountability indeed give sufficient 
incentives to the financial supervisors to perform their supervisory tasks with adequate 
care? The latter topic will be discussed in more detail in the next section which 
evaluates the effectiveness of accountability as an incentive mechanism. First I will 
address the meaning of accountability.  
 
Accountability can mean different things to many different people (Bovens et al., 
2008). In general accountability can be defined as an obligation owed by one person to 
another according to which the former must give account of, explain and justify his 
actions or decisions against criteria of some kind, and take responsibility for any fault 
or damage (Amtenbrink & Lastra, 2008). Accountability can be thought of as fulfilling 
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three main functions with regard to financial supervisory authorities (Hüpkes et al., 
2005). First, it is important to provide a democratic means to monitor and control the 
conduct of financial supervisory authorities (the lawyer’s perspective). Second, 
accountability should help prevent abuses of power and third it should enhance the 
effectiveness of financial supervisory authorities. In other words, it should improve 
supervisory authority performance (the economist’s perspective). Considering the 
topic of this chapter, I will primarily focus on the latter function of accountability.  
 
To be recognized as an incentive mechanism, the definition of accountability has to be 
extended with consequences (rewards or sanctions) following a fair review of the 
performance of the authority. From this perspective, the concept of accountability 
also stands for the existence of adverse consequences once certain conditions are 
fulfilled (Amtenbrink & Lastra, 2008). These consequences should provide the 
financial supervisory authorities with the necessary incentives to perform their tasks 
with adequate care. When accountability is merely or primarily about disclosing 
information without any consequences, it is likely that it will not work properly as a 
mechanism to alter the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities. However, the 
possibility of consequences in the event of errors and shortcomings should motivate 
them to perform their tasks in the interest of society. In the next section, I will outline 
the potential consequences for Dutch financial supervisory authorities arising from 
their accountability. 
 
4.3.3 Consequences for financial supervisory authorities 
As stated above and in the introduction of this chapter, the threat of facing 
consequences from being held accountable should give financial supervisors 
incentives to take adequate care in performing their supervisory tasks. The majority of 
these consequences can be found in the law. For the Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities, potential consequences (sanctions) might be: 
 
Suspension or dismissal 
Section 1:26 of the Dutch Act on Financial Supervision states that the Minister of 
Finance has the power to suspend or dismiss by Royal Decree the Chair and other 
members of the Management when they fail to meet the requirements for the exercise 
of their duties or if they have seriously failed to perform these duties properly. Despite 
a few incidents where Dutch financial supervisory authorities failed to meet their 
supervisory tasks over the past few years, nobody was forced to step down or simply 
dismissed. However, examples of dismissal can be found in an international context. 
In Ireland, Mr. Patrick Neary, former chief executive of the Irish Financial Services 
Regulatory Authority, was forced to resign in January 2009 following claims that staff 
at the Regulator’s office knew, since January 2008, that the disgraced chairman of 
Anglo Irish Bank, Seán FitzPatrick, had been transferring loans of up to € 87 million 
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off the bank’s book to conceal them from shareholders.95 In 2009, Sir James Crosby, 
deputy chairman of the Financial Services Authority, resigned following the 
submission of a written memo by HBOS whistleblower Paul Moore to a parliamentary 
committee, which was hearing evidence on the factors behind the British recession.96 
Moore said Crosby, who was chief executive of the HBOS banking group from 2001 
to 2006, fired him after he warned that the bank was endangering financial stability by 
taking too many risks. In January 2009, the director of the Icelandic Financial 
Supervisory Authority, Jonas Fr. Jonsson, and the board of the institution also stepped 
down after the Icesave debacle.97 From the examples above we can conclude that 
dismissal of financial supervisors often means that they resign themselves following 
heavy internal or external pressure. 
 
Overruling 
As asserted in section 1:43 of the Dutch Act on Financial Supervision, the Minister of 
Finance has the power to decide that he will exercise one or more parts of the 
supervisor’s function, or to have them exercised by another supervisor, if the Minister 
believes that the supervisor has seriously failed to perform his function. Thus far, I 




Article 70 of the Dutch Constitution provides the Dutch Parliament the right to 
perform surveys. This right has further been outlined in the Parliamentary Survey 
Law. If the Dutch Parliament wants to examine the role or performance of the 
financial supervisors in a particular case, they can call for a parliamentary survey. For 
example, after the collapse of the DSB-bank some members of Parliament advocated 
a parliamentary survey regarding the role of the Dutch Central Bank and the Financial 
Markets Authority. Because the Minister of Finance himself had announced an 
independent investigation regarding the role of the financial supervisors in the 
collapse of DSB, a majority of the members of the Dutch House of Representatives 
was, however, against such a survey.98  
 
Liability 
Another consequence that may arise from accountability is the obligation to pay 
compensation after being held liable for supervisory failure. In The Netherlands, 
contrary to several other European countries, it is possible to hold the financial 
                                                 
95 See the Irish Times of 9 January 2009 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2009/0109/breaking75.htm). 
96 See BBS NEWS of 11 February 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7883409.stm). 
97 See IceNews of January 25 2009 (http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2009/01/25/icelands-minister-of-commerce-
and-board-and-director-of-fsa-resign). 




supervisory authority liable on the grounds of shortcomings in their supervisory role. 
This is based on article 6:162 of the Dutch civil code. Examples of tort cases against 
Dutch financial supervisory authorities include the Vie d’Or case in which the Dutch 
Central Bank was being held liable, and the Befra case, in which the Dutch Financial 
Market Authority was being held liable. However, in both cases, the liability of the 
supervisory authorities was not established by court, and as a result, they were not 
mandatory to pay any compensation. In an European context we have also witnessed 
a number of cases of supervisory liability (Tison, 2003). For example, in the United 
Kingdom, a number of depositors claimed in 1995 damages from the Bank of 
England based on inadequate financial supervision, following the collapse of the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). After a reserve judgement from the 
High Court said the case was no longer in the best interest of creditors, the liquidators 
for BCCI dropped their case against the Bank of England. Furthermore, supervised 
financial institutions have the right to appeal against any action or measure taken by 
one of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities, or to hold them liable if they suffer 
any damage from these measures.  
 
Reputation damage 
Thus far, we have only encountered consequences that are embedded in law. 
However, these are not the only consequences financial supervisory authorities can 
face when being held accountable. An important consequence that can arise from 
being held accountable is reputation damage. This particular consequence can not be 
found in law. Reputation damage can relate to the supervisory authority itself or its 
individual members, who are most likely the members of the Board. How does one’s 
reputation get damaged? Reputation damage of financial supervisory authorities can 
occur as a side effect of the earlier mentioned consequences. For example, the liability 
of a supervisory authority as a result of supervision shortcomings will not only lead to 
an obligation to pay compensation but also have a negative impact on the reputation 
of the authority.  
 
The same goes for the dismissal or suspension of a board member. Overruling of the 
supervisory authority will also have a negative impact on the reputation of the 
supervisory authority once this measure gets public. Furthermore, the outcome of a 
parliamentary survey regarding the role of the nation’s financial supervisors can also 
lead to severe reputation damage. Reputation damage, however, can also occur 
without the earlier mentioned consequences. This scenario is most likely after the 
collapse of a financial institution, which often leads to severe damages for society. 
After such an incident, society (and the media) will often question the role of financial 
supervisors in the collapse. For example, both the reputation of Mr. Nout Wellink, the 
chairman of the Dutch Central Bank (DNB), and the supervisory authority found 
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themselves under pressure after the collapse of Icesave and DSB.99 As a consequence, 
the Dutch House of Representatives has become hesitant over the reappointment of 
Mr. Nout Wellink.100 
 
4.4 Accountability as an effective incentive mechanism 
4.4.1 Introduction 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the consequences arising from being held 
accountable, we also need a theory on the behaviour of financial supervisors. Without 
understanding and being able to predict the behaviour of financial supervisors, it is 
hardly possible to know whether (the consequences from) accountability will change 
their behaviour in a manner we would judge preferable. Based on public choice theory 
it is clear that financial supervisory authorities do not automatically pursue the public 
interest, but will instead try to pursue their self-interest. This abstract view on 
supervisory behaviour is, not, however, sufficient enough to use for evaluating the 
effectiveness of accountability as an incentive mechanism. So, before examining the 
identified consequences of accountability, I will start by describing a behavioural 
model of financial supervisory authorities based on the (theoretical) insights from law 
and economics. 
 
4.4.2 A theory on the behaviour of financial supervisory authorities 
Traditional law and economics analysis uses a model of profit maximizing behaviour 
(Cooter & Ulen, 2007). This model applies well to private companies. These 
companies are generally constrained to produce at the minimum average cost in order 
to maximize their profits. What about public authorities such as financial supervisory 
authorities? Applying the profit maximizing model to a public authority seems to be 
more difficult. In general, public authorities do not pursue a goal of profit maximizing 
and, as a consequence, are not motivated by the desire to maximize profits. 
Furthermore, the budget constraint of the State or public authority is not directly 
comparable to that of private companies or individuals. When we take a closer look at 
the behavioural models of public authorities, we find both maximizing (“rational-
actor”) and non-maximizing varieties (Spitzer, 1977). A maximizing model assumes 
that the governmental entity has a goal and is trying to do its best to achieve that goal, 
while the non-maximizing model does not assume such behaviour.  
 
                                                 
99 See for instance the article ‘Nout Wellink: There are enormous gaps in our financial supervisory system’ in Vrij Nederland, 13 
March 2009 and the article ‘Nout Wellink lost authority’ in Elsevier, 24 October 2009. 




The most important maximizing model of governmental behaviour was developed by 
Niskanen. He suggests that the goal of budget maximization will replace profit 
maximization in a bureaucracy, since many of the objectives of a bureaucrat (power, 
prestige, and salary) are directly tied to the size of the bureau that the bureaucrat 
oversees (Niskanen, 1971). What about financial supervisory authorities? Financial 
supervisory authorities are public authorities and part of a country’s governmental 
infrastructure. It is obvious that they do not pursue a goal of profit maximizing, as 
their main goals consist of reducing financial market imperfections to maintain the 
stability of our financial system as we already have seen in Section 4.1. However, to 
fulfil these goals, financial supervisory authorities need some kind of budget that can 
not be unlimited, considering the government has many other goals to fulfil. Hence, 
financial supervisory authorities face, to a certain degree, a budget constraint, and shall 
try to maximize their budgets according to the theory of Niskanen (Dijkstra, 2009).  
 
The notion that the behaviour of financial supervisors and/or supervisory authorities 
is only effected by the impact on their private wealth or budget is not likely to be the 
complete picture. In reality, agents may get utility from some aspects of the task itself 
or from the actions they take in this job (Dixit, 2002). These effects are more likely to 
arise in public sector authorities, such as financial supervisory authorities, than in 
private firms. An important reason why agents in a public sector authority get utility 
from working there or from their actions is that they share some idealistic or ethical 
purpose served by the authority (Dixit, 2002). If financial supervisors get utility from 
the mentioned aspects, then less incentives are needed to secure the same level of 
effort.  
 
In this chapter, however, I assume that the behaviour of financial supervisors is based 
on the effects it has, on both their private wealth, and the budget of the supervisory 
authority.  
 
4.4.3 Evaluating the incentives 
In the following paragraphs I will evaluate each consequence on the impact it has on 
the private wealth of a financial supervisor or the budget of the supervisory authority. 
To work properly, the threat of these consequences must be severe enough to give 
financial supervisors effective incentives to change their behaviour in a way we judge 
preferable. I assume that threat consists of a combination of two components, namely 
(1) the likelihood that financial supervisory authorities will face one or more of the 
mentioned consequences and (2) the magnitude of the financial impact from these 
consequences. For each consequence I will therefore answer the following two 
questions. How likely is it that financial supervisory authorities will face the mentioned 
consequences? And, what is the magnitude of the financial impact of these 
consequences on the supervisor’s private wealth and the authority’s budget? Based on 
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the answers to these questions, I will make a judgement with regards to the 
effectiveness of these consequences. 
 
Suspension or dismissal 
It is likely that dismissal has a direct influence on the wealth of an individual board 
member. Furthermore, dismissal or suspension also may influence his wealth in the 
long term, as it is likely to damage a board member’s reputation. The dismissal of 
board members has however no influence on the future budget of the financial 
supervisory authority. To be an effective incentive, the threat of being dismissed has 
to be severe enough. When a board member fails to meet the requirements needed for 
the exercise of his duties, or he has seriously failed to perform them properly, the 
Minister of Finance has to dismiss him. However, when does a board member fail in 
his duties? This is often difficult to judge, especially since there exists no clear 
standard of care for financial supervisors, the fact that they operate independently 
from the Ministry of Finance and have discretionary power in performing their duties. 
As a consequence, the dismissal or suspension of a supervisory authority board 
member almost never occurs. For example, despite robust critique with regard to the 
role of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities, there were, until now, no personnel 
consequences. In other countries, only a couple of financial supervisors stepped 
down, or were forced to step down, often following severe media pressure as we have 
seen in part three of this chapter. The likelihood that financial supervisors face this 
consequence is therefore low. What about the financial impact?  
 
Dismissal will probably have a (short-term) negative impact on the private wealth of 
the financial supervisors, because they will not receive salary from the supervisory 
authority anymore. On the other hand, it is likely that they will receive a redundancy 
payment when being forced to resign or when being dismissed. Furthermore, former 
board members of a supervisory authority will not have too much difficulty in finding 
another job. However, when their reputation has been damaged, it is likely that their 
career opportunities have become less, effecting their private wealth in the longer 
term. The magnitude of this impact is however uncertain and depends on a lot of 
variables. Overall, the financial impact of a dismissal or suspension seems to be 
relatively limited.  
 
Overruling 
The exercise of (some of) the functions of the authority by the Minister of Finance 
himself or by another supervisor, does not impact the budget of a supervisory 
authority that has seriously failed in performing its duties nor the private wealth of the 
responsible financial supervisors. However, when it becomes public that the Minister 
of Finance has overruled a supervisory authority due to its shortcomings or failure, 
consequences for the reputation of the authority will likely follow. The financial 
impact of reputation damage, on the other hand, is limited as we will see in the 
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paragraph that deals with reputation damage. Due to the fact that there exist no clear 
standard of care for financial supervisory authorities, it is, as we already have seen, 
difficult to say when a supervisory authority seriously fails in performing it duties. So 
the likelihood  that a financial supervisory authority will face this consequence is low. 
This can also be seen in practice. Thus far, I have not come across an example of this 
consequence in The Netherlands nor in any other country. 
 
Parliamentary survey 
A parliamentary survey has no immediate impact on the private wealth of a financial 
supervisor nor on the budget of the supervisory authority. However, the outcome of 
the survey might have an effect on the reputation of individual supervisors and the 
authority. During a parliamentary survey, embarrassing facts regarding the role of 
supervisors can become public, thereby affecting their reputation. Thus, participating 
in a parliamentary survey may have a (limited) financial impact, by means of 
reputation damage, on the supervisor’s private wealth or authority’s budget. However, 
the probability that financial supervisory authorities have to participate in a 
parliamentary survey is relatively low, given the fact that in the past 100 years only 36 
parliamentary surveys have been carried out in The Netherlands, of which only one 
dealt with financial supervision.101 Despite the fact that this probability is low, the 
chance that financial supervisory authorities, especially after the collapse of a financial 
institution, are going to be subject of formal investigations is much higher. For 
example, after the collapse of the DSB-bank, the Dutch Minister of Finance 
announced an independent investigation regarding the role of the financial supervisory 
authorities. Overall, it is not likely that the threat of having to participate in a 
parliamentary survey gives sufficient incentives for financial supervisory authorities. 
 
Liability 
Tort law can, in theory, be an important incentive mechanism, as the threat of being 
held liable will give financial supervisor authorities an incentive to perform the tasks 
assigned to them with (greater) care. Why? Financial supervisory authorities will try to 
prevent liability (and in that way prevent compensation for the damage) to maximize 
their budget. However, if we take a look at the Dutch financial supervisory authorities, 
we find a few specific arrangements in place that change this theoretical outcome. The 
existence of a deposit guarantee system and safeguard clauses, as well as the possibility 
of insurance, leads to a situation in which the Dutch financial supervisory authorities 
do not face any significant financial consequences (Dijkstra, 2009). In the case of 
bankruptcy of a financial institution, the deposit guarantee system ensures the victims 
compensation up to € 100,000.102 Since the average deposit account in the 
                                                 
101 See http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/gxiomu23. 
102 In October 2008 the Dutch Minister of Finance decided to increase the amount from € 40,000 (with an own risk 
of 10% for the last € 20,000) to €100,000 for a period of one year. In October 2009 it became clear that the amount of 
€ 100,000 will remain for the period until December 2010. 
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Netherlands amounts to € 9,357, it is likely that the majority of the victims will not 
hold the financial supervisory authority liable because they are fully compensated.103 
This reduces the threat of liability for financial supervisors significantly.  
 
Furthermore, there are so-called safeguard clauses between the financial supervisory 
authorities and the Ministry of Finance. Through the existence of these safeguard 
clauses, the financial supervisory authorities face a financial risk of only 10% of their 
budget, when being held liable.104 As a result, the financial supervisory authorities will 
not face the full consequences despite being held liable. Financial supervisory 
authorities also have the opportunity to insure their financial risk which limits the 
financial impact of being held liable even further.105 Compared to the other 
consequences, the financial impact of liability on the authority’s budget can be 
considered medium.  
 
Next, there exists no clear standard of care. It is therefore very difficult to assess 
whether the actual level of care of the supervisory authority corresponds with the 
reasonable care standard. As a consequence, the likelihood, and thus the threat, of 
being held liable diminishes. This can also be seen in practice. Dutch financial 
supervisory authorities have, till now, never been convicted to pay compensation 
despite the fact that victims of bankrupted financial institutions have tried to hold 
them liable on grounds of supervisory failure in several cases. Overall, it is not likely 
that tort law will provide the Dutch financial supervisory authorities with sufficient 




In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that most consequences also contribute to 
reputation damage of the financial supervisory authority or its individual members. 
The threat of reputation damage can be an important mechanism to alter behaviour. 
This is most common in the private sector, characterized by competition. The private 
sector is generally characterized by a profit maximizing model. A bad reputation will 
lead to a decline in sales resulting in lower profit as customers will move from the bad 
reputation company to a competitor. Both the likelihood of facing this consequence 
and the magnitude of its financial impact is high. It is therefore likely that the fear of 
reputation damage will give private companies strong incentives to take adequate care 
in performing their activities. What about financial supervisory authorities? Reputation 
damage is likely to occur as we can witness in practice. Fuelled by the media, the 
Dutch Financial Market Authority, the Dutch Central Bank and its chairman, Mr. 
                                                 
103 See Statistics Netherlands: http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=70813ned&D1=12-
15&D2=a&HDR=T&STB=G1&VW=T. 
104 See the letter of the Dutch Ministry of Finance FM 2006-01624M dated 17 November 2006. 
105 See Dutch Parliament 2005/2006, publication 29 708, no. 39, p. 12. 
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Nout Wellink, for example, came under pressure after incidents with regard to Icesave 
and the collapse of the DSB-bank. It is likely that reputation damage has 
consequences for the future career opportunities of individual financial supervisors. 
This may affect their private wealth in the longer term. The magnitude of this impact 
is however uncertain and depends on a lot of variables. The financial impact of 
reputation damage on the authority’s budget is also difficult to assess. A bad 
reputation might have an impact on the future budget of the supervisory authority as 
government is not willing to spend money on governmental authorities that do a poor 
job. On the other hand, lowering the budget of a financial supervisory authority will 
result in less available resources for performing supervision, and thus increasing the 
probability of future financial crisis. To my opinion, government will not take such a 
risk. Therefore, I assume that the financial impact from reputation damage on the 
future budget of the supervisory authority is limited. Based on a high likelihood and a 
relatively low financial impact, the fear of reputation damage will give financial 
supervisory authorities some incentives to pursue the public interest. However, it is 
important to notice that the desire to maintain a favourable reputation can also result 
in taking decisions to keep interest groups quiet and mistakes out of the public eye 
(Leaver, 2009). 
 
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
There are many causes for financial supervisory failure. The most common are, lack of 
knowledge, lack of skills, and, lack of information. However, these causes may not 
provide a complete picture. An important factor that could contribute to financial 
supervisory failure is a lack of incentives. Delegation of the supervisory task by society 
to the government, who in turn delegates this task to specialized authorities, leads to 
the classical principal-agent problem. Since the principals (in this case society and 
government) are not able to monitor the agent (the financial supervisory authority) 
adequately, the financial supervisor may pursue his self-interest instead of the public 
interest, ultimately resulting in supervisory failure. To overcome this problem, 
incentives should be in place to stimulate the financial supervisors to pursue the 
public interest or, at least, discourage them from pursuing their self-interest. From a 
law and economics perspective, accountability could give financial supervisors 
sufficient incentives for performing their supervisory role with adequate care. 
However, to what degree is this the case for the Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities? Based on my analysis in the previous part, the following overall picture 
can be made (Table 7):106 
 
                                                 
106 The distinction between direct and indirect relates to the fact that it is likely that some consequences not only have 
a direct impact on the private wealth or budget, but also contribute to reputation damage. 
75 
 
Table 7: Accountability as an effective incentive mechanism? 
Consequence: 













Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Dismissal and 
suspension 
Yes Yes No No Low Low No 
Overruling No No No Yes Low Low No 
Parliamentary 
survey 
No Yes No Yes Medium Low No 
Liability n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Low Medium No 
Reputation damage Yes Yes Yes n.a. Low Low Medium 
 
From Table 7 it becomes clear that, despite the fact that most of the consequences 
may have a negative financial impact (direct or indirect by means of reputation 
damage) on the private wealth of a financial supervisor or the budget of the 
supervisory authority, the likelihood that these consequences occur in practice can be 
considered low (with an exception for reputation damage) even as the magnitude of 
their impact. Thus, the threat of facing consequences from being held accountable, is 
not severe enough to give the Dutch financial supervisory authorities sufficient 
incentives for performing their supervisory tasks with adequate care.  
 
4.6 Commentary 
As this chapter was originally published in 2010 it does not take into account the 
change of legislation that took place in the Netherlands as per 1 July 2012. As of that 
date, the liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities was limited to cases of 
gross negligence and/or bad faith.107 What does this change in legislation mean for the 
findings and conclusion of this chapter?  
 
Chapter 4 concluded that tort law will not provide the Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities with sufficient incentives to pursue the public interest with adequate care. 
This was based on the fact that different characteristics, such as the existence of a 
deposit guarantee system, diminish the likelihood of being held liable. By introducing 
a standard of gross negligence, it becomes even more difficult to hold the Dutch 
financial supervisory authorities liable based on shortcomings in performing financial 
supervision. As a result, supervisory authorities will not receive sufficient incentives to 
pursue the public interest with adequate care. The introduction of a gross negligence 
regime will therefore not change the findings and conclusion of this chapter.  
 
                                                 



























5 Compensating victims of bankrupted financial 
institutions: A law and economic analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The bankruptcy of financial institutions and the manner in which victims are being 
compensated is receiving a substantial amount of attention these days. When a 
financial institution goes bankrupt, one of the first questions that arises is how will 
victims of bankrupted financial institutions be compensated? Of course, the number 
of potential victims in the case of bankruptcy of a financial institution is huge. One 
can think of the shareholders as primary victims since they will often lose the money 
they have invested in a company; other victims are obviously creditors who may not 
be completely reimbursed by the proceeds of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, 
the type of victims we are interested in, as they constitute the majority of concern for 
policymakers, are the clients who simply have put their savings into a bank account, in 
other words depositors. So, what are the compensation mechanisms they can rely on 
if their financial institution goes bankrupt? 
 
The core of the compensation system is formed through a deposit guarantee system. 
Such a mechanism, aiming at the protection (IADI, 2009; Groeneveld, 2009) of clients 
of financial institutions is certainly not limited to Europe. Almost all Western 
countries have such a guarantee system to maintain stability of the financial system by 
preventing bank runs. However, despite the existence of this system, depositors may 
face losses when their deposits exceed the guaranteed amount. In these cases, they will 
have to rely on other instruments to get compensation for these losses, whereby tort 
law can be considered the most important instrument. Since the primary tortfeasor, 
the bankrupted financial institution, will not offer significant compensation options, 
victims will try to hold the financial supervisory authority or even the government 
liable. Financial supervisory authorities and governments have, compared to 
bankrupted financial institutions, deep pockets. The current structure of this 
compensation system raises several interesting questions. First, how does it affect 
incentives for welfare improving behaviour by all stakeholders involved? Thus the 
question could be asked to what extent the compensation system affects the incentives 
of potential clients to choose their financial institution carefully; the question could 
equally be asked how the guarantee system is financed and how does this system 
subsequently affect the behaviour of financial institutions and their leading officials? 
The guarantee system may also affect incentives of supervisory authorities which 
merits equal attention. Finally, one might ask how the different compensation 
mechanisms influence each other with regard to their incentive generating capability. 
 
Even though plenty of literature has addressed the deposit guarantee system and its 
impact on the behaviour of banks and depositors, none of these papers included its 
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impact on financial supervisory authorities and the government, nor do these papers 
address other compensation mechanisms that might be used by victims of bankrupted 
financial institutions. This chapter aims to address these issues. In order to examine 
the effect of compensation mechanisms on the incentives for the various stakeholders, 
we will use the insights of law and economics, as this methodology allows us to 
carefully analyze how regulation will affect the incentives and behaviour of 
stakeholders involved, and what the effects will be on social welfare. 
 
Since deposit guarantee systems exist in many jurisdictions and in different forms, we 
will address potential effects of such a deposit guarantee system in a rather abstract 
manner; however, we will also focus on the regulation of one particular legal regime to 
discuss and analyze how it works in a more detailed way. For that reason we have 
chosen the deposit guarantee system (in relation to other compensation mechanisms 
available) in the Netherlands. We examine to what extent the Dutch compensation 
structure provides sufficient incentives for all parties involved in case of bankruptcy of 
financial institutions. Hence, we examine the impact of the current compensation 
structure on the behaviour of depositors, financial institutions, financial supervisory 
authorities and government. The goal of this chapter is to provide an economic 
analysis, using the law and economics methodology, of the compensation system for 
victims of bankrupted financial institutions in the Netherlands. In addition, we expect 
that the analysis of one particular legal system will also allow a few general comments 
on the pros and cons of various compensation techniques, including a deposit 
guarantee system. 
 
In addition to this introduction, this chapter is divided into five sections. The 
following section (5.2) describes the compensation structure that currently exists in 
the Netherlands in more detail. The next section (5.3) provides an economic analysis 
of this compensation structure. Using insights from law and economics we make 
predictions with regard to the incentive effects of this structure on all relevant parties, 
being the (actual and potential) depositors, the financial institutions, the financial 
supervisory authorities and the government. In Section 5.4 we introduce some 
adjustments to the current compensation system in the Netherlands. Section 5.5 
contains the conclusions and recommendations of our research. 
5.2 Compensation structure 
A client who has deposited his savings with a financial institution that subsequently 
goes into bankruptcy has a variety of ways to look for compensation of his losses. The 
core of the compensation structure in the case of bankruptcy of a financial institution 
is formed by the deposit guarantee system. This system provides (automatic) 
compensation for the amounts deposited by the client in the bank. Given the low 
threshold, this procedure is the easiest and most obvious way for the victim to obtain 
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compensation of his losses. However, compensation through this system is restricted 
to a certain amount. When depositors lose more than this amount, they can try a 
number of other mechanisms to collect compensation for the remainder of their 
losses. The most important are submitting their claim to the liquidator and the use of 
tort law. In the following sections we describe this compensation structure in more 
detail. 
 
5.2.1 Deposit guarantee system 
The primary objective of any deposit guarantee scheme is to provide protection, thus 
allowing depositors to be quickly repaid should a financial institution fail. If depositors 
have an accurate and clear understanding of the protection offered, then panic 
behaviour, like bank runs, can be avoided. In that way, deposit guarantee systems 
contribute to the financial stability of a country (Campbell et al., 2007; Groeneveld, 
2009). The bankruptcies of various financial institutions in the sixties and seventies 
resulted in most countries establishing explicit deposit guarantee systems. The 
international affair with regard to the Bank for Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) was the reason for developing European legislation. In 1994 the European 
Council published Directive 94/19 EC on deposit guarantee schemes, followed in 
2009 by an addition, namely Directive 2009/14 of 11 March 2009. This new directive 
replaces some of the articles of the Directive from 1994. Having introduced the 
European regulatory framework of the deposit guarantee system, it is now time to 
discuss the Dutch deposit guarantee system. 
 
After the bankruptcy of Teixeria de Mattos in 1966, the Dutch Central Bank together 
with the banks decided that small depositors should be protected from the bankruptcy 
of financial institutions. This resulted in a collective guarantee system that was 
embedded in the Act on the Supervision of the Credit System in 1978.  Since that 
time, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) has been responsible for operating the deposit 
guarantee system. After the collapse of Van der Hoop Bankiers in 2005, the Dutch 
government adjusted the existing regulation. The financial crisis of 2008 led to another 
adjustment of the existing deposit guarantee system. In the following paragraphs, we 
will describe the main elements of the deposit guarantee system. The starting point is 
formed by the contents of the EC Directives, followed by details of the Dutch system. 
 
One of the most important elements of any deposit guarantee system is the minimum 
level of coverage it provides. Initially, the Directive of 1994 established a deposit 
guarantee protection for individuals of at least € 20,000. However, due to the financial 
crisis that started in 2008, the Council of the European Union agreed, that it was a 
priority to restore confidence and proper functioning of the financial sector. This 
decision led to the Directive 2009/14 which states that all member states should 
provide deposit guarantee protection for individuals of at least € 50,000 for at least 
one year, compared with the former figure of € 20,000. Furthermore, the Directive 
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states in section 3 that by December 2010, coverage for the aggregate deposits of each 
depositor should be set at € 100,000. The possibility for Member States to limit 
coverage to a specified percentage should also be discontinued as stated in section 14 
of Directive 2009/14. But, what about the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme? 
 
Initially, the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme ensured an amount of € 20,000. In 2005 
this amount was increased to € 40,000. Of this amount, € 20,000 was completely 
guaranteed, while depositors faced a risk of 10% on the next € 20,000. As a 
consequence, depositors could only receive a maximum compensation of € 38,000 if 
their deposits exceeded the amount of € 40,000. This kind of coverage is referred to as 
co-insurance. As a result of a legislative change (following the financial crisis) in 
October 2008 the guaranteed amount rose from 40,000 to € 100,000 without any co-
insurance. This amount is over of the prescribed level of coverage (€ 50,000) by the 
European Commission for 2010, but in line with the years to follow. 
 
Another element is the period in which the pay-out takes place. The former Directive 
provided a pay-out delay of three months which could be extended to nine months. 
However, this long period does not adequately contribute to depositor confidence. In 
the latest Directive, the pay-out delay was therefore reduced to a period of 20 working 
days. This period should only be extended under exceptional circumstances. Currently, 
the pay-out period in the Netherlands is set at a maximum of three months after 
receiving the claim from the depositor. 
 
Until now, there exists no harmonized manner with regard to funding the deposit 
guarantee system. The European Directive 94/19 did not address the point of 
financing. The Directive of 2009 states that the European Commission should have 
submitted a report on the funding mechanisms of deposit guarantee systems to the 
European Parliament and Council by 31 December 2009. The outcome of this report 
could have led to appropriate amendments to the Directive of 2009 by the European 
Commission. Thus far, we have not encountered any amendments relating to the 
funding of the deposit guarantee system. 
 
In general, a deposit guarantee system can be funded in three ways, namely ex ante 
and ex post, and a combination of ex ante and ex post mechanisms (IADI, 2009). Ex 
ante funding requires the accumulation and maintenance of a fund to cover deposit 
insurance claims and related expenses prior to a failure actually occurring. It is funded 
by its members through contributions, insurance premiums and other means. Ex post 
funding occurs after the bankruptcy of a financial institution. The costs for the claims 
arising from the deposit guarantee system are born by the surviving financial 
institutions. Research by the European Commission in 2007 shows that 16 Member 
States are using an ex ante funding system, while 6 Member States have adopted an ex 
post scheme. Five deposit guarantee systems do not meet the requirement to be 
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classified as either ex ante or ex post. These schemes can be categorized under a 
mixed system (IADI, 2009). 
 
The funding mechanism used in the Netherlands is regulated in article 3:259 section 4 
of the Act on Financial Supervision. The Dutch system is based on ex post funding. 
Thus, only after the failure of a financial institution, do the surviving banks have to 
contribute. The level of contribution of each financial institution is based on their 
market share in the savings market. Article 3:261 section 3 of the Dutch Financial 
Supervision Act states the legal consequences of receiving compensation. By receiving 
compensation from the deposit guarantee system, the victim transfers his claim on the 
bankrupted financial institution to the Dutch Central Bank. In this way, the Dutch 
Central Bank might get compensation from the bankruptcy’s proceedings. 
 
Until now, we have talked about explicit deposit guarantee systems. These systems are 
formally embedded in law. However, some scholars assume that every country has 
also a de facto implicit deposit guarantee system in place because governments are 
pressured to provide assistance when a large systemic banking distress occurs 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005). In the current financial crisis we have witnessed the bail 
out of several large financial institutions around the world by the government. 
Examples include Bear Stearns, Fanny Mae, Freddy Mac, Citygroup Inc. and Fortis. 
The bail out or nationalization of a distressed financial institution is not a mechanism 
on which depositors can rely. It is a mechanism which can only be applied by the 
government. Currently, there exists no specific law in the Netherlands which provides 
the government a legal foundation for a bail out of a financial institution. In the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria and more recently Germany, these laws already 
exist. A bail out of a financial institution by the government means that a depositor 
will not face any losses. Simply put, a bail out frees a financial from bankruptcy, thus 
allowing it to meet its obligations. Bail outs, or nationalization of financial institutions, 
often relate to the phenomenon ‘too big to fail’. This phrase refers to the idea that the 
largest and most interconnected businesses are so vital that a government can not 
allow them to declare bankruptcy because said failure would have a disastrous effect 
on the overall economy.108 
 
5.2.2 Submit claim to liquidator 
If a depositor would face losses in excess of the € 100,000, which is currently 
guaranteed through the deposit guarantee system in the Netherlands, he or she will 
not be compensated by the deposit guarantee system for the remainder. The most 
obvious way to receive compensation for these excess losses is to submit a claim to 
                                                 





the liquidator. Such an action can be done according to section 110 of the Dutch 
Insolvency Act. In theory this submission can lead to compensation still being paid, 
but in practice ordinary creditors (which the depositor would in that case be) usually 
have little chance of fully recovering their losses. The reason is that there may be 
many so-called proprietary creditors, like mortgage holders, social security institutions, 
etc., as well as (often very important) the tax authorities. Only after those claims have 
been satisfied will compensation to ordinary creditors be paid. In reality, ordinary 
creditors often receive little or no compensation through the bankruptcy proceedings 
(Couwenberg & De Jong 2006, 2008). Compared to the deposit guarantee system, 
compensation from the bankruptcy proceedings will often take a long time; the 
bankruptcy of Van der Hoop Bankiers in 2005 is an example. The liquidators of this 
bankruptcy expected that the liquidation could be completed in 2010. 
 
5.2.3 Tort law 
Another way of trying to obtain compensation for the remaining losses is by holding 
one or more of the parties involved liable. A depositor can try to hold the bankrupted 
financial institution itself, its board members, the financial supervisory authorities or 
the government liable for their shortcomings. In reality, claims against the institution 
itself or the government are rare. Tort claims against (former) board members are 
theoretically possible, but the threshold for liability is relatively high. The mere fact 
that a financial institution goes bankrupt and can not meet its obligations does not 
necessarily imply that board members acted wrongfully. In addition, it is unlikely that 
board members have enough assets to pay for all the damages. 
 
Therefore, a more likely candidate to sue (often discussed in legal doctrine, but 
increasingly also seen in practice) is the financial supervisory authority who failed to 
act appropriately to prevent the bankruptcy of the financial institution (Tison, 2005; 
Giessen, 2006). Liability of financial supervisory authorities is, however, a 
controversial topic in Europe. Some countries have statutory protections in place to 
protect their financial supervisory authorities from being sued, while other countries 
are submitting their financial supervisory authorities to normal liability rules (Dijkstra, 
2009). In the Netherlands, there exist no specific rules on the legal basis on which 
these parties can be held liable, so the legal basis is founded by article 6:162 of the 
Dutch Civil Code. Examples of tort cases against Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities include the Vie d’Or case in which the DNB was held liable and the Befra 
case in which the AFM was held liable. However, in both cases, the liability was not 
established by court, and as a result, they were not obligated to pay any compensation. 
 
Compared to the deposit guarantee scheme, compensation via tort law is not 
restricted to a certain amount. In other words, victims might be fully compensated. 
On the other hand, while compensation from the deposit guarantee system is 
83 
 
guaranteed and takes place within a relatively short period after the bankruptcy, tort 
cases may leave a person waiting many years for an uncertain outcome. 
 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
In this section we have outlined the compensation structure that currently exists in the 
Netherlands when a financial institution goes bankrupt. It is relatively clear that the 
most attractive system from the victim’s perspective is the deposit guarantee fund. 
First it provided a guarantee that savings up to € 40,000 would be paid back, and in 
2008 this amount was even increased to € 100,000. Given the low threshold of 
recovery, this will be the primary tool used by victims. Next victims can choose to 
submit their claim to the liquidator. However, it is not likely that depositors will 
receive (full) compensation from the bankruptcy proceedings since they are only 
ordinary creditors. A third tool which may be used is tort law, in which the most likely 
defendant is the financial supervisory authority, held responsible for his failure to 
adequately supervise the financial institution in question. 
 
Table 8: Characteristics of the different compensation mechanisms. 
Compensation 
mechanism: 
Compensation level Pay-out period Success rate 
Deposit guarantee fund Limited to € 100,000 < 3 months 100% 
Submitting claim to 
liquidator 
Full Often several years < 100% 
Tort law Full Often several years < 100% 
 
5.3 An economic analysis of the compensation structure 
5.3.1 Introduction 
We will now turn to the central question of this chapter: the economic effects of the 
various compensation mechanisms for victims of bankrupted financial institutions. 
We will mainly address the deposit guarantee system and tort law and analyze, with the 
use of insights from law and economics, how these instruments could affect 
stakeholder behaviour.  
 
5.3.2 Explicit deposit guarantee systems 
Despite the fact that a deposit guarantee system can contribute to financial stability by 
making bank runs less likely, it can also ex ante create adverse incentives for the parties 
involved. In general, the existence of a deposit guarantee system will lead to moral 
hazard as the various stakeholders are sheltered from the negative consequences of 
their behaviour (Shavell, 1979). Clearly, the more complete the deposit guarantee 
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system, the more likely it is that moral hazard will occur (Schich, 2008). We will now 
more specifically analyze how such a deposit guarantee system could potentially affect 
incentives of the various stakeholders. 
 
Incentives of financial institutions 
The existence of a deposit guarantee system can give financial institutions an incentive 
to pursue more risky investments (Demirgüç-Kunt & Kane, 2002; Goodhart, 2009). 
This behaviour is called moral hazard. Moral hazard in banking arises when banks are 
provided with incentives to take risks and can retain the returns, while still passing the 
(potential or realized) costs of the risk to the depositors, financial supervisory 
authorities or taxpayers (Mullineux & Murinde, 2003; Groeneveld, 2009). In addition, 
risky financial institutions will often pay higher interest rates to attract funding. We 
have witnessed this with Icesave, which offered an interest rate of 5.25% compared 
with an interest rate of 3.4% offered by Rabobank during the same period. So it is 
likely that a deposit guarantee system encourages (excessive) risk-taking by insured 
institutions leading to a negative impact on their solvency (Santomero, 1997).  
 
However, the way a deposit guarantee system is funded may, to some extent, 
counterbalance these adverse incentives. Ex ante funding with the use of risk-based 
premiums can give the participating financial institutions incentives to lower the risk 
of their operations in order to lower the premiums they have to pay for the deposit 
guarantee fund. Given that financial institutions are profit maximizing institutions, 
they will try to lower their premiums as much as possible in order to maximize their 
profits. In this way, a risk based premium will give financial institutions incentives to 
behave with less risk (Crocker & Snow, 2000; Groeneveld, 2009). Until now, only 
eight European countries apply a risk based contribution to their deposit guarantee 
fund. The differences ranged from a minimum contribution of 75% to a maximum of 
140% of the standard amount (European Commission, 2008). One might question 
whether these differences will give financial institutions sufficient incentives to lower 
the risk of their operations. 
 
Looking at the funding of the Dutch deposit guarantee fund, one may notice that the 
contribution by financial institutions (1) is ex post and (2) depends on the size of their 
business and not on their risk exposure. Therefore, it is unlikely that the current 
deposit insurance system in the Netherlands gives sufficient incentives to the financial 
institutions for keeping their risk level average (Kam Hon Chu, 2003). This means that 
there has to be a strong supervisory system to handle these potentially adverse effects 
from the existing deposit guarantee fund. 
 
Incentives of potential depositors 
Another question is how a deposit guarantee system affects incentives of potential 
clients (depositors) wishing to bring their savings to a financial institution. A deposit 
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guarantee system reduces the incentives for depositors to monitor the risks of the 
financial institutions they are doing or willing to do business with. The reason is that if 
depositors know ex ante that they are fully being compensated when a financial 
institution goes bankrupt, they have no incentive to look critically at the financial 
institutions they are willing to do business with. It is likely that they will care little 
about the assets their institutions hold or their likelihood of failure as their claim is on 
the government, not against the financial institution itself (Santomero, 1997). The 
power of this adverse incentive depends on (1) the level and (2) structure of deposit 
coverage. Within Europe, the level of deposit coverage varies amongst the member 
countries with a minimum level of € 50,000 as stated in a directive of the European 
Commission. Calculations of the European Commission show that 80% of savings is 
already covered at this level (Groeneveld, 2009). 
 
Besides the level of deposit insurance, the structure of the coverage also impacts the 
incentives for depositors. Some countries implement a certain excess in their deposit 
coverage. For example, the first layer, for instance € 20,000, is guaranteed in full, while 
the next layer, say € 80,000, may only be guaranteed up to 50%. In this way depositors 
still face a certain financial risk; it should encourage them to monitor the financial 
institutions they are doing business more carefully. This mechanism is called co-
insurance. However, as already mentioned, the European Commission has abandoned 
the use of co-insurance in their new directive (2009/14). 
 
The deposit guarantee system in the Netherlands appears rather generous: after the 
implementation of Directive 94/19 the guaranteed amount was € 40,000 (with co-
insurance of 10% over the last € 20,000), and in 2008 it was increased to € 100,000. 
Since full coverage is guaranteed to his amount, there is no risk sharing. Deposit 
holders, who only have an amount at stake of no more than € 100,000 are ex ante sure 
of being fully compensated, and can, in theory, go for the financial institution that 
offers the highest profits (in interest rates) without having to worry about the solvency 
of the institution where they bring their savings.  
 
It is important to note that the previously described group of depositors is not the 
only category of stakeholders of a financial institution. Uninsured depositors like other 
creditors and shareholders, are still exposed to risks from the financial institution. This 
should encourage them to monitor and limit the riskiness of the bank (Groeneveld, 
2009). A question one might ask is which party is in the best position to monitor 
financial institutions? In this chapter we assume that all parties are equally important 
for monitoring financial institutions. 
 
Incentives of financial supervisory authorities 
Knowing the existence of the deposit guarantee system and its effects on the insured 
institutions and depositors, financial supervisory authorities are forced to take on a 
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more active role (Schich, 2008; Groeneveld, 2009). The question arises of to what 
extent this pressure is felt in practice by financial supervisory authorities. The 
existence of deposit insurance is likely to give financial supervisory authorities an 
adverse incentive. Why? In case of a bankruptcy of a financial institution, society will 
usually immediately look at the role of financial supervisory authorities. The question 
whether the financial supervisory authorities failed in their supervision of the 
bankrupted institution will be asked not only by the public at large, but also by victims 
of bankrupted financial institutions. If the answer to this question is positive, it is 
likely that victims will hold the financial supervisory authorities liable on the grounds 
of shortcomings in their supervisory role. In this way, the threat of tort law gives 
financial supervisory authorities an incentive to take adequate care in performing their 
supervisory role and ensuring that financial institutions comply with the legal rules. 
However, a deposit guarantee system mitigates this incentive. When a victim knows he 
is going to receive compensation from the deposit guarantee fund, it is very unlikely 
that he or she will try to hold one of the financial supervisory authorities liable. A 
depositor will only do this when the damage he faces is (much) larger than the amount 
he receives from the deposit guarantee fund. Thus, the higher the deposit guarantee 
fund provides coverage, the less likely it is that depositors will hold the financial 
supervisory authority liable. Since the average deposit account in the Netherlands 
amounts to € 9,357 and the deposit guarantee amounts to € 100,000, it is likely that 
the majority of the victims will not hold the financial supervisory authorities liable 
because they are fully compensated.109 As a consequence, the incentive for financial 
supervisory authorities arising from tort law to keep a close watch on the behaviour of 
financial institutions will be smaller. 
 
Incentives of government 
The analysis of the influence of the deposit guarantee system on the incentives of 
government is very similar to that of the financial supervisory authorities. Indeed: in 
case of failure of a financial institution the government is at risk to be called upon by 
victims or could, assuming it had a role in the failure, could be held liable in tort law. 
Hence, the larger the monetary amounts provided under a deposit guarantee system, 
the less likely the government will be called upon in tort liability, or to provide another 
kind of ex post relief (Kaplow, 2000). In that sense, a deposit guarantee fund reduces 
incentives for government. However, by increasing the reimbursement level 
governments face a greater financial risk (Groeneveld, 2009). This is certainly the case 
in an ex post funding scheme, where the government will often make pay-outs itself 
and then collect the money from the surviving financial institutions (IADI, 2009). In 
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case of a financial crisis, the question remains to what extent the financial institutions 
are able to make their contributions. Government can come under pressure to provide 
financial assistance. 
 
From a law and economics perspective, exposure to (a greater) financial risk gives 
governments incentives to take measures to prevent the failure of financial 
institutions. Governments, consisting of politicians, strive to be re-elected (Alesina & 
Tabellini, 2007). The failure of a financial institution will result in many costs that are 
ultimately going to be borne by the taxpayers or voters of a country. This may have a 
negative impact on the re-election chances of the current government. Hence, we 
expect that governments facing greater financial risk arising from the deposit 
guarantee schemes (e.g. larger guaranteed amounts) to take measures to prevent such 
an incident from occurring. These measures may consist of tighter financial regulation 
or delegating more power to the supervisory authorities. In this way, the reduced 
incentives from tort law are (partly) being compensated by incentives arising from 
facing (a greater) financial risk. This will only be the case, however, in a financial crisis. 
 
5.3.3 Implicit deposit guarantee systems: bail out or nationalization 
In recent years, we have witnessed the bail out of several financial institutions, not 
only in the United States but in Europe as well. As a result of the financial crisis the 
US government bailed out AIG, Bank of America and Citigroup, while in Europe 
Northern Rock, Fortis and Hypo Real Estate were, amongst others, bailed out by their 
governments. The bail out of these financial institutions can largely be related to the 
term ‘too big to fail’. 
 
The question arises what the effects may be of this nationalization on the incentives 
for the parties involved. For the financial institutions it might encourage recklessness 
since the government would intervene (e.g. by bailing out the company) in the event 
of bankruptcy. It raises the issue of moral hazard in business operations. When 
depositors know ex ante that the government is going to bail out large financial 
institutions whenever they fail, they have little incentives to monitor these institutions 
themselves due to the fact that they will not face any damage at all in case of a bail out 
by the government (Beck et al., 2010). The same argument applies to financial 
supervisory authorities. A bail out makes it unlikely that they will face any legal 
consequences from the depositors, as the latter have no damage. However, 
shareholders of the bailed out financial institution will incur damage, and may have an 
incentive to hold the financial supervisory authorities liable on grounds of 
shortcomings in their supervisory role. So, a bail out may limit some of the threat of 
tort law for the financial supervisory authorities and, as a consequence, mitigates the 




5.3.4 Tort law 
Tort law can be seen as fulfilling two main functions, namely compensation and 
prevention (Van Boom, 2006). Standard law and economics theory predicts that the 
threat of tort law will give potential tortfeasors incentives to comply with the legal 
standards and thus prevent or discourage unlawful behaviour. By obliging the 
tortfeasor to compensate damages after the event, he is encouraged to act with the 
appropriate level of care before such an event could occur. The question arises 
whether tort law provides the various stakeholders in the case we examined with 
sufficient incentives in order to prevent the bankruptcy of a financial institution. 
 
In the previous section we saw what the impact of a deposit guarantee system has on 
the incentives for financial supervisory authorities arising from tort law: these 
incentives may simply be reduced. Furthermore, there are so-called safeguard clauses 
between the financial supervisory authorities and the Ministry of Finance. Through 
the existence of these safeguard clauses, the financial supervisory authorities face a 
financial risk of only 10% of their budget when being held liable. As a result, the 
financial supervisory authorities will not face the full consequences despite being held 
liable. Financial supervisory authorities also have the opportunity to insure their 
financial risk which, if not sufficiently remedied by moral hazard, limits the financial 
impact of being held liable even further. As a consequence, the likelihood, and thus 
the threat, of being held liable diminishes. This can also be seen in practice. Dutch 
financial supervisors have, until now, never been convicted to pay compensation 
despite the fact that victims of bankrupted financial institutions have tried to hold 
them liable on grounds of supervisory failure in several cases. Overall, it is not likely 
that tort law will provide the Dutch financial supervisory authorities with sufficient 
incentives (Dijkstra, 2009). 
 
The same line of reasoning applies to government liability except for the fact that the 
government is not able to insure their financial risk. There also exist no safeguard 
clauses for the government. Hence, if they are being held liable they face the total 
financial risk. The fact that financial supervisory authorities only face a 10% financial 
risk of their budget also increases the financial risk for the government. From this 
perspective, it is likely that the government will face more incentives from tort law 
when compared with the financial supervisory authorities. However, the existence of a 
deposit guarantee system reduces the incentives arising from tort law as the 
probability of being held liable diminishes. It is therefore unlikely that tort law will 
give the government sufficient incentives. 
 
The final question that arises concerns the effects of tort law on the financial 
institutions and the depositors (taxpayers). A depositor could, in theory, still hold the 
financial institution or its chief officers liable for the losses suffered. Again, the 
problem of depositors being fully compensated by the deposit guarantee fund results 
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in a lack of incentive to use tort law against the financial institution or its officers. 
However, when a depositor knows he will not be fully compensated by the deposit 
guarantee system, he has an incentive to monitor the financial institution he does 
business with. Given that in some legal systems, like in the Netherlands, the deposit 
guarantee system is very generous (guarantee up to € 100,000), one can not expect 
many incentives from tort law with depositors who have savings below that amount. 
We therefore expect that the incentives arising from tort law for both the financial 
institutions and depositors to be limited. 
 
5.3.5 Submit claim to liquidator 
When a depositor faces damage (because he had deposits which exceeded the deposit 
insurance) he or she might submit a claim to the liquidator. Because the outcome of 
the liquidation process is uncertain (the depositor does not know if or how much he 
will receive out of the liquidation) he has an incentive to monitor the financial 
institution he is doing business with. However, exactly the same problem arises here 
as with tort law: since the deposit guarantee system is comprehensive, the possibility 
of bankruptcy does not provide enough incentives for monitoring by depositors. 
Moreover, there is an abundance of economic literature on the effects of bankruptcy 
laws, showing precisely how (financial) institutions may use the bankruptcy system 
(e.g. to restructure) (White, 2008). Hence, submitting a claim to the liquidator will not 
lead to any incentives for financial institutions. The same goes for the government and 
the financial supervisory authorities: it is not likely that they will receive incentives 
from the fact that a depositor might submit its claim to a liquidator. 
 
5.3.6 Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that the existence of a deposit guarantee system can to a 
large extent dilute incentives for monitoring the behaviour of financial institutions. 
One can expect that this conclusion may particularly affect the behaviour of 
depositors more, since a guarantee system effectively removes risk from them. To 
some extent it may equally lead to moral hazard on the side of the financial institution 
itself. Also, since depositors will be fully compensated (depending upon the generosity 
of the system), financial supervisory authorities or the government no longer face the 
threat (and corresponding incentives) from tort law. This may also negatively affect 
their incentives. 
 
Similar problems may arise in the case of a bailout or nationalization. A major 
difference is, however, that the deposit guarantee system is of a structural nature and 
hence provides certainty ex ante to depositors, whereas this is less the case with a 
bailout system. Where a bailout system may be in favour of larger financial institutions 
(too big to fail), a deposit guarantee system may, to the contrary, favour smaller 
institutions: it makes it attractive for smaller entities with lower start-up costs to enter 
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the market (e.g. through internet banking), offering very attractive conditions (e.g. 
high interest rates) to potential clients. An effect of the deposit guarantee system is 
that clients need no longer ex ante to worry about the financial viability of the 
institution and, hence, have no incentive to monitor the solvency or operations of the 
institutions. One could expect that the more generous a deposit guarantee system is, 
the more it would become attractive for smaller, low operation-cost institutions to 
enter the market and offer high interest rates and engage in risky behaviour. 
 
Of course there are other mechanisms affecting incentives of financial institutions 
which we did not incorporate. One issue, related to the deposit guarantee system is 
that the system is financed by the financial institutions. However, contrary to what 
theory predicts, the contributions do not seem to be risk related. Instead, they are 
largely related to the size of the market share of a financial institution, once more 
favouring smaller financial institutions. Second, the incentives of financial institutions 
are also affected by corporate governance, specifically the control exercised by 
shareholders on directors and by the market of corporate control (Pacces, 2008). 
Moreover, financial institutions can not simply enter the market, try to acquire a large 
share of customers by offering attractive interest rates, obtain large profits and 
dividends, and, subsequently, go bankrupt. There is a detailed financial and solvency 
regulation which, to some extent, limits excessive risk taking by financial institutions. 
However, these financial regulations often provide a minimum protection; beyond 
following the mandatory regulation, financial institutions still have a large amount of 
discretion on how to invest, how to attract clients, what type of interest rates to offer, 
etc. 
 
5.4 Improving the current compensation system from an incentive perspective 
5.4.1 Introduction 
We have seen that it is unlikely that the current compensation structure will provide 
adequate incentives for the stakeholders involved. In order to solve this problem, we 
suggest making adjustments to the current system. From this perspective we have to 
take a closer look at both the deposit guarantee system and tort law. With regard to 
the deposit guarantee system this means that we can think about changing the amount 
of coverage (which implies shifting the balance from the deposit guarantee system to 
the use of tort law), introducing co-insurance, and introducing risk based 
contributions, or a combination of these three adjustments. Regarding tort law we 
might think about abandoning it or replacing it with a system of first party insurance. 
In the sections below we will outline the possible consequences of these adjustments 




5.4.2 Deposit guarantee system 
As we indicated in Section 5.3.2, there are a few inefficiencies in the current deposit 
guarantee system, at least as far as providing incentives to the parties involved is 
concerned. The most obvious way to improve the incentives is by lowering the 
amount of coverage of the deposit guarantee system. By lowering the coverage level, 
depositors will face more risk and hence will have more incentives to monitor the 
financial institutions they are doing business with more carefully. Furthermore, a 
lower coverage level will also have a positive effect on the incentives of financial 
institutions. It is likely that a lower coverage level will result in less moral hazard and, 
therefore, in less riskier activities by financial institutions. Lowering the coverage level 
also implies shifting the balance from the deposit guarantee system to the use of tort 
law. The chance that a depositor is not fully compensated by the deposit guarantee 
system increases when the coverage level decreases. Therefore, it is likely that 
depositors will use tort law more often (by holding the financial supervisory 
authorities or government liable) in order to get compensation. As a result, both the 
government and financial supervisory authorities will face a greater risk of being held 
liable and, consequently, will have more incentives to keep a close watch on the 
behaviour of financial institutions. So, lowering the coverage level of the deposit 
guarantee fund is obviously the first best solution for improving the incentives for all 
parties involved. 
 
However, we have seen that within the framework of  the EC Directive, the possibilities 
of  lowering the guaranteed amount are limited: the amount which currently (in 2009) 
has to be guaranteed is € 50,000, whereas € 100,000 is now guaranteed under the Dutch 
system. Theoretically, the coverage could be reduced to € 50,000, but that would only be 
a short-term solution: by December 2010, the coverage for aggregate deposits will – as a 
result of  a change in the Directive - have to be € 100,000 anyway. Moreover, the 
difference would merely be symbolic as we previously indicated that the average deposit 
account in the Netherlands amounts to € 9,357. A reduction from € 100,000 to € 50,000 
would not make much of  a difference. Lowering the coverage level under current 
European legislation is not possible. 
 
Second to lowering the coverage level of the deposit guarantee system, we could 
introduce a deductible (referred to as co-insurance), whereby a part of  the loss would 
still be carried by the depositor. This adjustment also results in greater financial risk for 
depositors, forcing them to monitor their financial institutions more closely. Under a co-
insurance, depositors will not be fully compensated by the deposit guarantee system. 
Therefore, it is likely that they will try to hold the government or the financial 
supervisory authorities liable in order to receive full compensation. The threat of  tort 
law will increase, resulting in more incentives for financial supervisory authorities and 
government. It is not likely that financial institutions will face incentives to lower the 
riskiness of  their operations based only on the introduction of  co-insurance. However, 
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the EC directive 2009(14) has abandoned the possibility of  introducing co-insurance. So, 
this adjustment to the existing deposit guarantee system is also not possible under 
current European legislation 
 
Another possibility refers to the financing of  the deposit guarantee system. Currently, 
the level of  contribution of  each financial institution is simply based on their market 
share, and is not risk related at all. We indicated above that in other European countries, 
the contributions of  the financial institutions to the deposit guarantee system are risk 
related. Such a system would obviously provide better incentives to financial institutions 
and is, therefore, a more likely candidate for improving the system. But what are the 
consequences for the government, financial supervisory authorities and depositors? It is 
not likely that risk based contributions have a direct impact on the incentives of  the 
government, financial supervisory authorities and depositors. 
 
5.4.3 Tort law 
One of the most rigorous adjustments to the current system that could be pursued 
under current legislation is abandoning the use of tort law. This means that depositors 
are not able to hold the financial supervisory authorities or the government liable in 
case a financial institution goes bankrupt. How may this affect the incentives of the 
various stakeholders involved? Abandoning the use of tort law will obviously have a 
negative impact on the incentives for the government and the financial supervisory 
authorities since they no longer face the threat of being held liable. However, we have 
mentioned in the previous section that both the government and the financial 
supervisory authorities already face few incentives from the use tort law due to the 
existence of a deposit guarantee system. Hence, abandoning the use of tort law has, in 
our opinion, no major impact on the current incentives of the government and 
financial supervisory authorities. 
 
How would this affect the incentives of depositors? Depositors will have more 
incentives to monitor financial institutions since they will lose a mechanism to get 
compensation for damage that exceeds the coverage level of the deposit guarantee 
system. Depositors with savings that exceed the coverage level run a greater risk of 
not getting fully compensated in case of a bankruptcy. In this case, one would expect 
depositors to look more carefully at the financial institutions they are doing or are 
willing to do business with. However, we must not overstate this positive effect on the 
incentives of depositors as it only applies to a relatively small amount of depositors 
(those in excess of € 100,000). 
 
Financial institutions will receive no direct incentives from the fact that depositors are 
not able to hold the government and financial supervisory authorities liable in case of 
their bankruptcy. However, they might receive indirect incentives. We have noticed 
that depositors with savings that exceed the coverage level of the deposit insurance 
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system will probably have more incentives to monitor the financial institutions. In 
order to keep these depositors as customers, financial institutions might want to lower 
the riskiness of their activities. Obviously the impact of this indirect incentive will 
largely depend on the number of customers who have deposit savings that exceed the 
coverage level. A financial institution that is largely dependent on wealthy clients will 
face more incentives to lower the riskiness of their activities compared to institutions 
that are less dependent of these kinds of clients. 
 
Abandoning the use of tort law might therefore result in some minor improvements 
towards the incentives of depositors. However, due to the fact that tort law does not 
only fulfil functions with regard to compensation and prevention, but also to a feeling 
of justice in society, it remains questionable whether totally abandoning the use of tort 
law would be a socially acceptable solution. 
 
A second option for reform is the replacement of tort law by first party insurance. 
First-party insurance is a system whereby insurance coverage is provided and 
compensation is awarded directly by the insurer to the victim. It is thus the potential 
victim who buys this type of insurance coverage, protecting himself from future harm 
and corresponding damages (Faure & Bruggeman, 2008). Hypothetically the 
depositors would choose to buy this kind of insurance. This means that in case of a 
bankruptcy of a financial institution, depositors are no longer able to hold the 
government or the financial supervisory authorities liable in order to receive 
compensation for the remainder of their damage, since tort would be replaced by a 
system of first party insurance. 
 
The question arises how a first party insurance system would affect the incentives of 
the various stakeholders. Consider first the depositor. The depositor has to pay 
premiums in order to receive an amount of compensation above the coverage level 
arising from the deposit guarantee system. In order to provide incentives for the 
depositors, the amount of the premiums should be based on the riskiness of the 
financial institution where the depositor has placed his savings. In this way the 
depositor pays a higher premium if he places his savings in a riskier financial 
institution that offers higher interest rates. Once again, one should notice that this 
kind of insurance applies only to a relatively small group of depositors with deposits in 
excess of € 100,000. Instead of buying a first party insurance, a depositor could also 
allocate his savings to different financial institutions as the guaranteed amount of € 
100,000 applies to each institution individually. This diversification could save the 
depositor the premium he would otherwise have to pay. 
 
The question also arises of how a system of first party insurance affects the incentives 
of financial institutions. If insurance premiums are based on the riskiness of the 
financial institution where the depositor places his savings, financial institutions might 
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modify some of their more risky practices. In order to keep their wealthy customers, 
e.g. those with saving deposits that exceed the coverage level of the deposit guarantee 
system, they may lower their operational risk in order to keep the insurance premiums 
for their main customers minimal. 
 
Finally, the question arises of how this impacts incentives of the government and 
financial supervisory authorities. The more government is exposed under tort law, the 
more it will de facto act as insurer of the depositors. Being exposed to liability, 
government and financial supervisory authorities will have an incentive to take 
adequate measures in order to prevent failures of financial institutions. It is likely that 
governments want to prevent failures because failures will result in political costs. 
These measures might consist of tighter financial regulation or delegating more power 
to national financial supervisory authorities. However, under a system of first party 
insurance, which replaces tort law, it is not possible to hold the financial supervisory 
authorities liable. Thus, financial supervisory authorities and the government will not 
receive any incentives from tort law. 
 
The demand for first party insurance coverage will depend upon the generosity of the 
deposit guarantee system (assuming that the two would be combined). Victims would 
only have a demand for first party coverage for losses not covered under the deposit 
guarantee system. Given that depositors can also allocate their savings to different 
institutions in order to limit their own risk, it is unlikely that there is a real demand for 
this kind of insurance coverage. 
 
5.5 Conclusion and recommendations 
In this chapter we have analyzed, with the use of law and economics, the impact of 
the current compensation system on the incentives of depositors, financial 
institutions, financial supervisory authorities and government in case of the 
bankruptcy of a financial institution. An optimal compensation system should provide 
all stakeholders sufficient incentives for preventing the failure of a financial institution. 
Our analysis, similar to that of earlier studies in the US (Kam Hon Chu, 2003) and 
Europe (Groeneveld, 2009), predicts that the current compensation system in the 
Netherlands, mainly consisting of a combination of a deposit guarantee system and 
tort law, will not provide sufficient incentives for all stakeholders to prevent the 
failure of a financial institution. The existence of a deposit guarantee system has a 
negative impact on the incentives arising from tort law, due to a decrease in the 
likelihood that the government or financial supervisory authorities will be held liable. 
In order to improve the current compensation system with regard to incentives, we 
have suggested lowering the coverage level, introducing co-insurance, abandoning the 
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use of tort law or replacing the role of tort law by a system of first party insurance, 
and changing the finance (funding) structure of the deposit guarantee fund.  
 
The best solution is to lower the current coverage level of the deposit guarantee 
system. This would improve the incentives to all parties involved. However, under 
current European legislation, this is not possible. The same goes for introducing co-
insurance, which is also not possible under the current EC directive. We strongly 
recommend the European Commission to take another look at this directive and its 
impact on the incentives for the various parties. Under current legislation only minor 
adjustments to the deposit guarantee system (of which the introduction of risk based 
premiums are most promising) are possible. Currently, all financial institutions in the 
Netherlands participate in the funding of the deposit guarantee system on the basis of 
their market share. A risk based premium setting could positively affect incentives of 
financial institutions. 
 
We have also discussed the possibility of abandoning the use of tort law. In practice, 
tort law has no major role in compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions 
due to the existence of the deposit guarantee system. From a compensation 
perspective, there are no strong arguments supporting the use of tort law. Our analysis 
shows that this shift will probably lead to more incentives for depositors that have 
deposits in excess of the coverage provided by the deposit guarantee system. 
However, since this specific group of depositors is relatively small, the impact will be 
minor. Abandoning the use of tort law will, on the other hand, negatively affect the 
incentives of financial supervisory authorities and government. This negative effect is, 
however, limited, considering the fact that the existence of a rather generous deposit 
guarantee system already results in a smaller likelihood that financial supervisory 
authorities or the government will be held liable. Due to the fact that tort law does not 
only fulfil functions with regard to compensation and prevention, but also to a feeling 
of justice in society, it remains questionable whether totally abandoning the use of tort 
law would be a socially acceptable solution. 
 
Instead of abandoning the use of tort law, we discussed the introduction of first party 
insurance. A system of first party insurance could replace the role of tort law. Our 
analysis of this alternative showed that first party insurance is likely to give depositors 
more incentives to monitor financial institutions. The question remains, however, 
whether this alternative can be realized in practice as it relates to a relatively small 





As this chapter was originally published in 2010 it does not take into account the 
change of legislation that took place in the Netherlands as of 1 July 2012. As of that 
date, the liability of the Dutch financial supervisory authorities was limited to cases of 
gross negligence and/or bad faith.110 What does this change in legislation mean for the 
findings and conclusion of this chapter? 
 
Chapter 5 mentions in Section 5.3.4 that, under a negligence regime, it is not likely 
that tort law will provide the Dutch financial supervisory authorities with sufficient 
incentives, as the actual liability threat is considered low. Introducing a gross 
negligence regime will not change this outcome, as this regime makes it even more 
difficult to hold the Dutch financial supervisory authorities liable. However, 
depositors will receive, in theory, more incentives to monitor financial institutions, 
since it has become more difficult to hold financial supervisory authorities liable. The 
latter impact should not be overrated, as it was also under a negligence rule difficult to 
hold the financial supervisory authorities liable. 
 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 suggested to introduce a risk-based premium in order to 
improve the incentives of financial institutions. The Dutch parliament decided that, as 
of 1 July 2015, the funding of the Dutch Deposit Guarantee System will be based on 
ex ante risk-based premiums.111 
  
                                                 
110 See article 1:25d of the Dutch Act on financial supervision. 




6 Is limiting financial supervisory liability a way to prevent 
defensive conduct? The outcome of  a European survey 
6.1 Introduction 
The liability of financial supervisory authorities in situations involving the 
performance of their public law supervisory tasks is a topic of recurring debate. 
Financial supervisory authorities have the complex task of monitoring the financial 
markets in order to reduce the probability of distress of individual financial 
institutions as well as on the entire financial system. In doing so, they face the 
possibility of being held liable by both third parties and financial institutions subject to 
their supervision, since they are often required to weigh delicate interests (Tison, 2003; 
Athanassiou, 2011).112 The potential cases of supervisory liability towards financial 
institutions are often based on an overreaction on the part of the financial supervisory 
authority. By reacting too strictly, a financial supervisory authority can create damage, 
as its harsh intervention might affect the reputation of the financial institution under 
supervision and, in turn, weaken depositors’ confidence. Where damage has been 
done in such a case, the financial institution can attempt to hold the supervisory 
authority liable, based on a too severe and thus unjustified intervention. However, if 
the authority acts too leniently, the financial institution can get into serious trouble 
that could eventually result in its bankruptcy. This is likely to cause damage for third 
parties, for which they will try to be compensated by suing the financial supervisory 
authority. The motives underlying their claims are often based on shortcomings in the 
way the supervisory authority exercised its supervision. It may be alleged, for example, 
that the authority, faced with indications of problems at the financial institution, 
should have acted more decisively to protect depositors (Nolan 2013).  
 
At the centre of the debate regarding financial supervisory liability is the question of 
under what conditions and subject to what limitations financial supervisory authorities 
should be held liable (e.g., Athanassiou 2011). The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision suggested in 1997 (Principle 1) protection (normally in law) from personal 
and institutional liability for supervisory actions and/or omissions taken in good faith 
in the course of performing supervisory duties (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1997).113 Since then, an increasing number of member states have chosen 
to introduce criteria of gross negligence and/or bad faith to limit the liability of their 
supervisory authorities (Dijkstra, 2012).114 But why should the liability of financial 
supervisory authorities be limited?  
                                                 
112 In some countries the State (for instance in France) or the Ministry of Finance has to be held liable instead of the 
financial supervisory authority itself. 
113 The revised principles of September 2012 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2012) still contain the 
principle of legal protection for supervisors and their staff (Principle 2).  
114 Most recently, in 2012 the Netherlands changed the liability regime of their financial supervisory authorities, the 
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One of the most important policy arguments for this limitation can be found in the 
concept of “defensive conduct” (e.g. Booth & Squires, 2005; Giesen, 2006; Van Dam, 
2006; Delston & Campbell, 2007; Dragomir, 2010; De Mot & Faure, 2012). Politicians 
and many others are convinced that normal liability rules result in defensive conduct 
on the part of financial supervisory authorities.115 The threat of huge damage claims 
would have a chilling effect on the performance of effective financial supervision. By 
limiting liability to cases of gross negligence or bad faith, this effect would be 
mitigated and hence result in more-effective financial supervision. This line of 
reasoning not only assumes that normal liability rules do influence the behaviour of 
financial supervisory authorities but also goes a step further by arguing that they will 
result in over-deterrence and, hence, defensive conduct. The deterrent effect of tort 
law on financial supervisory authorities is however highly debated, and to my 
knowledge, no overwhelming empirical evidence to support this effect exists (e.g. 
Marsh, 2008; De Mot & Faure, 2012). 
 
Whether financial supervisory liability promotes more-effective financial supervision, 
encourages defensive conduct, or has no significant effect is at heart an empirical 
question.116 This article therefore examines, in a European context, the impact of 
financial supervisory liability by means of empirical research. More specifically, it 
examines the widely used argument that limited financial supervisory liability prevents 
the occurrence of defensive conduct. Objective data on the impact of financial 
supervisory liability is, however, difficult to obtain. Therefore, the strategy adopted is 
to explore this topic through the perceptions of financial supervisors. This was 
performed through a survey of financial supervisors in the European Union. The 
survey results will assist in gaining a better understanding of how financial supervisory 
liability may affect the behaviour of financial supervisors or, at least, how it influences 
their perceptions. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the 
economic analysis of public authority liability in general and addresses several key 
factors regarding financial supervisory authorities. This part makes clear that, from a 
theoretical perspective, the impact of financial supervisory liability is difficult to 
predict. Section 6.3 describes the methodological framework and data set that used to 
examine the impact of financial supervisory liability. Section 6.4 presents the results of 
                                                                                                                  
Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Financial Market Authority (AFM), by limiting their liability to cases of gross 
negligence or bad faith. 
115 In this paper normal liability rules are defined as negligence and no-fault. 
116 To my knowledge, Van Dam (2006) is the only one who has undertaken limited empirical research regarding the 
impact of liability that included financial supervisory authorities. Based on a short questionnaire and interviews with 
Dutch supervisory authorities, including the Dutch financial supervisors who, at that time, were bound to normal 
liability rules (negligence), Van Dam (2006) mentioned that, according to the statements of the supervisors, there was 
no indication for defensive conduct. Supervisors did, however, mention that they would include the outcome of court 
decisions in their policies in order to improve the quality of their supervision. Van Dam (2006) mentioned, 
furthermore, that none of the supervisory authorities asked for a limitation of supervisory liability. 
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the survey, followed by a discussion in Section 6.5. The conclusions are then 
presented in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2 Economic analysis of public authority liability 
This section discusses the economic analysis of public authority liability in general and 
addresses several key factors regarding financial supervisory liability. The economic 
analysis of tort law is traditionally concerned with providing incentives to individuals 
and firms to behave carefully. The reasoning is that the ex ante foresight of potentially 
being held liable will induce the rational, wealth-maximizing actor today to behave 
carefully (Cooter & Ulen, 2008). Only during recent years has the literature begun to 
address the economic analysis of public authority liability (e.g. Posner & Sykes, 2007; 
Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2010; Marsh, 2008; De Geest, 2011; De Mot & Faure, 2012). 
From this perspective, public authority liability provides incentives for careful 
behaviour.117 In reality, the conviction has taken root among politicians and many 
others that normal liability rules result in too much pressure on financial supervisory 
authorities. As a consequence, normal liability rules would result in defensive conduct 
and, in turn, ineffective financial supervision (Delston & Campbell, 2007).118 This line 
of reasoning is not new. The concept of defensive conduct is one of the traditional 
arguments against public authority liability used especially in commonwealth countries 
(Booth & Squires, 2005; Dari-Mattiachi et al., 2010).  
 
But what is actually meant by defensive conduct? A clear definition unfortunately does 
not exist (Marsh, 2008). Defensive conduct, or in this study defensive financial 
supervision, is often the result of a situation of over-deterrence. The fear of being held 
liable is, in this situation, so severe that one starts to act with too much caution when 
dealing with the supervisee. Thus, defensive financial supervision refers to any act or 
omission by financial supervisors that is performed not for the benefit of supervision 
but solely to avoid liability or to provide a good legal defense against a liability 
claim.119 This can generally take two forms (e.g. Velthoven & Van Wijck, 2012).120 
                                                 
117 The economic analysis of public authority liability starts by taking the traditional economic model as a reasonable 
account of the way in which the tort system affects the private sector. The question, however, is to what extent the 
traditional economic model can be used for public authorities, as their objective, unlike those of corporations, is not 
profit maximization. Some scholars have therefore argued that the traditional economic model of tort law cannot be 
applied to public authorities (Levinson 2000; Schäfer 2012). Others have argued that public authorities face budget 
constraints that could result in a more or less similar response to liability as corporations (e.g., Niskanen 1971; 
Rosenthal 2006). This latter perspective is an application of the rational-choice model of bureaucratic behaviour that 
assumes that a bureaucrat will seek to maximize the size of her agency’s budget. One could claim that, whatever 
underlying behavioural model one uses to characterize public authorities, public liability imposes some (political) costs 
upon these authorities that create incentives to prevent misconduct (Dari-Mattiacci et al. 2010). 
118 See fn 3. 
119 This definition has been derived from the definition of defensive medicine as used by Hauser et al. (1991). It is 
furthermore interesting to note that when discussing the concept of defensive conduct as a result from liability, 
defensive conduct itself might also result in liability. This is most likely the case when supervisory authorities engage in 
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First, supervisors can engage in fewer activities than desired. This will decrease the 
chance of being held liable by supervised financial institutions, while the risk of being 
held liable by third parties will probably not increase significantly, as bankruptcies of 
financial institutions, the main trigger for third party liability, are not that common in 
normal economic times. Second, defensive supervision can involve carrying out 
supervisory activities in a cost-inefficient, unproductive way. This occurs, for instance, 
when financial supervisors intensively involve legal experts in order to review their 
supervisory decisions before announcing and executing them. The use of extensive 
reviews by legal experts will likely limit the possibility of a successful lawsuit against 
the authority in a later stage, but it can also interfere with a fast and effective 
execution of financial supervision. Conversely, not all thorough financial supervision is 
necessarily defensive: Many other factors inspire thoroughness, including the quest for 
knowledge and improved data collection, and the belief that doing things thoroughly 
is, indeed, the best course of action for both the financial institutions under 
supervision and the third parties.121  
 
How can the concept of defensive conduct be explained from a law and economic 
perspective? The keyword in this perspective is over-deterrence. The traditional 
economic model assumes that due care is set at the optimal level, and there is no 
uncertainty regarding this level of care (e.g. Cooter & Ulen, 2008). In the real world, 
however, legal standards are often uncertain. To determine the optimal level of due 
care, courts need complete and accurate information on the costs of care and the 
expected costs of accidents for each level of care. However, data necessary to set the 
optimal level of care will often be unavailable. In addition, courts will not always be 
able to properly observe the actual level of care exercised by the tortfeasor due to 
measurement errors, insufficient evidence, and misrepresentation about the actual 
level of care. Thus, only during a trial, when parties present the facts of the case, is the 
due level of care established in a more-precise way. As a result, tortfeasors exercising a 
certain level of care might not know ex ante whether or not they will be found 
negligent. This also applies to financial supervisory authorities. 
 
From case law and literature, it becomes clear that the standard for financial 
supervisory authorities under a negligent liability rule is “reasonable care.”122 This 
                                                                                                                  
fewer activities and, as a consequence, fail in performing their supervisory tasks. 
120 This also relates to the distinction made between care-level deterrence and activity-level deterrence, where the first 
concerns the degree to which a potential tortfeasor exercises care, and the second concerns the extent to which a 
potential tortfeasor engages in an activity that creates tort risks even when done carefully (Shavell 1980).  
121 In addition, thoroughness in performing financial supervision can also be impacted by differences in mandates of 
financial supervisory authorities. 
122 See, for instance, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in the Vie d’Or case. In order to determine whether 
financial supervision complies with the standard of reasonable care, all circumstances of the individual case have to be 
taken into account. These circumstances are the ‘nature’ of financial supervision: the fact that financial supervisors 
have discretionary powers in order to fulfill their supervisory duties, and the fact that financial supervisors face the 
difficult task of taking into account both the interests of the supervised institutions and society (supervisors’ dilemma). 
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standard is surrounded by uncertainty, given the facts that financial supervisors have 
discretionary powers to fulfill their supervisory duties and face the difficult task of 
taking into account both the interests of the supervised institutions and the individual 
members of society. What does this mean for the deterrent effect of tort law? 
Uncertainty regarding the level of due care changes the deterrent impact of legal rules 
by creating two opposing effects (Craswell & Calfee, 1986). The first effect is an 
incentive to over-comply. However, uncertainty also creates a chance that a tortfeasor 
will not be held liable, thus reducing the incentives to comply with the legal standard. 
The question thus created is which effect will prevail. Standard law and economic 
theory predict that over-deterrence (and thus defensive conduct) will occur (Craswell 
& Calfee, 1986). Scholars have argued that this is even worse when a public authority 
is involved due to the fact that, unlike private tortfeasors, a public authority typically 
balances two external costs, as it does not bear the costs of over-precaution. Public 
authorities are therefore much more quickly inclined towards taking an 
overabundance of precaution (e.g. De Geest, 2011; De Mot & Faure, 2012).  
 
The existence of uncertainty regarding the standard of due care for financial 
supervisory authorities might explain why politicians and many others fear over-
deterrence and thus defensive conduct on the side of financial supervisory authorities. 
By limiting the liability of financial supervisory authorities to cases of gross negligence 
and/or bad faith, they argue, the standard of care becomes clearer, and hence would 
result in limiting over-deterrence and thus defensive conduct. 
 
Despite the fact that this line of reasoning sounds attractive, it fails to incorporate one 
other important factor, namely, the existence of an alternative mechanism for 
compensation (Dijkstra, 2009). Most countries have in place a deposit guarantee 
system that offers compensation to depositors in the event of the bankruptcy of a 
financial institution. The standard economic model of tort law assumes, however, that 
tort law is the only mechanism capable of obtaining compensation for losses (Cooter 
& Ulen, 2008). It is important that the potential tortfeasor internalizes all the costs of 
his or her behaviour. Otherwise, he or she will receive an incentive that is less than 
optimal and, as a consequence, will engage in less-cautious behaviour. Based on the 
European Council Directive 94/19/EC of May 1994 as amended by Directive 
2009/14/EC, member states are required to implement a deposit guarantee system 
with a minimum compensation of € 100,000. The primary objective of any deposit 
guarantee scheme is to provide protection, allowing depositors to be repaid quickly 
should a financial institution fail. But what is the influence of such guarantee systems 
on the deterrent effect of tort law?  
 
As mentioned earlier, financial supervisory authorities face liability threats from both 
the financial institutions under supervision and third parties. The threat of being sued 
by the latter group is most likely to occur when a financial institution goes bankrupt. 
102 
 
The existence of alternative compensation by means of a deposit guarantee system will 
then decrease the liability threat for financial supervisory authorities from this 
particular group. Depending on the amount of losses arising from the bankruptcy of a 
financial institution, depositors faced with losses will always receive full or partial 
compensation through the deposit guarantee scheme. Only if their losses were (much) 
greater than the compensation from the deposit guarantee fund would they have an 
incentive for holding the financial supervisory authority liable. As a consequence, the 
existence of a deposit guarantee scheme will eliminate some of the potential liability 
threat from third parties resulting in under-deterrence (Dijkstra, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that public authorities themselves do not commit 
harmful acts; people do. Public authority liability involves the imposition of liability on 
the organization itself due to the harmful behaviour of its employees. However, 
making the public authority liable may fail to provide its employees with sufficient 
incentives to act carefully, as the sanctions imposed on the organization might not 
reach the responsible individuals (Dijkstra, 2009; Dari-Mattiachi et al., 2010).123 The 
question of whether incentives are transferred from the organization to its agents is a 
manifestation of the well-known agency problem between organizations and their 
employees. The challenge for public authorities is, therefore, one of overcoming 
principal–agent problems. This principal–agent problem undermines the production 
of adequate incentives and questions, therefore, the deterrent effect of public 
authority liability (Croley, 1996). 
 
The factors mentioned influence the deterrent impact of tort law in opposite ways. 
While a vague standard of due care is likely to result in over-deterrence, the existence 
of a deposit guarantee system and principal-agent issues are likely to have a mitigating 
effect on the deterrent impact of tort law. This clearly shows that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to estimate the net impact of financial supervisory liability from a 
theoretical perspective. It is, therefore, interesting to see how financial supervisors 
themselves perceive the impact of financial supervisory liability by conducting 
empirical research. 
 
6.3 Methodology and data 
6.3.1 Introduction 
This study explores the impact of financial supervisory liability on financial 
supervisors. More specifically, it examines the widely used argument that limited 
financial supervisory liability prevents defensive conduct from happening. An ideal 
                                                 
123 Some financial authorities can, in theory, initiate recourse actions against individual supervisors in case they have 
been found liable by courts. This could provide individual supervisors incentives for taking adequate care. 
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research design would observe the actual behaviour of financial supervisors under 
different liability regimes. This can be done by examining jurisdictions with different 
levels of tort liability or a single jurisdiction that has shifted from one form of liability 
rule to another. As the financial supervisory liability regimes in the member states of 
the EU range from no-fault liability to immunity, I have chosen to examine the impact 
of financial supervisory liability by making use of these different jurisdictions.124 
However, objective data on the actual behaviour of financial supervisors is difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain. Therefore, the strategy I adopted is to address the research 
questions through the perceptions of senior financial supervisors. This was done with 
a survey of financial supervisors in the European Union, which is described in the 
next paragraph. 
 
6.3.2 Survey design125 
The survey comprises three parts. The first part collects information about the 
characteristics of the respondents. The survey asked respondents in what country they 
operate (question 1) and to which financial supervisory authority they belong (question 
2). Furthermore, the survey asked respondents about their current position in the 
organization (question 3), how long they have worked in their organization (question 4), 
and in what category of financial supervision they are active (question 5).  
 
The extent to which financial supervisors are deterred is most likely dependent on the 
(perceived) threat from liability. The second part of the survey consists, therefore, of 
eight general questions and one statement related to the liability of the financial 
supervisory authority. An initial question raised was whether the organization could be 
held liable (question 6). The answers on this question define the data set, as the analysis 
will be based on the answers of those respondents who think that their organization 
can be held liable or do not know whether this is possible.126 Subsequently, the survey 
asked whether the organization has been held liable in the past five years (question 7), 
and if this was the case, how often this has occurred (question 8), by whom the 
organization was held liable (question 9), and how often a court has established liability 
and sentenced the authority to compensate damages (question 10). Furthermore, the 
survey asked financial supervisors about the existence of any limitations of financial 
supervisory liability (question 11). The answers to the latter question will be used to 
measure any differences in answers on the impact of financial supervisory liability 
between financial supervisors who perceive the liability of their organization as limited 
                                                 
124 See Dijkstra (2012) for an overview of the financial supervisory liability regimes in the European Union. 
125 A preliminary survey was designed and tested by two financial supervisory authorities, namely, the Croatian 
National Bank and the Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority. The helpful comments and recommendations I 
received from those two authorities were used to finalize the survey. For the complete survey, I refer to Appendix 5. 
126 If financial supervisors don’t believe that their organization can be held liable, it is unlikely that (the threat of) 
liability has any impact at all on their behaviour. 
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and those who do not (dependent variable).127 Where a limitation was indicated, the 
survey also sought to find out what kind of limitation was applicable (question 11a). 
The survey also included a statement that asked respondents if they view their 
decisions and actions as a potential lawsuit for the organization (statement 1). This 
statement offers an indication of the level of liability threat. 
 
The third and main part of the survey focuses on the actual impact of financial 
supervisory liability. Studies regarding the impact of liability or specific changes in the 
liability regime of public authorities are rare. This part of the survey is therefore based 
on insights from empirical research in the field of defensive medicine (e.g. Suddert et 
al., 2005; Nahed et al., 2012). It consists of eight statements that can shed some light 
on how financial supervisors perceive the impact of financial supervisory liability and, 
depending on the answers, on the existence of over-deterrence and/or defensive 
conduct.128 Respondents were asked to reply by means of a 5-point Likert-type scale 
anchored at the low end by “strongly disagree” and at the high end by “strongly 
agree.”129 The survey asked, for instance, whether financial supervisors see any 
concrete impact of financial supervisory liability on the supervisory activities of their 
organization at all (statement 8). If there is an impact of financial supervisory liability, it 
is likely that this will result in changed internal policies (statement 2). Where changes 
have been indicated, the survey also sought to find out whether this was done merely 
to mitigate the risk of future lawsuits (statement 2b) or to improve the effectiveness of 
financial supervision (statement 2a). As mentioned earlier, defensive conduct can 
generally take two forms, namely, a reduction of (socially desired) activities (statement 3) 
or overly cautious behaviour when engaging in activities. An example of the latter is 
the extensive involvement of legal experts before decisions are made (statement 4). To 
examine whether this involvement is considered counterproductive, the survey asked 
whether the involvement of legal experts increased the quality of financial supervision 
(statement 4a) or prevented financial supervisors from reacting fast (statement 4b). 
Furthermore, the survey included three general statements about the impact of 
financial supervisory liability (statements 5, 6 & 8). One can assume that financial 
supervisors who face over-deterrence are more willing to change the existing liability 
regime and to be more negative about the overall impact of financial supervisory 
liability. Answers related to these statements can therefore be considered as an 
indication of the existence of over-deterrence and, therefore, defensive financial 
supervision.  
 
                                                 
127 To examine whether there are any statistically significant differences between financial supervisors who perceive the 
liability of their organization as limited and those who do not, I performed a Mann-Whitney U test. The Mann-
Whitney U test is a non-parametric test used  to determine if a difference exists between two groups. 
128 These eight statements cannot be considered as a scale of defensive conduct and need, therefore, to be judged 
individually. 
129 The intermediate steps include ‘Agree’, ‘Neutral,’ and ‘Disagree’. 
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6.3.3 Survey participants 
The survey was sent to 706 senior financial supervisors working in 48 financial 
supervisory authorities in 27 member states of the EU.130 I have chosen to focus on 
senior, high-ranking employees, as their perceptions are most likely to influence the 
rest of the organization.131 The individual subjects were identified using the 
organizational charts from the websites of financial supervisory authorities and the 
website Linkedin. The survey was administered using LimeSurvey, a subscription web 
service that provides tools for building and administering surveys and for storage of 
the resulting data.132 Subjects were given a link to the survey residing on the 
LimeSurvey site via email. After the first electronic mailing in May 2013, 197 messages 
were returned due to incorrect addresses, leaving an active sample of 509 financial 
supervisors. Approximately two weeks after the initial mailing, a reminder was sent. 
This was followed by a final reminder at the end of June. A total of 119 individuals 
completed the survey between May and July 2013, resulting in an overall response rate 
of 23.4%.133 All 27 member states of the EU are represented in the responses.134 Of 
the 48 financial supervisory authorities, only three did not respond.135 Furthermore, 
six financial supervisory authorities decided to reply with only one “organizational” 
response instead of individual responses by the invited senior employees. In my 
analysis, I have treated their responses as individual responses.  
 
6.3.4 Data set 
It is not likely that respondents who believe that their organization cannot be held 
liable are influenced by the threat of liability.136 In order to examine the impact of 
financial supervisory liability, I will therefore use only the answers of respondents who 
believe, or, who don’t know, that it is possible to hold their organization liable 
(question 6). From table 9, it becomes clear that this data set contains 105 respondents 
                                                 
130 Because the survey was conducted in the period May – July 2013, Croatia, which became the 28th member state of 
the EU as of 1 July, was not included. In this study, financial supervisory authorities are defined as organizations 
performing the public law task of financial supervision in one or more of the following areas: banking supervision, 
insurance supervision, pension supervision, and securities supervision. For an initial overview of these authorities, see 
Dijkstra (2012). 
131 Members of the executive board, directors, and managers of financial supervisory authorities are those most likely 
to make the most important decisions and shape internal policies. 
132 See www.limesurvey.com.  
133 The response rate may be relatively low, but it can be argued that the specialist nature of the group being surveyed 
does not lead to bias in the results: see Leslie L., ‘Are high response rates essential to valid surveys?’ (1972) 1 Social 
Science Research 323. Moreover, it should be noted that this response rate could be considered normal and adequate with 
respect to online surveys amongst a widely differentiated group. 
134 The median number of responses per member state was 4  (min = 1, max = 11), while the median number of 
responses per financial supervisory authority was 2 (min = 1, max = 11). 
135 The three financial supervisory authorities that did not respond were the French Prudential Supervisory Authority 
(Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel), the Luxembourg supervisory and regulatory authority of the insurance and 
reinsurance sector (Commissariat aux Assurances), and the Bank of Spain (Banco de España). 




(88% of total respondents).137 The characteristics of these respondents and the 
analysis of their answers will be described in Section 6.4. 
 
Table 9: Defining the data set for analysis. 
Is it possible to hold your organization 
liable? 
N % of total 
Yes 88 74% 
No 14 12% 
I do not know 17 14% 
 
6.3.5 Limitations 
Using this method of online questioning of financial supervisors in the European 
Union, I have accessed an important source of information; however, the findings 
have to be qualified in two respects. As with all survey data, the responses reflect the 
reality as observed and perceived by the financial supervisors; perceptions may differ 
from actual practice patterns. The answers of the respondents may also be biased 
toward giving a socially desirable response or achieving political goals (Suddert et al., 
2005). However, if there is no difference in the answers between financial supervisors 
who perceive the liability of their organization as limited and those who do not, bias is 
not likely to play an important role. Furthermore, the nature of the questions and 
statements and the wide variety of jurisdictions of the respondents result in a set of 
responses on a highly aggregate level. There is a danger that certain factors of 
influence in a particular jurisdiction have not been captured in the survey. As a result 
of these limitations, one should be careful in using the findings. The outcome of this 
study provides only a general indication of the impact of financial supervisory liability. 
 
6.4 Survey results and analysis 
6.4.1 Characteristics of the respondents 
The respondents in the data set represent 27 member states of the European Union 
and 43 (out of a targeted total of 48) financial supervisory authorities. Table 10 reveals 
that the respondents covered, in more or less equal distribution, all financial 
supervision areas. The areas of banking supervision (30%) and securities supervision 
(30%) are represented most often, followed by the areas of insurance supervision 
(21%) and pension supervision (17%).  
                                                 
137 The data set of 105 respondents reflects 27 member states and 43 financial supervisory authorities. The complete 
data package (n = 119) reflects 27 member states and 44 financial supervisory authorities. 
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Table 10: Characteristics of the respondents. 
  N=105 % of total 
Representation of area of supervision:*   
      Banking supervision 57 30% 
      Insurance supervision 40 21% 
      Pension supervision 33 17% 
      Securities supervision 57 30% 
      Other 3 2% 
    
Respondents’ roles in organization:   
     Member executive board 8 8% 
     Director 32 30% 
     Manager 24 23% 
     Senior supervision professional 18 17% 
     Support staff 5 5% 
     Legal expert 17 16% 
     Other 1 1% 
    
Respondents’ work experience:   
      < 5 years 33 31% 
      5 – 10 years 29 28% 
      10 – 15 years 24 23% 
       > 15 years 19 18% 
* Respondents can be active in multiple areas of supervision (therefore, N ≠ 105). 
 
The survey targeted senior financial supervisors, as their perceptions are most likely to 
have the greatest influence in the organization since they can be considered as the 
decision makers within the organization. Table 10 shows that most of the respondents 
fall within this category. Almost 38% belong to the top level (executive board and 
directors), while  40% belong to the senior level (managers and senior supervision 
professionals). The relatively high percentage of legal experts (16%) can be explained 
by the topic of the survey.  
 
Most of the respondents in the data set report significant work experience in their 
current organization. Almost 18% of the respondents have worked more than 15 
years in their organization. Another 51% of those in the data set have between five 
and 15 years of experience. Only 31% of the respondents has relatively little 
experience, defined as less than five years in their current organization.  
 
6.4.2 The impact of financial supervisory liability 
Do the respondents see any impact of financial supervisory liability? Table 11 reveals 
that only 25% of the respondents agree with the statement: I do not see any concrete 
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impact of a threat of supervisory liability on the supervisory activities of my 
organization, while 40% of the respondents disagree with this statement.  
 





Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I do not see any concrete 
impact of a threat of supervisory 
liability on the supervisory 
activities of my organization. 
105 3% 37% 35% 19% 6% 
 
Thus, it seems that a significant number of respondents believe that financial 
supervisory liability has an impact on financial supervision. This is also confirmed by 
the answers on the next statement. Table 12 shows that 39% of the respondents are 
convinced that financial supervisory liability has changed their internal policies, 
indicating that liability does have an impact. 
 
Table 12: Impact on internal policies. 




Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Financial supervisory liability cases have 
changed our internal policies regarding 
the way we perform our supervisory 
tasks. 
 
105 13% 18% 30% 33% 6% 
The changed internal policies improve 
the effectiveness of our financial 
supervision. 
 
72 0% 8% 50% 35% 7% 
The purpose of the changed   internal 
policies is to mitigate the risk of future 
lawsuits. 
72 1% 4% 39% 42% 14% 
 
Despite the fact that a significant number of respondents believe that financial 
supervisory liability has an impact on financial supervision, it is not clear how they 
perceive this impact. Therefore, the survey also sought to find out whether the 
policies were changed in order to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision or 
merely to mitigate the risk of a future lawsuit. From table 12, it becomes clear that 
42% of the respondents believe that the changed policies contribute to the 
effectiveness of financial supervision; only 8% disagree with this statement. 
Furthermore, the majority of the respondents agreed with the statement that the 




As mentioned in the previous section, defensive conduct generally takes two forms. 
First, over-deterrence could result in fewer activities. Therefore, the survey asked 
whether financial supervisory liability results in fewer activities than desired.  
 





Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
The existing threat of 
supervisory liability results in 
fewer supervisory activities 
than desired. 
105 27% 43% 19% 10% 2% 
 
Table 13 shows that most of the respondents (70%) disagreed with the statement. It 
seems that financial supervisors are convinced that the level of their activities is not 
negatively affected by financial supervisory liability.  
 
Defensive supervision can also involve carrying out supervisory activities in a cost-
inefficient, unproductive way. This occurs, for instance, when financial supervisors 
intensively involve legal experts in order to review their supervisory decisions before 
announcing and executing them. Therefore, the survey asked whether every decision 
needs to be checked with the legal department before being announced or published. 
 





Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Every supervisory decision has 
to be checked with our legal 
department (internal or external) 
before being announced or 
published. 
105 2% 19% 19% 42% 18% 
 
The majority of respondents (60%) agreed with the statement. This could indicate the 
existence of defensive conduct. Subsequently, the survey asked respondents who 
agreed with this statement (n = 63) whether they thought that the involvement of the 
legal department increased the quality of supervision or prevented them from reacting 













Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
The involvement of our legal 
department increases the 
quality of our financial 
supervision. 
63 0% 0% 16% 59% 25% 
The involvement of our legal 
department prevents us from 
reacting fast when that is 
required. 
63 14% 30% 38% 16% 2% 
 
It is interesting to see that 84% of these respondents are convinced that the 
involvement of their legal department increases the quality of financial supervision, 
while only 18% think that this involvement prevents them from reacting quickly. So 
despite the fact that supervisory decisions need to be checked by the legal department, 
financial supervisors don’t perceive this as a negative for performing financial 
supervision.  
 
One could further assume that in a situation of over-deterrence, financial supervisors 
are more likely to be more negative when asked about the impact of financial 
supervisory liability. Therefore, the survey asked the respondents about their view on 
the impact of financial supervisory liability. 
 





Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
The existing liability regime has 
a positive impact on the quality 
of financial supervision. 
105 2% 6% 52% 38% 2% 
The existing liability threat 
results in more careful 
supervisory decisions. 
105 1% 11% 42% 44% 2% 
Our organization would be 
more effective without the 
threat of liability. 
105 6% 37% 45% 10% 2% 
 
As Table 16 indicates, most respondents consider the impact of financial supervisory 
liability to be a neutral or positive one. Of the respondents, 40% think that the 
existing liability regime has a positive impact on the quality of financial supervision 
while 46% of the respondents believe that the existing liability threat results in more 
careful supervisory decisions. Only 12% of the respondents agreed with the statement 
that their organization would be more effective without the threat of liability. This 
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indicates that the majority of the respondents is content with the existing situation and 
do not see any reason to change it. 
 
At most, the evidence from the survey implies an arguably modest degree of 
deterrence. Most financial supervisors classify the impact of financial supervisory 
liability as neutral or positive. It seems, therefore, that financial supervisors generally 
don’t see financial supervisory liability as a burden for performing effective financial 
supervision. 
 
6.4.3 The influence of liability limitations 
The previous section indicated that most of the respondents consider the impact of 
financial supervisory liability to be neutral or positive. However, this analysis does not 
take into account the potential differences in perceptions between respondents who 
believe the liability of their organization is limited and those who do not. If the 
argument that limited liability would prevent defensive conduct from happening is 
true, one would expect to see differences between these groups. More specifically, one 
would expect that respondents who think that the liability of their organization is not 
limited are more negative about the impact of financial supervisory liability than those 
who do not.  
 
Therefore, the survey asked respondents about the existence of liability limitations 
regarding their organization (question 11). The answers to this question (Table 17) show 
that 35% of the respondents think that the liability of their organization is limited, 
while 32% of the respondents believe that this is not the case; 32% of the respondents 
do not know whether there are limitations in place. A closer examination of the 
answers of those respondents who believe that the liability of their organization is 
limited (n = 37) indicates that this limitation is often based on rules of gross 
negligence and/or bad faith.   
 
Table 17: Financial supervisory liability limitations. 
Are there any limitations of financial supervisory liability regarding your 
organization, that you know of? 
N % of total 
Yes 37 35% 
No 34 32% 
 I do not know 34 32% 
 
In order to examine any significant statistical differences between financial supervisors 
who perceive the liability of their organization as limited and those who do not, I 
conducted a Mann-Whitney U test. This test is based on the independent survey 
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variable “Are there any limitations of financial supervisory liability that you know of?” 
For this test, the answers “No” and “I do not know” have been combined, as none of 
these respondents perceive any limitation of liability. 
 
Table 18: Mann-Whitney U test on the impact of perceived liability limitations. 
  N U Z p-value 
(2) Financial supervisory liability cases have changed our internal policies 
regarding the way we perform our supervisory tasks. 
105 1060 -1.38 0.168 
(2a) The changed internal policies improve the effectiveness of our 
financial supervision. 
72¹ 425 -1.32 0.188 
(2b) The purpose of the changed internal policies is to mitigate the risk of 
future lawsuits. 
72¹ 508 -1.62 0.871 
(3) The existing threat of supervisory liability results in less supervisory 
activities than desired. 
105 1241 -0.12 0.901 
(4) Every supervisory decision has to be checked with our legal 
department (internal or external) before being announced or published. 
105 1192 -0.46 0.642 
(4a) The involvement of our legal department increases the quality of our 
financial supervision. 
63² 399 -0.85 0.395 
(4b) The involvement of our legal department prevents us from reacting 
fast when that is required. 
63² 313 -2.09 0.036* 
(5) The existing liability regime has a positive impact on the quality of 
financial supervision. 
105 1132 -0.95 0.343 
(6) The existing liability threat results in more-careful supervisory 
decisions. 
105 971 -2.10 0.036* 
(7) I do not see any concrete impact of a threat of supervisory liability on 
the supervisory activities of my organization. 
105 1152 -0.75 0.453 
(8) Our organization would be more effective without the threat of 
liability. 
105 1163 -0.69 0.489 
* Statistically significant p < 0.05         
¹ Number of respondents who answered 'neutral,’ ‘agree,’ or 'strongly 
agree' on statement (1)         
² Number of respondents who answered 'agree' or 'strongly agree' on 
statement (4)         
 
The Mann-Whitney U Test revealed a statistically significant difference regarding 
statement 4b between financial supervisors who perceive the liability of their 
organization as limited (Md = 2, n = 22) and those who do not (Md = 3, n = 41), U = 
311, z = - 2.09, p = 0.036, r = - 0.26. Respondents who perceive the liability of their 
organization as limited are more convinced that their legal department does not have a 
negative impact on the speed of their reaction. Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney U 
113 
 
Test revealed a statistically significant difference regarding statement 6 between 
financial supervisors who perceive the liability of their organization as limited (Md = 
3, n = 37) and those who do not (Md = 3.5, n = 68), U = 971, z = - 2.10, p = 0.036, r 
= - 0.20. Respondents who do not perceive the liability of their organization as limited 
are slightly more positive about the impact of financial supervisory liability regarding 
the level of careful supervisory decisions.  
 
The overall outcome of this Mann-Whitney U test suggests that limiting financial 
supervisory liability doesn’t have an impact on the behaviour, or at least on the 
perceptions, of financial supervisors. Both groups share the same neutral or positive 
perception on the impact of financial supervisory liability. The study therefore calls 
into question the widely accepted argument of defensive conduct for limiting the 
liability of financial supervisory authorities.138  
 
6.5 Discussion 
The previous section showed that most respondents, independent of their view on 
liability limitations, consider the impact of financial supervisory liability to be neutral 
or positive. How can this outcome be explained? A possible explanation can be found 
in the level of liability threat. The survey asked if respondents viewed every 
supervisory decision as a potential lawsuit for their organization.  
 





Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I view every financial 
supervisory decision/action as a 
potential lawsuit for my 
organization. 
105 10% 36% 16% 31% 7% 
 
The outcome in table 19 shows that 46% of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement, while 38% agreed with the statement. The answers could indicate that the 
overall liability threat, even for respondents who agree with this statement, is not 
severe enough to result in over-deterrence. Figure 10 shows this line of reasoning. 
                                                 
138 In addition to the Mann-Whitney U test based on the independent survey variable “Are there any limitations of 
financial supervisory liability that you know of” (Table 10), I have carried out two Kruskal-Wallis tests to control for 
national variation and variation based on liability regime. The first Kruskal-Wallis test was based on the independent 
survey variable “In which county are you located” (control for national variation). This test showed no statistically 
significant differences between the different countries. Next, using earlier research (Dijkstra, 2012), I categorized each 
financial supervisory authority into one of the following liability regimes: “no-fault”, “negligence”, “gross-negligence” 
or “immunity”. Based on this classification, I carried out a Kruskal-Wallis test which also showed no statically 











     
 
 
         Figure 10: Impact of the level of liability threat.  
 
The liability threat that financial supervisors face is dependent on the liability threats 
their organizations face. Table 20 presents the outcome of three questions related to 
liability that could give an indication of the actual liability threat financial supervisory 














































Respondents who view every financial 
supervisory decision/action as a potential 
lawsuit for their organization 
Respondents who do not view every 
financial supervisory decision/action as a 





Table 20: Financial supervisory liability in the last 5 years. 
 
More than half of the financial supervisory authorities have been held liable in the past 
five years. However, examining the liability frequency, it becomes clear that 
approximately 46% of these authorities have been held liable fewer than five times 
during this period, while only 15% have been held liable more than 15 times. Table 20 
also shows that most financial supervisory authorities who have been sued have never 
been found liable by a court. It seems that financial supervisory authorities face a 
relatively low level of liability threat.139 This threat is probably being mitigated even 
more as it concerns institutional liability and not personal liability. To impact the 
behaviour of individual financial supervisors, the threat of institutional liability needs 
to be transferred to the individual supervisors in an efficient way. In practice, this 
might be difficult to achieve, and consequently, it mitigates the impact of liability on 
the behaviour, or at least the perceptions, of individual financial supervisors.140 The 
                                                 
139 Based on table 12, it is not likely that the ‘floodgates’ argument, often used by opponents of applying normal 
liability rules, and, that is frequently connected to the idea of defensive conduct, holds ground.  
140 It should be noted that the threat of institutional liability could, to a certain extent, be transferred to employees 
through its negative impact on reputation. This reputation damage could impact the career opportunities of financial 
supervisors. Furthermore, some financial authorities can, in theory, initiate recourse actions against individual 





Has your organization been held liable in the past 5 
years?         
      Yes 36 34% 26 60% 
      No 47 45% 15 35% 
      I do not know 22 21% 2 5% 
          
How often has your organization been held liable 
in the past 5 years?         
      < 5 times 15 42% 12 46% 
      5 – 15 times 7 19% 7 27% 
      > 15 times 4 11% 4 15% 
      I do not know 10 28% 3 12% 
          
How often has a court established liability and 
sentenced your organization to payout 
compensation for damages in the last 5 years?         
      Never 18 50% 15 56% 
      < 5 times 8 22% 6 22% 
      > 5 times 1 3% 1 4% 
      I do not know 9 25% 5 19% 
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idea that the actual liability threat faced by financial supervisors is relatively low is also 
confirmed by the data presented in Table 21. 
 
Table 21: Mann-Whitney U test on the impact of liability. 
  N U Z p-value 
(2) Financial supervisory liability cases have changed our internal 
policies regarding the way we perform our supervisory tasks. 
105 848 -2.76 0.006* 
(2a) The changed internal policies improve the effectiveness of our 
financial supervision. 
72¹ 609 -0.19 0.850 
(2b) The purpose of the changed internal policies is to mitigate the 
risk of future lawsuits. 
72¹ 461 -2.00 0.045* 
(3) The existing threat of supervisory liability results in fewer 
supervisory activities than desired. 
105 1197 -0.32 0.748 
(4) Every supervisory decision has to be checked with our legal 
department (internal or external) before being announced or 
published. 
105 1008 -1.66 0.097 
(4a) The involvement of our legal department increases the quality of 
our financial supervision. 
63² 439 -0.58 0.560 
(4b) The involvement of our legal department prevents us from 
reacting fast when that is required. 
63² 421 -0.80 0.422 
(5) The existing liability regime has a positive impact on the quality of 
financial supervision. 
105 1221 -0.16 0.871 
(6) The existing liability threat results in more careful supervisory 
decisions. 
105 991 -1.85 0.065 
(7) I do not see any concrete impact of a threat of supervisory liability 
on the supervisory activities of my organization. 
105 982 -1.85 0.064 
(8) Our organization would be more effective without the threat of 
liability. 
105 1036 -1.51 0.132 
* Statistically significant p < 0.05         
¹ Number of respondents who answered “neutral,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” on statement (1) 
² Number of respondents who answered “agree” or “strongly agree” on statement (4) 
 
Table 21 reports the outcome of a Mann-Whitney U test based on the independent 
variable: “Has your organization been held liable in the past five years?” For this 
survey, the answers “No” and “I do not know” have been combined, as neither of 
these groups are aware of any liability cases against their organizations. Only two 
statements have statistically significant differences, namely, statements (2) and (2b).141 
First, respondents whose organizations have been held liable (Md = 4, N = 36) are 
more convinced that liability cases have changed their internal policies than 
                                                                                                                  
supervisors in case they have been found liable by courts. This could provide individual supervisors incentives for 
taking adequate care. 
141 An explanation of these differences can also be based on behavioural  insights, especially the availability heuristic. 




respondents whose organizations have not been held liable (Md = 3, N = 69). 
Secondly, respondents whose organizations have been held liable (Md = 4, N =29) are 
more convinced that the changed internal policies serve to mitigate the risk of future 
lawsuits compared to those whose organizations have not been held liable (Md = 3, N 
= 43). These differences are not surprising and do not change the overall neutral or 
positive view on the impact of financial supervisory liability. 
 
The outcome of this test demonstrates that actual liability claims do not result in a 
negative view on the impact on behaviour. This can probably be explained by the fact 
that the risk of supervisory liability is in general a low probability event. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The concept of defensive conduct is one of the main arguments for countries to limit 
the liability of their financial supervisory authorities to cases of gross negligence or 
bad faith. The actual deterrent effect of financial supervisory liability is, however, 
debated, and there exists no empirical research to support this effect. This work fills a 
gap in that it is the first empirical study of the impact of financial supervisory liability. 
 
Interestingly, the outcome of the survey showed that most of the respondents classify 
the impact of financial supervisory liability as neutral or positive. At most, the 
evidence from the survey implies, therefore, an arguably modest degree of deterrence. 
The relatively neutral or positive attitude suggests further that financial supervisors do 
not see financial supervisory liability as a burden in executing effective financial 
supervision. As the survey found no significant differences between respondents who 
perceive the liability of their organization as limited and those who do not, it also 
indicates that limiting financial supervisory liability does not have an impact on the 
behaviour, or at least on the perceptions of the impact of financial supervisory 
liability, of financial supervisors. Therefore, the study calls into question the widely 
accepted argument of defensive conduct as a reason for limiting the liability of 
financial supervisory authorities. 
 
A possible explanation for this outcome could be that financial supervisory 
authorities, independent of the liability regime in which they operate, face a relative 
small liability threat. This line of reasoning seems to be confirmed by the relatively low 
level of liability cases against financial supervisory authorities during the last five years. 
This threat is probably being mitigated even more for individual financial supervisors, 
as it concerns institutional liability and not personal liability. To affect the behaviour 
of individual financial supervisors, the threat of institutional liability needs to be 
transferred to the individual supervisors in an efficient way. In practice, this might be 
difficult to achieve, and consequently it is likely to mitigate the impact of liability on 
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financial supervisors. The fact that the survey did not reveal any important differences 
in perceptions between respondents whose organizations actually have been held 
liable and those whose organizations have not been held liable also seems to confirm 
this. 
 
This research may represent an important first step in understanding the impact of 
financial supervisory liability. More targeted research, for instance through the use of 
case studies, could enrich the results of the current survey and delve further into the 



















Since the financial crisis of 2008, the topic of financial supervisory liability has been 
frequently discussed. At the centre of this discussion is the question of whether or not 
third party liability of financial supervisory authorities should be limited. Politicians, 
legislators and legal scholars use various arguments against or in favour of limited 
financial supervisory liability. This study revolves around three arguments that often 
play a major role in the discussion of whether or not to limit third-party financial 
supervisory liability.  
 
Two of these arguments are in favour of limited financial supervisory liability. First, 
when limiting the liability of their financial supervisory authorities, politicians and 
legislators frequently refer to the limited liability regimes of other countries. Second, it 
has been suggested that normal liability rules (e.g. negligence) would result in 
defensive conduct and hence inhibit the effective operations of financial supervisory 
authorities. Limiting financial supervisory liability would prevent this from happening. 
To the contrary, the third argument supports the application of normal liability rules.142 
In this view, the threat of being held liable would give financial supervisory authorities 
an incentive to perform their assigned tasks with adequate care.  
 
Despite the major role these arguments play in the larger conversation about 
supervisory liability, it is important to consider the evidence, or lack thereof, that often 
underpins them. A closer examination reveals five specific gaps in our knowledge 
about financial supervisory liability. This could, at least to some extent, explain why 
the three arguments are valued differently. As a result of these different valuations, 
politicians, legislators and legal scholars will prefer a certain financial supervisory 
liability regime to another.  
 
This work aims to examine whether the three arguments actually hold true. To this 
end, new data has been collected in five studies. This work then contributes to a better 
understanding of financial supervisory liability and provides further guidance on the 
debate. In this final chapter, I will outline the main findings of each previous chapter 
(Section 7.2) and demonstrate how they influence the central question of this study 
(Section 7.3). The chapter ends with Section 7.4, which sets forth some final thoughts 
concerning the answer of whether or not financial supervisory liability should be 
limited. 
                                                 




7.2 Findings  
7.2.1 Gap 1: Financial supervisory liability regimes in the EU 
The first gap relates to our knowledge about financial supervisory liability regimes in 
other countries. We have seen that politicians, legislators and legal scholars often refer 
to limited financial supervisory regimes in other countries when arguing for a 
limitation of the liability of their own financial supervisory authorities. This is not 
surprising given the fact that, from a European perspective, financial supervisory 
liability is becoming increasingly important (Athanassiou, 2011). Existing comparative 
research focuses only on a limited number of EU member states (Andenas & 
Fairgrieve, 2000; Tison, 2005; Van Dam 2006a, De Kezel et al, 2009). Chapter 2 builds 
upon this earlier work by collecting data on third party financial supervisory liability 
regimes in all EU member states. 
 
Chapter 2 shows that an increasing number of member states formally limit the 
liability of their financial supervisory authorities by using specific provisions in 
legislation. In recent years, Belgium (2002), Italy (2005), Austria (2008), and the 
Netherlands (2012) have limited the liability of their financial supervisory authorities. 
A closer look reveals that these limitations often take the form of a standard of gross 
negligence and/or bad faith; the use of complete immunities is scarce. Only two 
financial supervisory authorities, the German Financial Supervisory Authority ‘Bafin’ 
and the Austrian Financial Markets Authority ‘Finanzmarktaufsicht’, are completely 
immune to third party liability claims. Despite the fact that an increasing number of 
member states have formally limited the liability of their financial supervisory 
authorities, there is still a substantial number of member states who apply a rule of no-
fault or (simple) negligence. There is therefore no common approach to financial 
supervisory liability in the EU.  
 
It is only when we take into account weighting factors to express the relative 
importance of a member state in the EU (e.g. GDP or population size) that limited 
third party liability prevails over non-limited third party liability (no-fault, negligence). 
Thus, from a ‘weighted perspective’ there exists a European practice of limited 
financial supervisory liability. A closer examination of this weighted practice reveals 
that gross negligence is the most frequently used standard for formally limiting 
financial supervisory liability.  
 
Readers should be aware that the research in Chapter 2 focuses mainly on the 
standard for liability as stated in the legislation of a member state. However, the 
standard of liability is merely one of the requirements for holding financial supervisory 
authorities liable. Other requirements are the existence of damage and a causal 
relationship between damage and the behaviour of the tortfeasor. The interpretation 
of the behavioural standard and these other requirements will often differ among 
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member states because of their various historical and cultural backgrounds. This can 
result in liability more or less often. Despite this limitation, Chapter 2 still provides an 
important overview of financial supervisory liability regimes as stated in the legislation 
of European member states. This chapter can therefore be considered a starting point 
for future, more in depth, comparative research. 
 
7.2.2 Gap 2: Theoretical knowledge about the deterrent impact of financial 
supervisory liability 
The second gap relates to our knowledge about the deterrent impact of financial 
supervisory liability. Politicians, legislators and legal scholars often state simply that 
financial supervisory liability results in defensive conduct or prevents negligent 
conduct from occurring. In doing so, they refer to general and widely-used insights 
from law and economics theory on the deterrent impact of tort law. Unfortunately, 
these general insights do not take the specific context in which financial supervisory 
authorities operate into account. Therefore, Chapter 3 addresses this context by 
identifying a number of important characteristics that are likely to influence the 
deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability.  
 
The first characteristic is the applicable standard of care. Normal liability rules refer in 
most cases to a standard of ‘reasonable care’. We have seen that this is, in practice, a 
relatively vague and uncertain standard. What does this uncertainty mean for the 
deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability143? Uncertainty changes the deterrent 
impact of liability by creating two opposing effects. The first is an incentive to over-
comply as a result of over-deterrence, while the second is an incentive to under-
comply as uncertainty creates a probability that the injurer will not be held liable. 
Which effect will prevail? In order to provide financial supervisory authorities with the 
correct incentives to prevent losses, damages should be based on the social losses 
caused by the financial supervisory authorities. If damages are in excess of social loss, 
over-deterrence is more likely because there is an additional pay-off of decreasing the 
probability of being held liable. This line of reasoning assumes that the damage 
consists of pure economic loss (namely the monetary losses for depositors), which 
does not have to correspond with the total social loss as this accounts for third party 
earnings (transfer of wealth). On the other hand, if damages are lower than the social 
loss, under-deterrence will likely be the result since the financial supervisory authority 
is not responsible for the total costs of his behaviour. This may be the case when a 
financial institution’s bankruptcy results in an overall lack of faith in the financial 
markets, subsequently causing a financial crisis.  
 
                                                 
143 If the standard of care is precise, over-compensation (compensation amount is higher than social costs) will not 




In theory, the problem of over-deterrence can be solved by negligence rules, which 
restrict compensation to cases of obvious negligence or wilful behaviour. Compared 
to simple negligence, a standard of gross negligence can be considered more precise. 
Although it is not always clear what is meant by reasonable financial supervision, it is 
easier to determine whether certain behaviour is grossly negligent. The change from a 
negligence regime to a gross negligence regime is thus likely to limit the occurrence of 
over-deterrence. On the other hand, when social costs exceed the pure economic loss 
of third parties, financial supervisory authorities will, independent of a standard of 
negligence or gross negligence, face under-deterrence since they will not face the full 
financial consequences of their negligent behaviour. 
 
Chapter 3 also demonstrates that, in order to work properly, the threat of being held 
liable must be severe enough to give financial supervisory authorities sufficient 
incentives to behave carefully. The main threat of liability arises from the damage 
compensation an authority must pay if found (grossly) negligent. From this 
perspective, the existence of a deposit guarantee system plays an important role. Third 
party financial supervisory liability will often follow the bankruptcy of a financial 
institution. In this situation, tort law is not the only mechanism that can provide 
compensation. In the event of a financial institution’s bankruptcy, the deposit 
guarantee system ensures an amount of € 100,000 in compensation for depositors. As 
a result, the majority of the depositors will be fully compensated and thus have no 
incentive to hold the financial supervisory authority liable. The existence of a deposit 
guarantee system thus greatly mitigates the incentive-generating capacity of tort law, 
ultimately resulting in under-deterrence. 
 
The existence of a deposit guarantee system is not the only factor that impacts the 
amount of compensation a financial supervisory must pay if found (grossly) negligent. 
The situation here in the Netherlands illustrates this perspective well. The Netherlands 
has safeguard clauses in place between the Dutch financial supervisory authorities and 
the Ministry of Finance. These safeguard clauses limit a financial supervisory 
authority’s financial risk to a certain percentage of its budget. The remainder of the 
damage is then compensated by the Dutch state. In addition to safeguard clauses, 
Dutch financial supervisory authorities can also partially insure their liability risk. Both 
mechanisms ensure that Dutch financial supervisory authorities do not face the full 
consequences of their grossly negligent behaviour, thus mitigating the deterrent 
impact of financial supervisory liability even further. 144  
 
                                                 
144 If the insured financial supervisory authority no longer has to bear the full cost of its behaviour it often may lead to 
more risky behaviour. In order to avoid this change in behaviour, insurance companies attempt to set their premiums 
in such a way that the insured party still has an incentive to take adequate care. But in order to give financial 
supervisory authorities incentives to behave carefully, it is necessary that the insurance company is able to observe the 
level of care taken by financial supervisory authorities. Depending on how adequate the insurance company is capable 
of doing this, financial supervisory authorities will face more or less effective incentives (Cooter & Ulen, 2008).  
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When taking into account the specific context in which (Dutch) financial supervisory 
authorities operate, Chapter 3 makes clear that financial supervisory liability is most 
likely to result in under-deterrence. It therefore questions the defensive conduct 
argument and challenges the idea that financial supervisory liability is able to optimally 
prevent negligent conduct. 
 
7.2.3 Gap 3: Alternative instruments for achieving deterrence 
Theoretically, financial supervisory liability is not the only instrument that can provide 
incentives for financial supervisory authorities to behave carefully. If other 
accountability arrangements are able to provide effective incentives, the deterrent 
impact of financial supervisory liability becomes less important. The third identified 
gap therefore relates to the incentive-generating capacity of other accountability 
arrangements in comparison with financial supervisory liability, addressed in Chapter 
4.  
 
In addition to financial supervisory liability this chapter identifies four consequences 
of being held accountable. Firstly, financial supervisory failure can result in the 
suspension or dismissal of a member of the authority’s management. Secondly, the 
Minister of Finance has the power to decide whether he will perform one or more 
aspects of the supervisor’s function or have another supervisor perform them. 
Thirdly, Parliament has the right to execute surveys about the role of the financial 
supervisory authority in a particular case. Finally, the fourth consequence that may 
arise from being held accountable is damage to reputations, which can relate either to 
the financial supervisory authority itself or to its individual employees.  
 
Chapter 4 makes clear that, despite the fact that most of these consequences may have 
a negative financial impact (directly or indirectly by means of reputation damage) on 
the private wealth of a financial supervisor or on the budget of the supervisory 
authority, the likelihood that these consequences will occur in practice can be 
considered low (with an exception for reputation damage). It is therefore unlikely that 
these alternative accountability arrangements provide the financial supervisory 
authorities with sufficient incentives to perform their supervisory tasks with adequate 
care.   
 
7.2.4 Gap 4: The influence of compensation mechanisms on incentives for 
welfare-improving behaviour 
Financial supervisory liability is not the only mechanism people can rely on to receive 
compensation for losses in the event of the bankruptcy of a financial institution. As 
we have already seen in Chapter 3, victims of bankrupted financial institutions will 
often receive compensation from a deposit guarantee system. But they can also 
attempt to secure compensation by submitting a claim to the liquidator of the financial 
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institution. To what extent do these alternative compensation mechanisms influence 
the incentives of various stakeholders such as depositors, financial institutions, and 
financial supervisory authorities? And to what extent does a deposit guarantee system 
impact the incentive-generating capacity of financial supervisory liability? These 
questions are considered the fourth gap in our knowledge about financial supervisory 
liability and are addressed in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 5 illustrates that the compensation system in the Netherlands will not prevent 
the failure of a financial institution by providing sufficient incentives for all 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the existence of a deposit guarantee system has a negative 
impact on the incentives arising from financial supervisory liability. This is due to the 
fact that persons who have received full compensation from the deposit guarantee 
system are not likely to hold the financial supervisory authority liable.  
 
In order to improve the current compensation system with regard to incentives, the 
chapter suggests reducing the coverage level, introducing co-insurance, and changing 
the finance (funding) structure of the deposit guarantee fund. The chapter indicates 
that, looking only at the incentives of tort law, the best solution would be to lower the 
current coverage level of the deposit guarantee system, which would improve the 
incentives of all parties involved. For instance, it would increase the likelihood that 
financial supervisory authorities are held liable by third parties, thereby improving the 
deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability. However, it is not possible to lower 
the coverage level under current European legislation, and additionally it may be 
undesirable from other perspectives such as optimal compensation. With respect to 
the other suggestions, it is important to note that, as of 1 July 2015, the funding of the 
Dutch deposit guarantee system will be based on ex ante risk-based premiums, which 
is likely to improve incentives for financial institutions. 145 
 
Chapter 5 also discusses the possibility of abandoning the use of tort law. In practice, 
due to the existence of the deposit guarantee system, tort law has no major role in 
compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions. From this compensation 
perspective, there are no strong arguments supporting the use of tort law. Our analysis 
suggests that abandoning tort law would likely give depositors, who have deposits in 
excess of the coverage provided by the deposit guarantee system, more incentives to 
carefully select their financial institution. However, since this specific group of 
depositors is relatively small, the impact would be minor.  
 
On the other hand, abandoning the use of tort law would negatively affect the 
incentives of financial supervisory authorities. This negative effect is limited due to the 
fact that the existence of a rather generous deposit guarantee system already results in 
                                                 
145 See Dutch Ministry of Finance, FM / 2012 478 M. 
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a smaller likelihood that financial supervisory authorities will be held liable. Because 
tort law fulfils functions with regard not only to compensation and prevention but 
also to the perception of justice in society, it is unclear whether abandoning the use of 
tort law entirely will be a socially acceptable solution. 
 
7.2.5 Gap 5: Empirical research on the impact of financial supervisory liability 
Ultimately, the question of the impact of financial supervisory liability on the 
behaviour of financial supervisory authorities is an empirical one. Surprisingly, little 
empirical evidence has been put forth on the behavioural impact of financial 
supervisory liability to date.146 Chapter 6 aims to address this gap by presenting the 
outcome of a European survey on the impact of financial supervisory liability.  
 
By surveying more than 500 senior financial supervisors across 27 EU member states, 
this chapter shows that  the majority of respondents classify the impact of financial 
supervisory liability as either neutral or positive. The findings from the survey 
therefore imply a modest degree of deterrence. Furthermore, the relatively neutral or 
positive attitude suggests that financial supervisors do not consider financial 
supervisory liability a burden in executing effective financial supervision. The survey 
found no significant differences between those respondents who perceive the liability 
of their organization as limited and those who do not. This suggests that limiting 
financial supervisory liability does not affect perceptions of the impact of financial 
supervisory liability or possibly even the behaviour of financial supervisors. The 
chapter thus calls into question the relevance of defensive conduct as an argument for 
limiting the liability of financial supervisory authorities. 
 
A possible explanation for this outcome may be that financial supervisory authorities, 
independent of the liability regime in which they operate, face a relatively small threat 
of actually being found liable. This line of reasoning seems to be confirmed by the low 
number of liability cases against financial supervisory authorities over the last five 
years. As this threat is about institutional liability and not personal liability, it is likely 
being further mitigated for individual financial supervisors. To impact the behaviour 
of individual financial supervisors, the threat of institutional liability must be 
transferred to the individual supervisors. In practice, this may be difficult to achieve 
and consequently it is likely to mitigate the impact of liability on financial supervisors. 
This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the survey did not reveal any important 
differences in perceptions between respondents whose organizations have actually 
been held liable and those whose organizations have not. 
 
                                                 




Chapter 6 both complements and challenges the existing (theoretical) notions about 
the deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability by providing empirical data. 
However, readers should be aware of the limitations of this empirical research. While 
the survey responses reflect the observations and perceptions of the financial 
supervisors, perceptions may differ from actual behaviour. Additionally, responses 
may be biased if respondents were inclined to offer a socially desirable response or to 
achieve political goals.  
 
Notwithstanding its complexity, empirical research is important because it is the only 
type of research that can reveal how and to what extent (limited) financial supervisory 
liability actually impacts financial supervision. This emphasises the need for future 
empirical research on the impact of financial supervisory liability. Empirical research 
in various ways (e.g. online surveys, interviews, case studies) and by different scholars 
is likely to ultimately provide a more accurate picture of the impact of financial 
supervisory liability. 
 
7.3 Conclusion: to what extent do the three arguments hold true? 
7.3.1 Referring to limited financial supervisory liability regimes 
Referring to limited financial supervisory liability regimes in other countries is a 
popular practice amongst politicians, legislators and legal scholars. Belgian legislators, 
for instance, referred to Germany when they limited the liability of their financial 
supervisory authorities in 2002 to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith (De 
Kezel et al., 2009). Similarly, Ireland’s introduction of a standard of bad faith for the 
supervisory authorities was inspired by the situation in the United Kingdom (Doherty 
& Lenihan, 2005). In addition, Dutch politicians explicitly referred to the limited 
liability regimes of neighbouring countries (Belgium, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom) in 2012 when they introduced a standard of gross negligence and/or bad 
faith.147 But to what extent does this argument actually hold true? 
 
Earlier comparative research – as well as the findings of chapter 2 – confirms that the 
countries mentioned above have formally limited the third party liability of their 
financial supervisory authorities. Referring to the limited liability regimes of these 
countries thus seems a valid argument. But is it convincing? Chapter 2 shows that 
there are still a number of member states that apply a rule of no-fault or (simple) 
negligence. This could imply that referring to limited financial supervisory liability 
regimes is conveniently selective. Depending on one’s preference for a specific 
financial supervisory liability regime, one refers to countries that either have a limited 
liability regime or apply normal liability rules. From this perspective, referring to 
                                                 
147 See fn. 3. 
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limited financial supervisory liability regimes does not seem to be a very objective or 
convincing argument. 
 
However, this view changes when we take into account weighting factors (GDP or 
population size) to express the relative importance of a member state in the EU. If we 
use weighting factors, it becomes clear that limited third party liability (gross 
negligence, bad faith, immunity) is dominant over non-limited third party liability (no-
fault, negligence). This suggests that referring to countries that have limited the 
liability of their financial supervisory authorities is a stronger argument than referring 
to countries that have applied normal liability rules. 
 
Despite its attractiveness, politicians, legislators and legal scholars should be cautious 
about using the legal situations of other countries as a decisive argument for limiting 
the liability of their own financial supervisory authorities. The fact that other countries 
have limited the liability of their financial supervisory authorities may reflect a kind of 
collective wisdom, but it may also relate to herd behaviour or a specific political 
reaction such as to the events following a particular financial institution’s bankruptcy. 
It does not provide us with a fundamental justification for limiting financial 
supervisory liability. The question of why these countries have limited their financial 
supervisory authorities’ liability remains unanswered. Unless this can be answered, 
referring to limited financial supervisory liability regimes should merely be seen as a 
supportive argument in the debate rather than a decisive one. 
 
7.3.2 Is fear for defensive conduct justified? 
The behavioural impact of financial supervisory liability is perhaps the most intriguing 
topic in the discussion about financial supervisory liability. Why? It is being used as an 
argument both in favour of, as well as against financial supervisory liability. In regards 
to the latter view, there are concerns that financial supervisory liability will lead to 
over-deterrence and thus defensive conduct. In other words, the threat of financial 
supervisory liability will inhibit financial supervisory authorities’ effective financial 
supervision. In order to prevent this from happening, limiting financial supervisory 
liability to cases of gross negligence and/or bad faith is recommended. The contrary 
assertion is that financial supervisory liability improves financial supervision by 
deterring the careless execution of financial supervisory tasks. This view then 
promotes the application of normal liability rules (e.g. negligence).  
 
The theoretical and empirical findings of this study suggest that normal liability rules 
are not likely to result in over-deterrence. The main reason can be found in the 
specific context in which financial supervisory authorities operate. Third party 
financial supervisory liability is, in most cases, triggered by the bankruptcy of a 
financial institution. As such bankruptcies do not happen frequently, financial 
supervisory authorities generally face a relatively minor liability threat. And, when a 
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financial institution does goes bankrupt, the existence of a deposit guarantee system at 
least partially shields financial supervisory authorities from third party liability, as most 
victims will be compensated in full by this system.  
 
The deposit guarantee system is, however, not the only mechanism able to mitigate 
the liability threat. In the Netherlands, for instance, there are safeguard clauses 
between the financial supervisory authorities and the Ministry of Finance that 
effectively transfer a large portion of the financial risk from the supervisory authorities 
to the Dutch state. In addition to safeguard clauses, Dutch financial supervisory 
authorities can also insure their liability risk, thereby reducing the financial risk of 
being held liable. Both arrangements limit the amount of compensation that financial 
supervisory authorities need to pay if found (grossly) negligent. This is likely to reduce 
the liability threat they face, which is probably mitigated even further as it concerns 
institutional liability and not personal liability. To affect the behaviour of individual 
financial supervisors, the threat of institutional liability needs to be transferred to the 
individual supervisors, however this may be difficult to achieve in practice.  
 
Taking all of these factors into account, it is difficult to believe that financial 
supervisory authorities will actually engage in defensive conduct. Both the empirical 
and theoretical findings of this study therefore suggest that the argument of defensive 
conduct has less value than was assumed by some authors prior to the execution of 
these studies. 
 
7.3.3 Does financial supervisory liability result in careful supervision? 
Although normal liability rules are not likely to result in defensive conduct, the 
question remains whether these are capable of efficiently deterring the careless 
execution of financial supervision, and thus promoting effective financial supervision. 
In this perspective, it is helpful to separate two distinct forms of the deterrence 
argument (Schwartz, 1994). In its strong form, the argument insists that tort law does 
indeed deter in the comprehensive systematic way that economic models suggest. The 
argument’s more moderate form concedes that tort law does not deter 
comprehensively, yet still claims that tort practices provide some meaningful amount 
of deterrence.  
 
This study casts genuine doubt on the strong version of the deterrence argument. 
Chapter 3 shows that financial supervisory liability is most likely to result in under-
deterrence, while the empirical findings of Chapter 6 indicate only a modest degree of 
deterrence. It therefore seems that financial supervisory liability is incapable of 
achieving optimal deterrence, suggesting that the strong version of the deterrence 
argument should be rejected. However, the findings of this study are not inconsistent 
with the deterrence argument in its moderate form. Financial supervisory liability, 
while not as effective as economic models suggests, may still contribute to achieving 
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the stated deterrence goals. The threat of financial supervisory liability is therefore 
likely to exert a certain amount of pressure on financial supervisory authorities to alter 
their behaviour in a more socially desirable way.  
 
Is financial supervisory liability a requisite element for achieving (suboptimal) 
deterrence? There are a number of alternative (internal and external) mechanisms 
available to regulate the activities of financial supervisory authorities independently of 
tort law (Sugarman, 1985). The most important external alternative mechanisms are: 
the possibility of dismissing members of the financial supervisory authority’s 
management, the right of parliament to perform inquiries regarding the authority’s 
role in a particular case, and the fear of reputation damage as a result of negative 
publicity. If these alternative mechanisms provide financial supervisory authorities 
with sufficient incentives to perform their supervisory tasks with adequate care, 
financial supervisory liability may be dispensable.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that a number of important external alternative 
mechanisms are unlikely to provide financial supervisory authorities with sufficient 
incentives (Chapter 4). Thus, while there is scope for conflict and competition 
between the various mechanisms, viewing them as potentially complementary can be 
valuable (Adler, 2003). Moreover, it may be the case that financial supervisory liability 
has the capability to interact with other incentives in a beneficial way. Tort actions 
can, for instance, generate publicity (in some cases resulting in reputation damage) or 
uncover information in a way that can set policy changes in motion. Although 
generating information can be economically valuable, solely using the tort litigation 
system to generate this information may be very costly, especially when it is not clear 
whether it is the event itself or the tort suit that generates information (De Mot & 
Faure, 2012; Dari-Mattiacci et al, 2010).  
 
In summary, despite the fact that financial supervisory liability does not deter 
comprehensively, it tends to play a valuable role – in conjunction with other 
mechanisms – in providing financial supervisory authorities with incentives to behave 
carefully. However, in order to better understand the interaction between the various 
incentive generating mechanisms, more empirical interdisciplinary research is needed.  
 
7.4 Final thoughts 
Having read the last section, the reader may ask what the outcome of this study means 
for the question of whether or not to limit financial supervisory liability. Although this 
study did not validate and weigh all arguments against or in favour of financial 




Under normal circumstances, one would expect that public authorities, and thus 
financial supervisory authorities, should be treated in the same way as other 
defendants (Dicey, 1915). The general elements of negligence normally provide 
sufficient flexibility to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained between 
claimant and defendant (Bailey, 2006). Therefore, there needs to be a good reason for 
restricting financial supervisory liability.  
 
While multiple arguments could explain the rationale for limited financial supervisory 
liability, the fear of defensive conduct can probably be considered the most important. 
As the findings of this study suggest that this argument has less value than 
commentators tend to assume, we should be skeptical about the desirability of limiting 
financial supervisory liability based on this argument. Would this then also mean that 
governments who have adopted a rule of gross negligence and/or bad faith should 
start thinking about reforming their financial supervisory liability regimes? The main 
issue here is the existence of depositor guarantee schemes. These schemes shield, to a 
certain extent, financial supervisory authorities from liability as compensated victims 
will not have many incentives to sue them. As long as depositor guarantee schemes 
exist, the deterrent impact of third party financial supervisory liability is likely to 
remain weak regardless of the choice between  rules of negligence, gross negligence 
and/or bad faith.  
 
One could thus seriously doubt whether there is a noticeable difference in deterrence 
between the rules of negligence, gross negligence and/or bad faith. The empirical 
findings of this study seem to confirm this, as there were no significant differences 
between financial supervisors who perceive their organization’s liability as limited and 
those who do not. This would suggest that the choice of a rule of negligence, gross 
negligence and/or bad faith is, more or less, insignificant from a deterrence 
perspective.  
 
The question of whether or not to limit financial supervisory liability should therefore 
be answered on different grounds than deterrence. The answer should probably be 
sought in terms of optimal compensation and cost efficiency. In this perspective, the 
use of tort law is being restricted in favour of an alternative, more cost-efficient, 
compensation mechanism such as a deposit guarantee system. This line of reasoning 
could thus partly justify limited financial supervisory liability. However, more research 







Appendix 1: Overview of third party financial supervisory liability 
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Appendix 2: Third party financial supervisory liability regimes in 






Bad Faith Immunity Unknown









Czech Republic 1 CNB 3.7%
Denmark 1 DFSA 3.7%
Estonia 1 EFSA 3.7%
Finland 1 FIN-FSA 3.7%
AMF 1.9%
ACP 1.9%
Germany 1 BaFin 3.7%
BoG 1.9%
Hungary 1 HFSA 3.7%





Latvia 1 FKTK 3.7%
Lithuania 1 BoL 3.7%
CSSF 1.9%
CAA 1.9%


















Sweden 1 SFSA 3.7%
United Kingdom 1 FSA 3.7%
























Appendix 3: Third party financial supervisory liability regimes in 
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Czech Republic 10,532 CNB 2.1%
Denmark 5,560 DFSA 1.1%
Estonia 1,340 EFSA 0.3%
Finland 5,375 FIN-FSA 1.1%
AMF 6.5%
ACP 6.5%
Germany 81,751 BaFin 16.3%
BoG 1.1%
Hungary 9,986 HFSA 2.0%





Latvia 2,229 FKTK 0.4%
Lithuania 3,244 BoL 0.6%
CSSF 0.1%
CAA 0.1%


















Sweden 9,415 SFSA 1.9%
United Kingdom 62,435 FSA 12.4%
Total 502,479 48 23.6% 11.9% 27.8% 14.4% 17.9% 4.4%
Country






















Appendix 4: Third party financial supervisory liability regimes in  






Bad Faith Immunity Unknown









Czech Republic 145.0 CNB 1.2%
Denmark 234.0 DFSA 1.9%
Estonia 14.5 EFSA 0.1%
Finland 180.3 FIN-FSA 1.5%
AMF 7.9%
ACP 7.9%
Germany 2,498.8 BaFin 20.4%
BoG 0.9%
Hungary 98.4 HFSA 0.8%





Latvia 18.0 FKTK 0.1%
Lithuania 27.4 BoL 0.2%
CSSF 0.2%
CAA 0.2%


















Sweden 346.7 SFSA 2.8%
United Kingdom 1,696.6 FSA 13.8%
























Appendix 5: European survey on financial supervisory liability   
   
Part I: 
Question 1: In which country are you located? 
Question 2: To which organization do you belong? 
Question 3: What is your role in the organization? 
Question 4: How long have you worked for this organization? 
Question 5: In what category of financial supervision are you active? 
Question 6: Is it possible to hold your organization liable based on shortcoming in 
performing financial supervision? 
 
Part II:  
Question 7: Has your organization been held liable in the last 5 years? 
Question 8: How often has your organization been held liable in the last 5 years? 
Question 9: Who has held your organization liable? 
Question 10: How often has a court established liability and sentenced your organization to 
pay-out compensation for damages in the last five years? 
Question 11: Are there any limitations of financial supervisory liability regarding your 
organization, that you know off? 
Question 11a: Please describe what kind of limitations is (are) in place with a reference to 
specific legislation or case-law. 




Statement 2: Financial supervisory liability cases have changed our internal policies regarding 
the way we perform our supervisory tasks. 
Statement 2a: The changed internal policies improve the effectiveness of our financial 
supervision. 
Statement 2b: The purpose of the changed internal policies is to mitigate the risk of a future 
law suit. 
Statement 3: The existing threat of supervisory liability results in less supervisory activities 
than desired. 
Statement 4: Every supervisory decision has to be checked with our legal department (internal 
or external) before being announced or published. 
Statement 4a: The involvement of our legal department increases the quality of our financial 
supervision. 
Statement 4b: The involvement of our legal department prevents us from reacting fast when 
that is required. 
Statement 5: The existing liability regime has a positive impact on the quality of financial 
supervision. 
Statement 6: The existing liability threat results in more careful supervisory decisions. 
Statement 7: I don’t see any concrete impact of a threat of financial supervisory liability on 
the supervisory activities of my organization. 
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